21 found
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  1. The phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-induced changes in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder patients: An enactive affordance-based model.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-14.
    People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...)
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  2.  11
    Enactive psychiatry.Sanneke de Haan - 2020 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    The need for a model -- Currently available models in psychiatry -- Introduction to enactivism -- Body and mind - and world -- The existential dimension and its role in psychiatry -- Enriched enactivism : existential sense-making, values, and socio-cultural worlds -- Enactive psychiatry : psychiatric disorders are disorders of sense-making -- An enactive approach to causes, diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric disorders.
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  3. Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the lived experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder patients.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2015 - PLoS ONE 10 (8):1-29.
    Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes that (...)
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  4. An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry.Sanneke de Haan - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):3-25.
    Psychiatry is enormously complex. One of its main difficulties is how to connect the wide diversity of factors that may cause or contribute to the problems at hand, factors ranging from traumatic experiences, dysfunctional neurotransmitters, existential worries, economic deprivation, and social exclusion, to genetic bad luck. Interventions are also diverse, with options including chemical or electrical treatment, therapies aimed at behavior change and those promoting insight. Much is still unknown: what are the causal pathways, which interventions work best for which (...)
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  5. Becoming more oneself? Changes in personality following DBS treatment for psychiatric disorders: Experiences of OCD patients and general considerations.Sanneke De Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2017 - PLoS ONE 12 (4):1-27.
    Does DBS change a patient’s personality? This is one of the central questions in the debate on the ethics of treatment with Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS). At the moment, however, this important debate is hampered by the fact that there is relatively little data available concerning what patients actually experience following DBS treatment. There are a few qualitative studies with patients with Parkinson’s disease and Primary Dystonia and some case reports, but there has been no qualitative study yet with patients (...)
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  6. Social affordances in context: What is it that we are bodily responsive to.Erik Rietveld, Sanneke de Haan & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):436-436.
    We propose to understand social affordances in the broader context of responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances in general. This perspective clarifies our everyday ability to unreflectively switch between social and other affordances. Moreover, based on our experience with Deep Brain Stimulation for treating obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, we suggest that psychiatric disorders may affect skilled intentionality, including responsiveness to social affordances.
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  7.  33
    The Need for Relational Authenticity Strategies in Psychiatry.Sanneke de Haan - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (4):349-351.
    Psychiatric disorders involve changes in how you feel, think, perceive, and/or act—and the same goes for psychotropic medication. How then do you know whether certain thoughts or feelings are genuine expressions of yourself, or whether they are colored by your psychiatric illness, or by the medication you take? Or, as Karp nicely sums up the problem: “if I experience X, is it because of the illness, the medication, or is it “just me’?” Such “self-illness ambiguity” seems to be quite an (...)
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  8.  84
    The ghost in the machine: Disembodiment in schizophrenia - Two case studies.Sanneke de Haan & Thomas Fuchs - 2010 - Psychopathology 43 (5):327-333.
    The notion of embodiment is central to the phenomenological approach to schizophrenia. This paper argues that fundamental concepts for the understanding of schizophrenia have a bodily dimension. We present two single cases of first-onset schizophrenic patients and analyze the reports of their experiences. Problems such as loss of self, loss of common sense, and intentionality disorders reveal a disconnectedness that can be traced back to a detachment from the lived body. Hyperreflectivity and hyperautomaticity are used as coping mechanisms, but reflect (...)
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  9.  34
    On the Significance of the Identity Debate in DBS and the Need of an Inclusive Research Agenda. A Reply to Gilbert, Viana and Ineichen.Anke Snoek, Sanneke de Haan, Maartje Schermer & Dorothee Horstkötter - 2019 - Neuroethics 14 (1):65-74.
    Gilbert et al. argue that the concerns about the influence of Deep Brain Stimulation on – as they lump together – personality, identity, agency, autonomy, authenticity and the self are due to an ethics hype. They argue that there is only a small empirical base for an extended ethics debate. We will critically examine their claims and argue that Gilbert and colleagues do not show that the identity debate in DBS is a bubble, they in fact give very little evidence (...)
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  10. Being free by losing control: What Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder can tell us about Free Will.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys - 2015 - In Walter Glannon (ed.), Free Will and the Brain: Neuroscientific, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    According to the traditional Western concept of freedom, the ability to exercise free will depends on the availability of options and the possibility to consciously decide which one to choose. Since neuroscientific research increasingly shows the limits of what we in fact consciously control, it seems that our belief in free will and hence in personal autonomy is in trouble. -/- A closer look at the phenomenology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) gives us reason to doubt the traditional concept of freedom (...)
