The Iraqi constitution of 2005 grants freedom of religious thought, belief and practice for all religions. This study was also based on the premise that the constitutional rights are not adhered to in Iraq, even by government officials, which could be due to the absence of suitable legislations subsequent to the framing of the constitutional provisions. An analytical and descriptive research design was adopted for this study. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources through documentation research and evaluation of (...) historical sources. The primary data comprised Articles of the Iraqi constitution, and a few national and international legal instruments related to religious freedom. Secondary data included empirical research studies, books, articles and other published sources. This study therefore took the form of an empirical legal research as it involved the issues of constitutional reforms in the field of religious freedom. A comparative approach was adopted in analyzing the documents about religion and politics related to both the Arab region and the West. The focus was on the measures that should be adopted to advance the dialogues of religious freedom and maintain religious neutrality in all government policies. The study found out that there were apparent contradictions between the constitutional provisions and the State Laws. Similarly, the Iraqi civil and penal codes remain silent regarding legal remedies for the violation of constitutional provisions. (shrink)

The Yazidi community is one of the largest minority groups in Iraq, who have suffered the most. They have been subjected to marginalization and trauma for decades, which has not been documented adequately in the past. The study adopted a descriptive exploratory research to collect and investigate historical evidence regarding the marginalization and traumatic experience of the Yazidi minority in Iraq and explore whether the western secularism could be helpful in achieving restorative justice and rehabilitation. Through the study of available (...) data in interdisciplinary sources, an attempt was made to fill the literature gap. The current study perceived whether the western so-called secularism could be effective in bringing reconciliation of the Yazidi minority with the Government of Iraq and the KRG. The study also found out that the Yazidi community does not need a European-style revolutionary and atheistic secularism which does not recognize any social, religious or political affiliation in the name of democratic principles. What the Yazidi community needs is a region specific, US-led political-religious initiative, equipped with principles of non-violence, peaceful coexistence, justice, and accessibility to equal human rights and a shared vision along with the majority of the Iraqi population and recognition by the KRG, failing which the Yezidi will continue to be considering themselves as a separate ethnic group and represent as the failure of western secularism. (shrink)

This article describes a multilevel theoretical framework that examines the multiple causes of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting in the social environment of business. We argue that substantive and/or symbolic reporting flows from individual‐, aggregate‐, organizational‐, and institution‐level phenomena, and is thus a complex outcome of CSR and corporate social performance (CSP). Theoretical lenses range from reinforcement theory at the microlevel to legitimacy and stakeholder theories at the macrolevel, and include a discussion of the emergence of lower‐level CSR‐relevant characteristics to (...) higher level constructs. Our goal is to clarify how this behavior develops from microlevel, mesolevel, and macrolevel processes with a view toward assisting corporations to better enact CSR reporting, and their stakeholders to effectively promote substantive reporting behavior. (shrink)

The cultural characteristics of any country generally give shape to the educational system. However, no country can assert its own educational system to be wholly indigenous. All the systems come into being as a synthesis of various ingredients of the home country and other countries. And it is quite natural to make use of the experiences and stock of knowledge of the others. This fact is indispensable especially when education is concerned. The curicial problem is to what extent the “borrowing (...) process” should be used. When the process of borrowing ideas become to take the form of “imitation” or “copy”, unexpected results and failure are unavoidable. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop and refine the idea that understanding is a species of explanatory knowledge. Specifically, we defend the idea that S understands why p if and only if S knows that p, and, for some q, S’s true belief that q correctly explains p is produced/maintained by reliable explanatory evaluation. We then show how this model explains the reception of James Bjorken’s explanation of scaling by the broader physics community in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The (...) historical episode is interesting because Bjorken’s explanation initially did not provide understanding to other physicists, but was subsequently deemed intelligible when Feynman provided a physical interpretation that led to experimental tests that vindicated Bjorken’s model. Finally, we argue that other philosophical models of scientific understanding are best construed as limiting cases of our more general model. (shrink)

