8 found
Order:
  1.  34
    Logic, Probability, and Human Reasoning.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Sangeet S. Khemlani & Geoffrey P. Goodwin - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):201-214.
  2.  22
    Facts and Possibilities: A Model‐Based Theory of Sentential Reasoning.Sangeet S. Khemlani, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Philip N. Johnson‐Laird - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (6):1887-1924.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3.  32
    Naive Probability: Model‐Based Estimates of Unique Events.Sangeet S. Khemlani, Max Lotstein & Philip N. Johnson-Laird - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (6):1216-1258.
    We describe a dual-process theory of how individuals estimate the probabilities of unique events, such as Hillary Clinton becoming U.S. President. It postulates that uncertainty is a guide to improbability. In its computer implementation, an intuitive system 1 simulates evidence in mental models and forms analog non-numerical representations of the magnitude of degrees of belief. This system has minimal computational power and combines evidence using a small repertoire of primitive operations. It resolves the uncertainty of divergent evidence for single events, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4.  26
    Response to Baratgin Et Al.: Mental Models Integrate Probability and Deduction.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Sangeet S. Khemlani & Geoffrey P. Goodwin - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (10):548-549.
  5.  13
    Episodes, Events, and Models.Sangeet S. Khemlani, Anthony M. Harrison & J. Gregory Trafton - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  6.  19
    Illusions in Reasoning.Sangeet S. Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):11-35.
    Some philosophers argue that the principles of human reasoning are impeccable, and that mistakes are no more than momentary lapses in “information processing”. This article makes a case to the contrary. It shows that human reasoners commit systematic fallacies. The theory of mental models predicts these errors. It postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities to which the premises of an inference refer. But, their models usually represent what is true in a possibility, not what is false. This (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  44
    Determinants of Cognitive Variability.Sangeet S. Khemlani, N. Y. Louis Lee & Monica Bucciarelli - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):37.
    Henrich et al. address how culture leads to cognitive variability and recommend that researchers be critical about the samples they investigate. However, there are other sources of variability, such as individual strategies in reasoning and the content and context on which processes operate. Because strategy and content drive variability, those factors are of primary interest, while culture is merely incidental.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  9
    The Function and Representation of Concepts.Sangeet S. Khemlani & Geoffrey Goodwin - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):216-217.
    Machery has usefully organized the vast heterogeneity in conceptual representation. However, we believe his argument is too narrow in tacitly assuming that concepts are comprised of only prototypes, exemplars, and theories, and also that its eliminative aspect is too strong. We examine two exceptions to Machery's representational taxonomy before considering whether doing without concepts is a good idea.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark