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Sam Coleman [17]Samuel J. Coleman [1]Samuel Coleman [1]
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Profile: Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire, University of London)
  1. There Is No Argument That the Mind Extends.Sam Coleman - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):100-108.
    There is no Argument that the Mind Extends On the basis of two argumentative examples plus their 'parity principle', Clark and Chalmers argue that mental states like beliefs can extend into the environment. I raise two problems for the argument. The first problem is that it is more difficult than Clark and Chalmers think to set up the Tetris example so that application of the parity principle might render it a case of extended mind. The second problem is that, even (...)
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  2. Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten.Sam Coleman - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
    According to the knowledge argument, physicalism fails because when physically omniscient Mary first sees red, her gain in phenomenal knowledge involves a gain in factual knowledge. Thus not all facts are physical facts. According to the ability hypothesis, the knowledge argument fails because Mary only acquires abilities to imagine, remember and recognise redness, and not new factual knowledge. I argue that reducing Mary’s new knowledge to abilities does not affect the issue of whether she also learns factually: I show that (...)
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  3. The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence.Sam Coleman - 2013 - Erkenntnis (1):1-26.
    Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to (...)
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  4. Mental Chemistry: Combination for Panpsychists.Sam Coleman - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):137-166.
    Panpsychism, an increasingly popular competitor to physicalism as a theory of mind, faces a famous difficulty, the ‘combination problem’. This is the difficulty of understanding the composition of a conscious mind by parts (the ultimates) which are themselves taken to be phenomenally qualitied. I examine the combination problem, and I attempt to solve it. There are a few distinct difficulties under the banner of ‘the combination problem’, and not all of them need worry panpsychists. After homing in on the genuine (...)
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  5.  89
    Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - forthcoming - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  6. Mind Under Matter.Sam Coleman - 2009 - In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Benjamins.
    Panpsychism is an eminently sensible view of the world and its relation to mind. If God is a metaphysician, and regardless of the actual truth or falsity of panpsychism, it is certain that he regards the theory as an honest and elegant competitor on the field of ontologies. And if God didn’t create a panpsychist world, then there’s a fair chance that he wishes he had done so, or will do next time around. The difficulties panpsychism faces, then, are not (...)
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  7.  44
    Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
    Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. This theory relies (...)
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  8. Chalmers's Master Argument and Type Bb Physicalism.Sam Coleman - manuscript
    Chalmers has provided a dilemmatic master argument against all forms of the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper explores a position that evades Chalmers's argument, dubbed Type Bb: it is for Type B physicalists who embrace horn b of Chalmers's dilemma. The discussion concludes that Chalmers fails to show any incoherence in the position of a Type B physicalist who depends on the phenomenal concept strategy.
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  9. Review of Michael Tye's Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW]Sam Coleman - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (3):413-418.
    Reading Tye’s new book reminded me of slowly sipping a good specimen of a dry vodka Martini. In both cases much is accomplished by the skilful assembly of only a few key ingredients. I don’t really like dry vodka Martinis, though, and similarly I found many of the thoughts offered by Consciousness Revisited to be too bitter to swallow. A sophisticated piece of work, however, it certainly is.
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  10. Being Realistic - Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism.Sam Coleman - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.
    In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin (...)
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  11.  57
    Consciousness and The Prospects of Physicalism. [REVIEW]Coleman Sam - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):824-827.
  12.  77
    Review of 'The Mental as Fundamental' Ed. Michael Blamauer. [REVIEW]Sam Coleman - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  13.  57
    Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism.Sam Coleman - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):133-136.
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  14.  38
    Preamble.Allison Barnes, Cara Spencer, Gavin B. Sullivan & Sam Coleman - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):815 – 833.
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    Review of Daniel N. Robinson, Consciousness and Mental Life[REVIEW]Sam Coleman - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).
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  16.  2
    A Cross-National Comparison of the Relative Influence of Male and Female Age on the Frequency of Marital Intercourse.J. Richard Udry, Fred R. Deven & Samuel J. Coleman - 1982 - Journal of Biosocial Science 14 (1):1.
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  17. Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness.Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    What are phenomenal qualities, the qualities of conscious experiences? Are phenomenal qualities subjective, belonging to inner mental episodes of some kind, or should they be seen as objective, belonging in some way to the physical things in the world around us? Are they physical properties at all? And to what extent do experiences represent the things around us, or the states of our own bodies? Fourteen original papers, written by a team of distinguished philosophers and psychologists, explore the ways in (...)
     
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  18. Reviews: Reviews. [REVIEW]Sam Coleman - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (3):413-418.
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