Controversial taboo appeals as an executional cue in viral advertising have commonly been used by advertisers. In this context, the study investigates the role of medium context on the effectiveness of controversial taboo ads. By implementing a tightly controlled experiment which deals with controversial taboo ads embedded in a press article and in a viral context, the study finds that the viral medium context does not lead to a more positive attitude toward the embedded brand or to more positive purchase (...) intentions. In addition, a viral medium context triggers ‘unintended consequences’ that lead consumers to undermine the level of tabooness of the viral advertising and subjective norms. To increase the external validity of the research, the results were replicated for two kinds of controversial taboo appeals; one related to sexuality, and the other to death. The results provide useful implications for theory and practice. Extending viral advertising research, a different angle on controversial viral advertising has been taken, shifting from an advertiser and brand focus, to a societal and social one. The work leads to a better understanding of the ethics of controversial viral advertising, and demonstrates its role in the trivialization of taboo behaviors and imagery. The results confirm the need for more regulation of online buzz communication and encourage regulatory bodies to extend policies of viral advertising regulation. (shrink)

From antiquity to the end of the twentieth century, philosophical discussions of understanding remained undeveloped, guided by a 'received view' that takes understanding to be nothing more than knowledge of an explanation. More recently, however, this received view has been criticized, and bold new philosophical proposals about understanding have emerged in its place. In this book, Kareem Khalifa argues that the received view should be revised but not abandoned. In doing so, he clarifies and answers the most central questions (...) in this burgeoning field of philosophical research: what kinds of cognitive abilities are involved in understanding? What is the relationship between the understanding that explanations provide and the understanding that experts have of broader subject matters? Can there be understanding without explanation? How can one understand something on the basis of falsehoods? Is understanding a species of knowledge? What is the value of understanding? (shrink)

Cause-related marketing, defined as a firm’s communication activities designed to promote a consumer good or service by including an offer to contribute a specified amount to a designated nonprofit cause, has become a preponderant practice. In tandem with the development of CrM activities, criticism of CrM has increased; critics note that some CrM claims mislead consumers regarding their purchases’ donative impact. Critics such as consumers and nonprofit advocates are using ad parodies, noncommercial messages that mimic an actual advertisement. In this (...) context, the study investigates how these ad parodies can result in a detrimental impact on consumers’ perceptual and behavioral evaluations of the sponsoring brand. By implementing a tightly controlled experiment comparing actual CrM campaigns and CrM parodies, the author shows that the detrimental effects of CrM parodies on brand attitude and word-of-mouth valence can be explained by greater skepticism toward the firm’s sincere and altruistic motivations. In addition, the author shows that a robust asymmetry emerges in which CrM ad parodies damage perceptual and behavioral evaluations of brands more than actual CrM campaigns improve them. The authors replicate the results for two kinds of critics and two types of brands. The results provide useful implications for theory and practice, documenting the backfire effect of poorly designed CrM, which may urge brands to move toward more self-regulation of CrM practices. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that a person is obligated to explain why p just in case she has a role-responsibility to answer the question “Why p?”. This entails that the normative force of explanatory obligations is fundamentally social. We contrast our view with other accounts of explanatory obligations or the so-called “need for explanation,” in which the aforementioned normative force is epistemic, determined by an inquirer's interests, or a combination thereof. We argue that our account outperforms these alternatives.

Many humanists and social scientists argue—if not assume—that race's centrality in social-scientific research provides an empirical justification for its reality as a constructed kind. In this paper, we first regiment these arguments, and then show that they face significant challenges. Specifically, race-concepts' social-scientific success is compatible with race being neither constructed nor real.

