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  1. The Psychology of Vagueness: Borderline Cases and Contradictions.Sam Alxatib & Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):287-326.
    In an interesting experimental study, Bonini et al. (1999) present partial support for truth-gap theories of vagueness. We say this despite their claim to find theoretical and empirical reasons to dismiss gap theories and despite the fact that they favor an alternative, epistemic account, which they call ‘vagueness as ignorance’. We present yet more experimental evidence that supports gap theories, and argue for a semantic/pragmatic alternative that unifies the gappy supervaluationary approach together with its glutty relative, the subvaluationary approach.
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  2. Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros Et Al. [REVIEW]Sam Alxatib, Peter Pagin & Uli Sauerland - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):619-634.
    Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction (...)
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    Actuality Entailments and Free Choice.Sam Alxatib - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (4):701-720.
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    Only, or, and Free Choice Presuppositions.Sam Alxatib - 2020 - Natural Language Semantics 28 (4):395-429.
    Bar-Lev and Fox, B-L&F, redefine the exhaustification operator, Exh, so that it negates innocently excludable alternatives and asserts innocently includable ones. They similarly redefine the exclusive particle only so that it negates IE-alternatives and presupposes II ones. B-L&F justify their revision of only on the basis of Alxatib’s finding that only presupposes free choice in cases like Kim was only allowed to eat soup or salad. I show challenges to B-L&F’s view of only and argue against extending II to its (...)
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