Libro reseñado: Dulces sueños. Obstáculos filosóficos para una ciencia de la conciencia. Autor: Daniel Dennett.

Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.

The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...) mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...) to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by brie y describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4). (shrink)

Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, (...) since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. (shrink)

Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one (...) of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels. (shrink)

Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the (...) reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action. (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...) on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

Ouraiminthischapteristodelineatetheformofsharedagencythatwe take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of (...) shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capac- ities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first (...) section of the pa- per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min- dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions other than the ascent routine. (shrink)

Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of remembering as a cognitive process unfolding within a single subject, as well as traditional understandings of memory knowledge as a justified memory belief held within the mind of a single subject. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psychology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. In (...) this chapter, we attempt an initial exploration of the epistemological implications of collaborative memory research, taking as our starting point the “extended knowledge” debate which has resulted from the recent encounter between extracranialist theories of cognition and externalist theories of knowledge (Carter et al., 2014; Carter et al., forthcoming). Various forms of socially and technologically augmented memory have played important roles in the extended knowledge debate, but the debate has so far not taken collaborative memory, in particular, into account. We will argue that collaborative memory supports a novel externalist theory of knowledge: distributed reliabilism. Distributed reliabilism departs in two important respects from both traditional reliabilism (Goldman, 2012) and updated theories such as extended (Goldberg, 2010) and social reliabilism (Goldman, 2014). First, it acknowledges that belief-forming processes may extend extracranially to include processing performed both by other subjects and by technological artifacts. Second, it acknowledges that distributed sociotechnical systems themselves may be knowing subjects. Overall, then, the main aim of the chapter is to draw out the philosophical implications of psychological research on collaborative memory. But our argument will also suggest that it may be useful to broaden the standard conception of collaborative memory to include not only the sorts of direct interactions among subjects that have been the focus of psychological research so far but also a range of more indirect, technology-supported and -mediated interactions, and it thus has implications for psychology as well. (shrink)

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

La ilusión de profundidad explicativa (ipe) es uno de los fenómenos que ha despertado gran interés en la ciencia cognitiva en los últimos veinte años. Sucede cuando la persona cree poder explicar un fenómeno mejor de lo que realmente puede explicarlo. A continuación, se hará una reconstrucción histórica de los estudios de la IPE a lo largo de las últimas décadas, dando cuenta de su actualidad e importancia. Primero se presentarán los antecedentes y los estudios fundantes de este tema de (...) investigación. A continuación, se expondrán las investigaciones iniciales (años 2002-2015), y la manera como prosiguió la indagación con cuestionamientos y soluciones a la IPE (años 2016-2021). Finalmente, se analizará la relación entre la ipe, las fake news y el internet. (shrink)

The feeling of error (FOE) is the subjective experience that something went wrong during a reasoning or calculation task. The main goal of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the FOE in the context of mental mathematical calculation. We used the number bisection task (NBT) to evoke this metacognitive feeling and assessed it by asking participants if they felt they have committed an error after solving the task. In the NBT participants have to determine whether the number (...) presented in the middle of a triplet corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers (e.g., 07_16_25) with a Yes/No answer. Our results show that FOE reports were strongly correlated with arithmetic errors and numerical properties of the NBT, suggesting that the FOE accurately represents the error. This finding indicates that even very fast metacognitive feelings are reliable when it comes to evaluating one’s own mental performance. Moreover, our results suggest that the occurrence of FOEs is determined by the fluency with which each triplet was solved and the post-decision evaluation processes that occurred after the NBT was solved. Additionally, we asked participants to report their confidence in the given answer for the cases where they did not report FOEs. Participants reported less confidence for the (objectively) incorrect answers than for the (objectively) correct ones, suggesting that in cases where they did not have a conscious FOE they still were able to implicitly detect their errors. Remarkably, confidence was also determined by the fluency of the NBT. (shrink)