The ontology of race is often seen as answering two central questions. First, do races exist? Second, if races do exist, then what are they? Consequently, determining the best methods for answering these questions falls within the metaontology of race. Within the ontology of race, it is common to select a privileged representation of race in order to draw ontological lessons. While ontological lessons are direct answers to the ontological questions raised above, privileged representations are the basis for inferring those (...) lessons. Using the Office of Management and Budget’s racial classification as an illustration, we argue that certain social-scientific methods are better than mainstream methods at ruling out just-so stories about race, and therefore outperform more mainstream philosophical methods in determining which representations of race should be privileged. In defending this position, we also argue that the widespread philosophical practice of sharply distinguishing social-scientific from ordinary-language conceptions of race is unmotivated. (shrink)

The underconsideration argument against inference to the best explanation and scientific realism holds that scientists are not warranted in inferring that the best theory is true, because scientists only ever conceive of a small handful of theories at one time, and as a result, they may not have considered a true theory. However, antirealists have not developed a detailed alternative account of why explanatory inference nevertheless appears so central to scientific practice. In this paper, I provide new defences against some (...) recent objections to the underconsideration argument, while also developing an account of explanatory inference that both survives these criticisms and does not entail realism. (shrink)

Because idealizations frequently advance scientific understanding, many claim that falsehoods play an epistemic role. In this paper, we argue that these positions greatly overstate idealiza...

Tefvîz meselesi ictihada başvurmaksızın ilkten hüküm koyma esasına dayanan girift bir meseledir. Şer’î ahkâmın kaynağı ya vahiy veya vahyin ışığında ictihaddır. Tefvîzde ise hüküm herhangi bir vahiy veya ictihada dayanmayıp, Allah tarafından daha önce verilen yetkiye dayanmaktadır. Tefvîzde ilkten ve re’sen bir hüküm koyma söz konusudur. Usulcüler arasında böyle bir yetkinin imkanı tartışılmış, mesele etrafında kabul ve red şeklinde temel iki görüş ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu ihtilafın temelinde hüsün ve kubuh etrafındaki kelamî tartışmaların önemli rol oynadığı anlaşılmaktadır. Tefvîzi kabul eden usulcüler (...) kendi içerisinde aklen cevaz verenler; hem aklen hem de fiilen mümkün görenler şeklinde ayrışmışlardır. Kabul eden usulcüler detayda da ihtilaf etmişler kimi usulcüler tefvîze peygamber, müctehid/âlim ve hatta âmmî bakımından cevaz verirken, kimisi sadece peygamber bakımından, kimisi hem peygamber hem de müctehidler bakımından cevazına hükmetmişlerdir. Çoğunluğu Mu‘tezile mensubu olan usulcüler ise ne aklen ne de fiilen gerçekleşmesini mümkün görmemişlerdir. Hem aklen hem de fiilen cevaz veren ve tefvîzi peygamber ve âlimlere teşmil eden usulcüler arasında Mu’tezilî âlim Müveys b. İmrân’ın adının ön plana çıktığı görülmektedir. İmam Şâfiî ve Şâfiî usulcüler de aynı grup içerisinde yer almış olmakla birlikte özellikle İmam Şâfiî’nin görüşü noktasında net bilgiler sunulamamıştır. Hem aklen hem de fiilen gerçekleştiğini kabul eden usulcüler görüşlerini aklî ve sem’î delillerle temellendirmeye çalışmışlardır Tefvîze cevaz veren usulcüler ayrıca tefvîzi şer’î hükmün kaynaklarından biri olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Tefvîze cevaz vermeyen ve çoğunluğunu fukahâ/Hanefî metoduna mensup alimlerin oluşturduğu usulcüler ise şer’î hüküm kaynaklarının vahiy ve ictihad olduğuna vurgu yaparak peygamber de olsa bunların dışında başka bir teşrî’ kaynağı bulunamayacağını iddia etmişler, onlar da iddiaların aklî ve naklî delillerle gerekçelendirmeye çalışmışlardır. Şîî usulcüler arasında tefvîzi temelden reddedenler olduğu gibi kabul ve red şeklinde sünnî usulcülerle benzer yaklaşımlar sergileyen alimler de bulunmaktadır. Bazı aşırı Şîa fırkaları arasında tekvînî tefvîz denen bir anlayış da bulunmaktadır. Bu anlayışa göre âlemin yaratılması, idare edilmesi, öldürme, diriltme, rızık verme, âhirette ceza ve mükâfat verme gibi hususlar Allah tarafından Hz. Peygamber, Hz. Ali ve imamlara havale edilmiştir. Fakat bu anlayış mutedil Şîa alimleri tarafından şiddetle reddedilerek bunu savunanların küfrüne hükmedilmiştir. Kimi usulcülerin ictihadla tefvîzi birbirine karıştırdıkları veya en azından tefvîzi de ictihad kapsamında gördükleri anlaşılmaktadır. Oysaki tefvîzin en temel özelliklerinden biri ictihada başvurmadan hüküm vermektir. Dolayısıyla böyle bir yaklaşım isabetli gözükmemektedir. (shrink)