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  11. On the nature of obsessions and compulsions.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - In David S. Baldwin & Brian E. Leonard (eds.), Anxiety Disorders. pp. 1-15.
    In this chapter we give an overview of current and historical conceptions of the nature of obsessions and compulsions. We discuss some open questions pertaining to the primacy of the affective, volitional or affective nature of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Furthermore, we add some phenomenological suggestions of our own. In particular, we point to the patients’ need for absolute certainty and the lack of trust underlying this need. Building on insights from Wittgenstein, we argue that the kind of certainty the patients (...)
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  12.  29
    The Role of Self-Illness Ambiguity and Self-Medication Ambiguity in Clinical Decision-Making.Roy Dings & Sanneke de Haan - 2022 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (6):58-60.
    In their target article, Moore and colleagues offer a valuable overview of the various ambivalence-related phenomena that may impede swift clinical decision-making. They argue that patients...
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  13. Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership.Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of (...)
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  14.  42
    Two Enactive Approaches to Psychiatry: Two Contrasting Views on What it Means to Be Human.Sanneke de Haan - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (3):191-196.
    The relevance and potential value of insights from enactivism for the field of psychiatry have been recognized for some time now. Recently, two overarching frameworks have been proposed, one by Nielsen, and one by me.1 As mentioned by Nielsen, we developed our approaches largely in parallel: I was not aware of Nielsen’s work, and he only became aware of my work in the last phase of his PhD. Nielsen compares our approaches and concludes that our frameworks are ‘largely compatible, do (...)
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  15.  31
    Missing Oneself or Becoming Oneself? The Difficulty of What “Becoming a Different Person” Means.Sanneke de Haan - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (2):110-112.
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  16. Enactivism and social cognition: In search for the whole story.Leon De Bruin & Sanneke De Haan - 2012 - Journal of Cognitive Semiotics (1):225-250.
    Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) it is difficult (...)
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  17.  35
    What do my problems say about me?Sanneke de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):159-164.
    ABSTRACT‘If I experience X, is it because of the illness, the medication, or is it ‘just me’?’ (Karp 2009) [Is it me or my Meds? Living with Antidepressants. Harvard University Press]. This issue is known as self-illness ambiguity (SIA) (Sadler 2007) ["The Psychiatric Significance of the Personal Self." Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes 70 (2): 113–129]. In her paper Know Thyself: Bipolar Disorder and Self-concept, Carls-Diamante (2022) [“Know Thyself: Bipolar Disorder and Self-Concept.” Philosophical Explorations, 1–17] offers a taxonomy of different (...)
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  18. (1 other version)Stimulating good practice - What an embodied cognition approach could mean for Deep Brain Stimulation practice.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 5 (4).
    We whole-heartedly agree with Mecacci and Haselager(2014) on the need to investigate the psychosocial effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS), and particularly to find out how to prevent adverse psychosocial effects. We also agree with the authors on the value of an embodied, embedded, enactive approach (EEC) to the self and the mind–brain problem. However, we do not think this value primarily lies in dissolving a so-called “maladaptation” of patients to their DBS device. In this comment, we challenge three central (...)
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  19.  13
    Book Author’s Response: Continuity, not Conservatism: Why We Can Be Existential and Enactive.Sanneke de Haan - 2022 - Constructivist Foundations 17 (2):173-178.
    García’s and Oblak’s reviews of my book Enactive Psychiatry open up some fundamental debates with regard to my use of the term “enactive” for the kind of approach that I develop. Is my account still properly “enactive” (García) and how does my approach compare to the extended mind theory on the one hand and to constructivism on the other hand (Oblak? In this response, I argue that (a) adding an existential dimension to enactivism is necessary to do justice to our (...)
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  20.  49
    Enactivism as a New Framework for Psychiatry.Sanneke de Haan - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):1-2.
    How we think about the mind affects how we think about mental disorders: about what they are, how they develop and how we should best treat them. How we think about the mind and its relation to both body and world will typically be implicit though. One commonly assumed 'mind-world topology' regards the mind as internal and the world as external, and gives the mind the task of properly representing the outer world. This leads to a division of labor in (...)
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  21. Auditory verbal hallucinations: Dialoguing between the cognitive sciences and phenomenology.Frank Larøi, Sanneke de Haan, Simon Jones & Andrea Raballo - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):225-240.
    Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are a highly complex and rich phenomena, and this has a number of important clinical, theoretical and methodological implications. However, until recently, this fact has not always been incorporated into the experimental designs and theoretical paradigms used by researchers within the cognitive sciences. In this paper, we will briefly outline two recent examples of phenomenologically informed approaches to the study of AVHs taken from a cognitive science perspective. In the first example, based on Larøi and Woodward (...)
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