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Sanford C. Goldberg [66]Sanford Charles Goldberg [1]
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Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
  1. Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world.
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  2.  7
    To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Sandford C. Goldberg puts forward a theory of epistemic normativity that is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. This theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself.
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  3. Should Have Known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.
    In this paper I will be arguing that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. My argument for this result will involve making two claims. The uncontroversial claim is this: S should have known that p when another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, the satisfaction of these expectations would require that (...)
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  4. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Sanford C. Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic (...)
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  5.  75
    What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4407-4423.
    The aim of this paper is to articulate and defend a particular role for ethico-political values in social epistemology research. I begin by describing a research programme in social epistemology—one which I have introduced and defended elsewhere. I go on to argue that by the lights of this research programme, there is an important role to be played by ethico-political values in knowledge communities, and an important role in social epistemological research in describing the values inhering in particular knowledge communities. (...)
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  6.  10
    Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Oxford University Press.
    Sanford C. Goldberg explores the source, nature, and scope of the normative expectations we have of one another as we engage in conversation. He examines two fundamental types of expectation -- epistemic and interpersonal -- that are generated by the performance of speech acts themselves.
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  7. Reliabilism in Philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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  8. Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 127--44.
     
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  9. Epistemic Extendedness, Testimony, and the Epistemology of Instrument-Based Belief.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):181 - 197.
    In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argue that a crucial (...)
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  10.  27
    What Epistemologists of Testimony Should Learn From Philosophers of Science.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12541-12559.
    The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.
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  11. Interpersonal Epistemic Entitlements.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):159-183.
    In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology (...)
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  12.  65
    Epistemically Engineered Environments.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2783-2802.
    In other work I have defended the claim that, when we rely on other speakers by accepting what they tell us, our reliance on them differs in epistemically relevant ways from our reliance on instruments, when we rely on them by accepting what they “tell” us. However, where I have explored the former sort of reliance at great length, I have not done so with the latter. In this paper my aim is to do so. My key notions will be (...)
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  13. On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):449-470.
    Elsewhere I and others have argued that evidence one should have had can bear on the justification of one's belief, in the form of defeating one's justification. In this paper, I am interested in knowing how evidence one should have had (on the one hand) and one's higher-order evidence (on the other) interact in determinations of the justification of belief. In doing so I aim to address two types of scenario that previous discussions have left open. In one type of (...)
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  14. Recent Work on Assertion.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):365-380.
    This paper reviews recent philosophical work on assertion, with a special focus on work exploring the theme of assertion's norm. It concludes with a brief section characterizing several open questions that might profitably be explored from this perspective.
     
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  15.  88
    Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.
    Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first (building on a point made in Lackey (2005)) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children (whose cognitive immaturity prevents them from having or appreciating reasons) cannot be said to satisfy the No-Defeaters condition on knowledge. The second is the extension challenge, (...)
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  16.  9
    Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays.Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, (...)
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  17. The Brain in a Vat.Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    The scenario of the brain in a vat, first aired thirty-five years ago in Hilary Putnam's classic paper, has been deeply influential in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. This collection of new essays examines the scenario and its philosophical ramifications and applications, as well as the challenges which it has faced. The essays review historical applications of the brain-in-a-vat scenario and consider its impact on contemporary debates. They explore a diverse range of philosophical issues, from intentionality, external-world (...)
     