This article discusses continuities and changes of educational institutions during the political transition from the Seljuq dynasty to the Ottoman sultanate. It diachronically examines elements of education which were transformed and adapted into a new political structure under the political regime, the Ottoman. This article will closely look at institutional transformation and educational curricula as to which the changing political regime affected contents and management of Islamic education. This article further argues that the political transformation from the Seljuq to the (...) Ottoman had generated a new educational system in which the Ottoman imposed the attempts to integrate Islam and modern sciences. At managerial level, the transformation has also invited the introduction of science in Islamic educational system. Western educational system reserved as an important reference for this transformation amid the changing regime from the Seljuq to the Ottoman. (shrink)

The outburst of the fourth Industrial Revolution had a significant impact on many aspects of life. The discovery of new technologies in medicine has resulted in innovations: organ transplants. The introduction of three-dimensional (3D) organ printing technology promises improvements to the field. Organs such as the liver, kidneys, heart and others are printed to meet the needs of the actual organs. However, the production of prototype organs to replace the original organs is associated with the issue of changing the creation (...) of Allah. Accordingly, this study will analyse the issue of changing the creation of God in three-dimensional (3D) organ printing technology according to the perspective of Islamic law. Several appropriate methodologies in Islamic law (usul fiqh) are used such as legal reasoning through maqasid shariah perspective and analogical reasoning. The result shows that three-dimensional (3D) organ printing technology falls under the permissible category of changing the creation of Allah because it can save human lives. The production of organs through 3D printing involving changes included in the category of necessity (daruri) and need (hajiy) is permissible, but the category of desirable (tahsini) requires further specifications. (shrink)

In this essay, I provide normative guidelines for developing a philosophically interesting and plausible version of social constructivism as a philosophy of science, wherein science aims for social-epistemic values rather than for truth or empirical adequacy. This view is more plausible than the more radical constructivist claim that scientific facts are constructed. It is also more interesting than the modest constructivist claim that representations of such facts emerge in social contexts, as it provides a genuine rival to the scientific axiologies (...) of scientific realists and constructive empiricists. I further contrast my view with positions holding that the aims of science are context dependent, that the unit of normative analysis is the scientific community, and that the aims of science are non-epistemic social values. (shrink)

We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechanist and autonomist programs by highlighting when and where topological explanations are mechanistic. Third, we defend this view against some powerful mechanist objections. (...) We conclude from this that topological explanations are autonomous from their mechanistic counterparts. (shrink)

Recently, several authors have argued that scientific understanding should be a new topic of philosophical research. In this article, I argue that the three most developed accounts of understanding--Grimm's, de Regt's, and de Regt and Dieks's--can be replaced by earlier accounts of scientific explanation without loss. Indeed, in some cases, such replacements have clear benefits.

