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Santiago Echeverri [24]Santiago Borda-Malo Echeverri [1]
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Santiago Echeverri
National Autonomous University of Mexico
  1. Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.
    Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...)
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  2. A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.
    According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S. It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination-based skepticism. I identify several principles that must be true if ED is to be uniquely placed to attain this goal. After (...)
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  3. Visual Reference and Iconic Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):761-781.
    Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key arguments against (...)
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  4. Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):283-307.
    Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing it, a (...)
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  5. How to Undercut Radical Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1299-1321.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...)
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  6. Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2012 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
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  7. Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.
    Austere relationism rejects the orthodox analysis of hallucinations and illusions as incorrect perceptual representations. In this article, I argue that illusions of optimal motion present a serious challenge for this view. First, I submit that austere-relationist accounts of misleading experiences cannot be adapted to account for IOMs. Second, I show that any attempt at elucidating IOMs within an austere-relationist framework undermines the claim that perceptual experiences fundamentally involve relations to mind-independent objects. Third, I develop a representationalist model of IOMs. The (...)
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  8. Guarantee and Reflexivity.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (9):473-500.
    The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An account along these lines was discussed in the late 70s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-conscious thoughts: Guarantee. Along the way, I (...)
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  9.  59
    Moderatism and Truth.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    According to MODERATISM, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges like <There is an external world>, <I am not a brain in a vat (BIV)>, and so on. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by combining the claim that external world propositions have a substantive truth property like correspondence with the claim that hinges (...)
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  10. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Conditionality Problem for Externalism.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Epistemological disjunctivism (ED) has been thought to solve the conditionality problem for epistemic externalism. This problem arises from externalists’ characterization of our epistemic standings as conditional on the obtaining of worldly facts which we lack any reflective access to. ED is meant to avoid the conditionality problem by explicating subjects’ perceptual knowledge in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge via their possession of perceptual reasons that are both factive and reflectively accessible. I argue that ED’s account of reflectively accessible factive perceptual (...)
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  11. McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.
    Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could be (...)
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  12. Putting I-Thoughts to Work.Santiago Echeverri - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (7):345-372.
    A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the self-concept as a device of information integration. It then shows that the indexical view yields a better explanation of the (...)
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  13. Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):215-245.
    Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a result, I reject the inaccessibility of early vision to higher cognition and make some constructive remarks on (...)
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  14. Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1361-1378.
    Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the (...)
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  15.  70
    Analytic Philosophy in Latin America (2nd edition).Diana I. Pérez & Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Analytic philosophy was introduced in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century. Its development has been heterogeneous in different countries of the region but has today reached a considerable degree of maturity and originality, with a strong community working within the analytic tradition in Latin America. This entry describes the historical development of analytic philosophy in Latin America and offers some examples of original contributions by Latin American analytic philosophers.
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  16. Explaining Reference: A Plea for Semantic Psychologism.Santiago Echeverri - 2014 - In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. University of Geneva. pp. 550-580.
    ‘Modest’ and ‘full-blooded’ conceptions of meaning disagree on whether we should try to provide explanations of reference. In this paper, I defend a psychological brand of the full-blooded program. As I understand it, there are good reasons to provide a psychological explanation of referential abilities. This explanation is to be framed at an intermediary level of description between the personal level and the explanations provided by neuroscience. My defense of this program has two parts: First, I display the explanatory insufficiency (...)
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  17.  17
    El coraje de la verdad en el último Michel Foucault: su “otro modo” y su “vida otra”.Santiago Borda-Malo Echeverri - 2021 - Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana 42 (124).
    El objetivo de este artículo es compartir con la comunidad académica el resultado de investigación de la tesis doctoral de filosofía intitulada La parresía como heterotopía en el último Foucault: otro modo crítico y específico de ser, pensar, decir y vivir. En efecto, intento esbozar el itinerario de la obra del úlltimo Foucault como una genealogía de la parresía, que recoge las conclusiones más relevantes de cuatro años de indagación. Finalmente, resalto la retrospectiva y la prospectiva de la parresía foucaultiana (...)
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  18. Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience.Santiago Echeverri - 2011 - In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience Et Réflexivité: Perspectives au-Delà de L’Empirisme Et de L’Idéalisme. L'harmattan. pp. 14p.
    Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper to responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is (...)
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  19. La filosofía trascendental de Kant y el argumento de la ilusión.Santiago Echeverri - 2004 - Pensamiento 60 (227):247-277.
  20. Subjetividad e inmaterialismo en la filosofía de George Berkeley.Santiago Echeverri - 2003 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 27:127-148.
  21. Christos Kyriacou and Kevin Wallbridge's Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. [REVIEW]Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1):61-78.
    This is a critical notice of Christos Kyriacou and Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York and London: Routledge, 2021. Pp. x + 324. ISBN 978-0-367-37018-3. It discusses in some detail contributions by Nevin Climenhaga, Christos Kyriacou, Michael Hannon, Kevin Wallbridge, Annalisa Coliva, and Genia Schönbaumsfeld.
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  22.  7
    La Crítica de Platón al relativismo en Protágoras y su significado para la filosofía política.Klaus Held & Santiago Echeverri - 1998 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia):95-107.
    En la crítica platónica al relativismo de Protágoras en el Teeteto se pueden distinguir dos ámbitos: el plano del aparecer conforme a la percepción y el plano del aparecer que dirige la acción. Held reconstruye los argumentos de dicha crítica, al tiempo que intenta mostrar cómo Platón proyecta superar ambas formas de relativismo, descubriendo que la base de la crítica es el pensamiento de las Ideas. En contraste, Held sugiere dos perspectivas distintas desde las cuales podría intentar superarse la tesis (...)
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  23. The Myth of the Conceptual Given.Santiago Echeverri - unknown
    Conceptualism conceives of perceptual experience as a source of reasons. This claim can be read in two ways: in a strong reading, perceptual experience is taken to provide necessary and sufficient conditions to justify doxastic states. In a weak reading, it is assumed to provide only the materials to form reasons, which are conceived as “hybrid entities” made from perceptual contents plus doxastic force. The paper shows that whereas the strong version is in error, the weak version is committed to (...)
     
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  24. Epistemology without concepts?: Penelope Maddy: What do philosophers do? Skepticism and the practice of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, xi+248pp, $29.95 HB. [REVIEW]Santiago Echeverri - 2018 - Metascience 27 (1):117-121.
    Review of Penelope Maddy, What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, 248 pp.).
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  25.  8
    Libro reseñado: El escepticismo y la filosofía trascendental. Autor: Luis Eduardo Hoyos. [REVIEW]Santiago Echeverri - 2003 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 27:161-173.
    Libro reseñado: El escepticismo y la filosofía trascendental. Autor: Luis Eduardo Hoyos.
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