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  18.  17
    Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages.Alessandro Capone, Una Stojnic, Ernie Lepore, Denis Delfitto, Anne Reboul, Gaetano Fiorin, Kenneth A. Taylor, Jonathan Berg, Herbert L. Colston, Sanford C. Goldberg, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri, Cliff Goddard, Anna Wierzbicka, Magdalena Sztencel, Sarah E. Duffy, Alessandra Falzone, Paola Pennisi, Péter Furkó, András Kertész, Ágnes Abuczki, Alessandra Giorgi, Sona Haroutyunian, Marina Folescu, Hiroko Itakura, John C. Wakefield, Hung Yuk Lee, Sumiyo Nishiguchi, Brian E. Butler, Douglas Robinson, Kobie van Krieken, José Sanders, Grazia Basile, Antonino Bucca, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri & Kobie van Krieken (eds.) - 2019 - Springer Verlag.
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  19.  96
    The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999).
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  20. Self‐Ascription, Self‐Knowledge, and the Memory Argument.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):211-219.
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  21. Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: The Case of Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
  22.  46
    Anti‐Reductionism and Expected Trust.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):952-970.
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  23.  23
    Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited1.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1-36.
    Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first ) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children cannot be said to satisfy the No‐Defeaters condition on knowledge. The second is the extension challenge, which is to give a motivated, extensionally‐adequate account of the conditions on testimonial knowledge in early childhood. (...)
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  24.  53
    II- Arrogance, Silence, and Silencing.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):93-112.
    Alessandra Tanesini’s insightful paper explores the moral and epistemic harms of arrogance, particularly in conversation. Of special interest to her is the phenomenon of arrogance-induced silencing, whereby one speaker’s arrogance either prevents another from speaking altogether or else undermines her capacity to produce certain speech acts such as assertions. I am broadly sympathetic to many of Tanesini’s claims about the harms associated with this sort of silencing. In this paper I propose to address what I see as a lacuna in (...)
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  25.  90
    Anonymous Assertions.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):135-151.
    This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the (...)
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  26. Testimonially Based Knowledge From False Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):512-526.
    Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
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  27. Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):178-203.
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...)
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  28. Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability1.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301-314.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps (...)
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  29.  99
    Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agent's Conception?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):597-621.
  30. Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW]Sanford C. Goldberg - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51 - 79.
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that (...)
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  31.  71
    Can Asserting That P Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):157-170.
    In this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this possibility may go some distance towards explaining several aspects of our (...)
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  32. Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...)
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  33.  38
    Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    In their chapter “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes,” Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne present several challenges to the doctrine of pragmatic encroachment. In this brief reply to their chapter two things are aimed at. First, the chapter argues that there is a sense in which their case against pragmatic encroachment is a bit weaker, and another sense in which that case is much stronger, than Anderson and Hawthorne’s own argument would suggest. Second, the chapter highlights and then builds upon their (...)
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  34. The Asymmetry Thesis and the Doctrine of Normative Defeat.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):339-352.
    It is widely considered a truism that the only evidence that can provide justification for one's belief that p is evidence in one's possession. At the same time, a good many epistemologists accept another claim seemingly in tension with this "truism," to the effect that evidence not in one's possession can defeat or undermine the justification for one's belief that p. Anyone who accepts both of these claims accepts what I will call the asymmetry thesis: while evidence in one's possession (...)
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  35.  33
    What Do You Know When You Know Your Own Thoughts?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
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  36.  86
    Inclusiveness in the Face of Anticipated Disagreement.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1189-1207.
    This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this will depend in part on the correct account of the epistemic (...)
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  37. The Epistemology of Silence.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 243--261.
     
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  38. Testimony as Evidence.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Philosophica 78.
    Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
     
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  39.  57
    (Nonstandard) Lessons From World-Switching Cases.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):85-131.
  40.  54
    Telling and the Reasons of Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):708-714.
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  41. On Our Alleged A Priori Knowledge That Water Exists.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):38-41.
  42.  8
    Brown on infallibilism’s problem with testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    In this review I focus on one of Brown’s arguments against infallibilism. While Brown argues that the infallibilist cannot vindicate testimonial knowledge, I argue that her case makes assumptions that the infallibilist should reject. The upshot is two-fold: this criticism of infallibilism does not succeed, and certain assumptions about testimonial knowledge should be rejected by the fallibilist and the infallibilist alike.
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  43.  72
    The Metasemantics of Memory.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):95-107.
    In Sven Bernecker’s excellent new book, Memory, he proposes an account of what we might call the “metasemantics” of memory: the conditions that determine the contents of the mental representations employed in memory. Bernecker endorses a “pastist externalist” view, according to which the content of a memory-constituting representation is fixed, in part, by the “external” conditions prevalent at the time of the tokening of the original representation. Bernecker argues that the best version of a pastist externalism about memory contents will (...)
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  44.  12
    Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):537-558.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that there are possible cases in which the demands of justice and the norms of epistemology cannot be simultaneously satisfied. I will bring out these normative clashes in terms of the now-familiar phenomenon of testimonial injustice. While the resulting argument is very much in the spirit of two other sorts of argument that have received sustained attention recently – arguments alleging epistemic partiality in friendship, and arguments that motivate the hypothesis of moral encroachment on (...)
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  45.  46
    Epistemic Justification Revisited.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):1-16.
    In his Beyond Justification, Bill Alston argued that there is no single property picked out by ‘epistemic justification,’ and that instead epistemological theory should investigate the range of epistemic desiderata that beliefs may enjoy. In this paper I argue that none of his arguments taken singly, nor the collection as a group, gives us a reason to abandon the traditional idea that there is a property of epistemic justification. I conclude by suggesting how Alston’s proposal to investigate the variety of (...)
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  46.  42
    The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):118-138.
    Many people agree that a proper epistemological treatment of testimonial knowledge will regard testimonial warrant—the total truth-conducive support enjoyed by a belief grounded on a piece of testimony —as socially diffuse, in the sense that it is not something that supervenes on the proper functionality of the hearer’s cognitive resources together with the reasons she has for accepting the testimony. After arguing for such a view, I go on to identify a challenge many people think flows from an acknowledgment of (...)
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  47.  94
    Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Knowledge of Content: Reply to Brueckner.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):212-217.
  48.  24
    The Promise and Pitfalls of Online ‘Conversations’.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:177-193.
    Good conversations are one of the great joys of life. Online ‘conversations’ rarely seem to make the grade. In this paper I use some tools from philosophy in an attempt to illuminate what might be going wrong.
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  49.  65
    The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (4):515-529.
    Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some (...)
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  50. The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):165 - 199.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), (...)
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