Peter Lipton has argued that understanding can exist in the absence of explanation. We argue that this does not denigrate explanation's importance to understanding. Specifically, we show that all of Lipton's examples are consistent with the idea that explanation is the ideal of understanding, i.e. other modes of understanding ought to be assessed by how well they replicate the understanding provided by a good and correct explanation. We defend this idea by showing that for all of Lipton's examples of non-explanatory (...) understanding of why p , there exists a correct and reasonably good explanation that would provide greater understanding of p. (shrink)

Recently, it has been debated as to whether understanding is a species of explanatory knowledge. Those who deny this claim frequently argue that understanding, unlike knowledge, can be lucky. In this paper I argue that current arguments do not support this alleged compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck. First, I argue that understanding requires reliable explanatory evaluation, yet the putative examples of lucky understanding underspecify the extent to which subjects possess this ability. In the course of defending this claim, I (...) also provide a new account of the kind of ‘grasping’ taken to be central to understanding. Second, I show that putative examples of lucky understanding unwittingly deploy a kind of luck that is compatible with knowledge. Finally, appealing to a number of works on explanation and its attendant epistemology, I argue that alleged instances of lucky understanding that overcome these two obstacles will invariably violate certain norms of explanatory inquiry – our paradigmatic understanding-oriented practice. By contrast, knowledge of the same information is immune to these criticisms. Consequently, if understanding is environmentally lucky, it is always inferior to the understanding that a corresponding case of knowledge would provide. (shrink)

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.

Several argue that truth cannot be science’s sole epistemic goal, for it would fail to do justice to several scientific practices that advance understanding. I challenge these arguments, but only after making a small concession: science’s sole epistemic goal is not truth as such; rather, its goal is finding true answers to relevant questions. Using examples from the natural and social sciences, I then show that scientific understanding’s epistemically valuable features are either true answers to relevant questions or a means (...) thereof. (shrink)

This book fills the gap between theories and practices of corporate governance in emerging markets by providing the reader with an in-depth understanding of governance mechanisms, practices and cases in these markets. It is an invaluable resource not only for academic researchers and graduate students in law, economics, management and finance, but also for people practicing governance such as lawmakers, policymakers and international organizations promoting best governance practices in emerging countries. Investors can benefit from this book to better understand of (...) these markets and to make judicious investment decisions. (shrink)

Identity and culture as the main concepts of INPE '94 were analyzed from philosophical perspectives that questioned their implications for our era of globalization. The formation of identities in a cultural context and their relationships with education gave focus to discussion. In other words, the effects of culture upon the individual and the role of education in strengthening or degrading these effects afforded the main concerns of our topical group.

Among epistemologists, it is common to assume that insofar as coherence bears on the justification of belief, the only relevant coherence relations are those _within_ an individual subject’s web of beliefs. After clarifying this view and exploring some plausible motivations for it, we argue that this individualistic account of the epistemic relevance of coherence fails to account for central facets of scientific practice. In its place we propose a social account of coherence. According to the view we propose, a scientist (...) _S_’s belief that _p_ is _prima facie_ unjustified if this belief negatively coheres with justified scientific claims in her scientific community. This account of coherence yields an epistemology for scientific belief which, we argue, has all of the benefits and none of the liabilities of its more individualistic predecessor. (shrink)

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010 ) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along (...) several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs! (shrink)

Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1Introduction2Change-Relating Monism's Three Problems3Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together4Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism4.1High-grade necessity4.2Unity in diversity5Conclusion.

This essay presents a fully inferentialist-expressivist account of scientific representation. In general, inferentialist approaches to scientific representation argue that the capacity of a model to represent a target system depends on inferences from models to target systems. Inferentialism is attractive because it makes the epistemic function of models central to their representational capacity. Prior inferentialist approaches to scientific representation, however, have depended on some representational element, such as denotation or representational force. Brandom’s Making It Explicit provides a model of how (...) to fully discharge such representational vocabulary, but it cannot be applied directly to scientific representations. Pursuing a strategy parallel to Brandom’s, this essay begins with an account of how surrogative inference is justified. Scientific representation and the denotation of model elements are then explained in terms of surrogative inference by treating scientific representation and denotation as expressive, analogous to Brandom’s account of truth. The result is a thoroughgoing inferentialism: M is a scientific representation of T if and only if M has scientifically justified surrogative consequences that are answers to questions about T. (shrink)

We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.