Los distintos intentos por aclarar el concepto de justificación epistémica han dado lugar a los más intrincados debates en la epistemología analítica contemporánea. Da cuenta de ello la controversia entre el internismo y el externismo de la justificación, y las discusiones que han surgido allí entre el fiabilismo y la epistemología de la virtud. Estas disputas han tomado un nuevo aire tras el surgimiento de la tesis de la mente extendida propuesta por Clark y Chalmers (1998), que sugiere la posibilidad (...) de conocimiento extendido más allá de la mente o el cerebro individual del sujeto. El objetivo de este capítulo es mostrar y evaluar cómo un debate que en su origen fue epistemológico ha recibido influencia de una tesis metafísica, proveniente de la filosofía de la mente. En la primera parte de este capítulo identificaremos las principales corrientes que surgieron en el marco del debate sobre el internismo y el externismo de la justificación, esto es, grosso modo, el debate acerca de si la justificación de una creencia debe estar al alcance del sujeto (internismo) o si esa justificación se determina independientemente de tal alcance (externismo). Seguidamente, abordaremos este debate desde el punto de vista del fiabilismo y la epistemología de la virtud, y finalmente presentaremos las tesis de la mente extendida y la cognición distribuida para mostrar cómo estas tesis pueden ser influyentes en las discusiones epistemológicas entre posturas internistas y externistas. (shrink)

The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.

En opinión de Francisco Puy, el jurista debe ser una persona que agarre decidido una experiencia jurídica siempre conflictiva, la describa, la valores y ofrezca una solución para limpiarla, pacificando los problemas que presenta de apropiación, transmisión, reparto, violación y reposición de derechos. Una experiencia jurídica se inicia cuando un individuo le dice a otro que una cosa es suya y el otro o los otros asienten o consienten en que es suya. Una experiencia jurídica crece, tornándose problemática, cuando un (...) individuo o dos o todo el grupo rechazan la declaración de uno o varios que dijeron que algo es suyo, que tiene un derecho de uso, de disfrute o de propiedad; un interés legítimo o cualquier otra opción jurídica. El Derecho es la misma cosa justa, lo justo materializado en el caso concreto real y práctico; y no lo justo legal ni lo justo diseñado en grandes teorías. Este enfoque teñido de realismo abre un amplio horizonte filosófico-jurídico que Puy ha recorrido en muchas direcciones, ensayando nuevas soluciones para cuestiones viejas. Catedrático ce Filosofía del Derecho de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela durante 45 años, Francisco Puy ha dedicado una buena parte de su pensamiento a desarrollar una forma de estudio y comprensión de la experiencia jurídica, la prudencial, diferente de la usualmente utilizada en las universidades públicas. Su camino lo ha conducido por las sendas de la Tópica, la Retórica y la Dialéctica clásicas, que ha actualizado en diálogo con la moderna teoría de la argumentación jurídica. En este libro, los colegas, amigos y discípulos del maestro dialogan con él y entre ellos, transitando un panorama temático tan complejo como sugestivo. (shrink)

El presente trabajo pretende servir como introducción a una teodicea de la filosofía y la teología racionalista (mu'tazilí) árabe a partir de un texto de Algazel. Esta teología y filosofía cree que Dios ha creado el mejor de los mundos posibles debido a su esencia buena, siendo, por tanto, optimista y determinista. Sin embargo, este optimismo en la teología viene dado por la mera voluntad de Dios, mientras que en la filosofía por la causalidad y la necesidad lógica.

An introduction, from an al-Ghazâlî´s text, into a philosophic theodicy and an Arabic rationalistic theology (mu`tazili). Both of them, theology and philosophy, belive that God has created the best of possible worlds, so that, this world is optimistic and deterministic. However this optimism sense has different causes in them; for theodicy that is owing to Good wishes, while for philosophy is because of the causality and logical necessity.

An introduction, from an al-Ghazâlî´s text, into a philosophic theodicy and an Arabic rationalistic theology (mu`tazili). Both of them, theology and philosophy, belive that God has created the best of possible worlds, so that, this world is optimistic and deterministic. However this optimism sense has different causes in them; for theodicy that is owing to Good wishes, while for philosophy is because of the causality and logical necessity.