Explanation is asymmetric: if A explains B, then B does not explain A. Tradition- ally, the asymmetry of explanation was thought to favor causal accounts of explanation over their rivals, such as those that take explanations to be inferences. In this paper, we develop a new inferential approach to explanation that outperforms causal approaches in accounting for the asymmetry of explanation.

Epistemologists have recently debated whether understanding is a species of knowledge. However, because they have offered little in the way of a detailed analysis of understanding, they lack the resources to resolve this issue. In this paper, I propose that S understands why p if and only if S has the non-Gettierised true belief that p, and for some proposition q, S has the non-Gettierised true belief that q is the best available explanation of p, S can correctly explain p (...) with q, and S can identify the features that make q the best explanation of p. On this analysis, understanding is reducible to knowing that p and that q is the best available explanation of p. (shrink)

Many have argued that the human sciences feature a unique form of understanding that is absent from the natural sciences. However, in the last decade or so, epistemologists and philosop...

Is discomfort intrinsic to wonder? The author pursues this question by showing how early visitors to the Niagara Falls found that efforts to improve the view eliminated the difficulty that made viewing the falls rewarding in the first place. Visitors’ experiences accord with eighteenth-century accounts that suggest that wonder thrives on difficulty and desire thrives on inaccessibility. This aesthetic effect finds expression in The Arabian Nights and other texts that both represent and enact narrative withholding, and also in the visual (...) form of the arabesque, which beguiles the eye with movement but does not go anywhere. The essay concludes by connecting these insights into aesthetic difficulty to present-day concerns that attempts to bring the humanities to a broader audience may “dumb down” art. I conclude that such concerns miss the point that aesthetic experiences depend upon a tension between legibility and illegibility that artworks continue to generate in new and unforeseen ways. (shrink)

I reply to Henk de Regt's "Can Scientific Understanding be Reduced to Knowledge?," which appears in the same volume.

We present a novel kind of “socio-functional” foundationalism rooted in the division of scientific labor. Our foundationalism is social in that it involves a socio-epistemic phenomenon we dub epistemic outsourcing, whereby claims from one group of scientists provide epistemological foundations for another group of scientists. We argue that: (1) epistemic outsourcing results in a legitimate form of epistemic foundationalism, (2) this sort of foundationalism can be used to shed light on the epistemology of measurement; and (3) epistemic outsourcing is a (...) distinctively collective epistemic phenomenon. (shrink)

Many epistemologists take Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) to be “fundamental.” For instance, Lycan (1988, 128) writes that “all justified reasoning is fundamentally explanatory reasoning.” Conee and Feldman (2008, 97) concur: “fundamental epistemic principles are principles of best explanation.” Call them fundamentalists. They assert that nothing deeper could justify IBE, as is typically assumed of rules of deductive inference, such as modus ponens. However, logicians account for modus ponens with the valuation rule for the material conditional. By contrast, fundamentalists (...) account for IBE with an ill-defined set of relations that happen to furnish their favorite set of inductive inferences. To our eye, this seems a little too convenient—there is too much room for ad hoc, just-so stories about the “striking” correspondence between our explanatory and inductive practices. We will argue that the (explanatory) pluralism adopted by the leading theorists of the best explanation—philosophers of science—undermines fundamentalism. Section 1 clarifies fundamentalism’s key tenets. Section 2 presents pluralism’s challenge to fundamentalism. Section 3 considers a potential fundamentalist reply to this challenge. Sections 4 through 6 canvass the leading candidates for developing this fundamentalist reply, showing each to be unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Several authors suggest that understanding and epistemic coherence are tightly connected. Using an account of understanding that makes no appeal to coherence, I explain away the intuitions that motivate this position. I then show that the leading coherentist epistemologies only place plausible constraints on understanding insofar as they replicate my own account’s requirements. I conclude that understanding is only superficially coherent.