Öz Mâtürîdî, dinin anlaşılmasında akla verilen değer açısından Eş‘arîler ile Mu‘tezile arasında konumlandırılmaktadır. Mâtürîdî’nin akıl yürütme anlayışında, gerçekliği beş duyu ile algılanabilen ve şehâdet âlemi olarak adlandırılan dış dünyanın ayrı bir yeri vardır. Mâtürîdî’ye göre bu dünya, beş duyunun algı alanına girmeyen ve gayb âlemi olarak bilenen duyular ötesi âlemin varlığına delil teşkil etmektedir. Kitâbu’t-Tevhid’de bu delillendirme “Delâletü’ş-Şâhid ale’l-Gâib” terkibiyle ifade edilmiştir. “Görünür âlem” veya “duyular âlemi” de denilen bu âlem, bizzat varlığıyla onu var edenin varlığına şahitlik etmektedir. Ancak görünür (...) âlemin, görünmezin varlığına şahitliğinin her zaman mümkün olup olmadığı tartışmalıdır. Şayet bu mümkünse hangi şartlarda gerçekleşeceği, üzerinde durulması gereken konulardandır. Söz gelimi görünür âlemin kendisinin özelliklerini taşıyan bir âleme şahitlik ettiği kabul edildiğinde bu durum Allah hakkında nasıl uygulanacaktır? Yani Allah’ın da bu âlem gibi fizik kurallarına bağlı bir varlık olduğu mu kabul edilecektir? Zira görünür âlemin kendisi gibi bir âleme şahitlik ettiğini kabul etmek böyle bir sonuca götürebilir. Öte yandan Allah ve sıfatları ile ahiret âlemi gibi konularda bu metodun kullanılmaması durumunda bilgi elde edilebilecek başka bir yol var mıdır? Mesela duyu organları bu sahada ne kadar etkindir? Veya “doğru haber”den elde edilen bilgi kendi başına yeterli midir? Çalışmamız, Mâtürîdî’nin görünür âlemi temel alarak görünmez âlemle ilgili yorumlamalarında nasıl bir yol takip ettiğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, literatür taraması, kavram tahlili, metin yorumlama yollarıyla yapılmış ve Mâtürîdî’nin Kitâbu’t-Tevhid ve Te’vîlat adlı eserleriyle sınırlandırılmıştır. (shrink)

Öz: Bu çalışmama İslam’da bireyin kamuya karşı sorumluluk alanı ile bağlantılı bir ilkesini; “Emr-i bi’l- Ma’ruf ve Nehyi Ani’l-Münker”i İslam İnanç Ekolleri içerisinde nasıl algılandığını ve nasıl uygulandığını ele alacaktır. Bundaki amacım birey- kamu ilişkisinde, bireyin özgürlük alanlarının ihmal edildiği yönündeki varsayımımdır. Bu girişten sonra, çalışmada İslam inanç ekollerinin konuya ilişkin yaklaşımları ve bu yaklaşımlarına kaynak teşkil eden metinlere yer verilecektir. Çalışmamızda ekollerin kronolojik tarihlerini göz önünde bulunduran bir sıralama takip edeceğiz. Bundaki amacımız özellikle “Emr-i bi’l- Ma’ruf ve Nehyi Ani’l- (...) Münker” ilkesinin ekollerde ele alınışının erken dönem İslam Siyasal Tarihi ile önemli oranda bir ilişkisi olduğu anlayışımız sebebiyledir. İslam siyaset kuramının birlikte yaşam, özgürlük ve adalet iddia ve idealleri çerçevesinde konuya İslam teolojik mezhepleri yakın ilgi göstermişlerdir. Ekollerin “Emr-i bi’l-Ma’ruf ve Nehyi Ani’l-Münker” ilkesine yoğun ilgilerine karşın, farklı yaklaşımlar gösterdikleri de söylenebilir. İslam geleneği içerisinde bu kurucu ilke birey özgürlüğü ve kamu düzeni arasındaki gerilimler nedeniyle politik yorumları da beraberinde getirmiştir. “Haricî” ekoller her bir Müslüman için gereken bir sorumluluk olarak yorumlamış ve “ayn-i vacib” olduğunu dile getirmişlerdir. Diğer ekoller ise bu ilkeyi ” kifa-i bir vucûb” olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Diğer yandan Mu’tezile ekolü bu ilkeyi usulu’l-hamse’ den biri olarak kabul etmiştir. İslam siyaset geleneğinin önemli bileşenlerinden olan ilke mezhepler arasında farklı uygulamalara konu olmuştur. (shrink)

Guidelines for an ideal Islamic society and the responsibilities of Muslim according to Islamic teachings.

2. Saebyŏngnyŏk chʻodang esŏ on pʻyŏnji.

Respuesta al comentario de Gustavo Caponi. “Ginnobili, Santiago. ‘El estatus fenomenológico de la teoría de la selección natural’”, Ideas y Valores LXII/152 (2013): 319-322.

Maḥmūd, Zakī Najīb, 1905-; philosophers; Egypt; biography; interview.

Logical thinking; criticism and interpretation; Arab philosophers.

Faith and reason--Islam; Human beings--philosophy; Faith--philosophy; Islamic philosophy.