1- The first period of human life in prehistoric times was known as the period of food gathering economy, as it depended on gathering wild plants and hunting animals, and made simple tools and machines from stones and animal bones that were used in hunting, and used tree leaves and animal skins to make clothes. As for the second period, the Neolithic era, it was known as the period of food production economy when he learned agriculture and domesticated animals. Agriculture (...) was initially described as meeting the need and was cultivated in small areas and in one season. 2- When he learned the life of stability and lived in permanent villages, the oldest of which is the village of Jarmo, many tools were found made of flint, stone vessels, spoons and pottery. In addition, the village contained permanent houses and clay ovens for making bread, fireplaces, basins, stoves and clay dolls. 3- Domesticating animals, especially goats, sheep and pigs, benefiting from their meat, cheese, skins and fat to make oils, and domesticating dogs. 4- The most important crops that he cultivated were wheat and barley, and later in other areas he cultivated lentils, flax and legumes. 5- In the Stone Age, he learned fertilization and artificial irrigation. He cultivated large areas and had a surplus in production, which prompted him to make large-sized stores to store the surplus, noting that the stores had existed since the era of Hassouna, but they were small. He also learned trade and the barter system and the discovery of metals. Specialization in work and division of labor appeared, and other crafts and professions appeared. The pottery wheel, spinning and weaving discs, and seals were invented. 6- Wool and hair of sheep and goats and some plants such as flax were used to make clothes using spinning discs. 7- Many pottery vessels of different sizes and shapes were found, and they contained drawings, decorations, engravings, and colors of great precision, some of which were made by hand and others with a pottery wheel. Tools and machines were made of copper. 8- Moving to the south and the emergence of large cities, carrying out irrigation projects, and the emergence of the first systems of government. 9- A change and development occurred in the human mind, benefiting from the natural environment and the wealth it contains that could serve him as a result of the development of social, cultural and economic life. 10- Plant cultivation and domestication were coupled with animal husbandry and domestication, as both complement each other in terms of benefit. Because of them, other crafts and professions emerged, including the manufacture of tools and machines, pottery and weaving. Trade also flourished as a result of an increase in the surplus and the increase in labor. 11- Learning how to extract oils and methods of obtaining them from plants and animals which was of great importance because it had multiple uses, especially in cooking, and the demand for it increased in trade. 12- Plant and animal wealth played an important role in its prosperity and economic recovery, as it represented the backbone of the economy of Mesopotamia. 13- Our information about animals and plants came from cuneiform texts and seals that show scenes of hunting animals, scenes of grazing sheep, scenes of ears of wheat and plants, and from murals on the walls of palaces, scenes of barns designated for raising animals, scenes of relief and three-dimensional sculptures that show domesticated domesticated animals, and scenes of hunting predatory animals. (shrink)

Criticism is a staple of the scientific enterprise and of the social epistemology of science. Philosophical discussions of criticism have traditionally focused on its roles in relation to objectivity, confirmation, and theory choice. However, attention to criticism and to criticizability should also inform our thinking about scientific pursuits: the allocation of resources with the aim of developing scientific tools and ideas. In this paper, we offer an account of scientific pursuitworthiness which takes criticizability as its starting point. We call this (...) the apokritic model of pursuit. Its core ideas are that pursuits are practices governed by norms for asking and answering questions, and that criticism arises from the breach of these norms. We illustrate and advertise our approach using examples from institutional grant review, neuroscience, and sociology. We show that the apokritic model can unify several indices of criticizability, that it can account for the importance of criticizing pursuits in scientific practice, and that it can offer ameliorative advice to erstwhile pursuers. (shrink)