In this paper I carry out two tasks. First, I account for one of the distinctive uses of thought experiments in philosophy, namely, the fact that just a thought experiment is sufficient to confute a well-established theory. Secondly, I present three arguments to defend the claim that, at least in philosophy, we should remove thought experiments from our metaphilosophical toolkit. The central premise that motivates these arguments is the following: the very methodology of thought experiments permits to construct different scenarios (...) in which philosophical theories are refuted ad infinitum. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is double. In the fi rst part I argue against the traditional interpretation of Ayer’s emotivism. According to this interpretation, in Language, Truth and Logic Ayer based emotivism on his “radical empiricist” view. I argue that this is not so. Then, in the second part I develop a new interpretation of emotivism according to which Ayer’s analysis of moral vocabulary does not depend on positivism. The purpose of the article is to contribute to the history (...) of metaethics by presenting a correct account of Ayer’s analysis. (shrink)

The nineteenth century was a time of great economic, social, and political change. The population of a modernizing Europe began demanding more freedom, which in turn propelled the ongoing discussion on the philosophy of nature. This spurred on Central European sheep breeders to debate the deepest secrets of nature: the transmission of traits from one generation to another. Scholarly questions of heredity were profoundly entwined with philosophy and politics when particular awareness of “the genetic laws of nature” claimed natural equality. (...) The realization that the same rules of inheritance may apply to all living beings frightened both the absolutist political power and the divided society of the day. Many were not prepared to separate religious questions from novel natural phenomena. Open-minded breeders put their knowledge into practice right away to create sheep with better wool traits through inbreeding and artificial selection. This was viewed, however, as the artificial modification of nature operating against the cultural and religious norms of the day. Liberal attempts caught the attention of the secret police and, consequently, the aspirations of scholars were suppressed by political will during approximately 1820–1850. (shrink)

The upheavals of late eighteenth century Europe encouraged people to demand greater liberties, including the freedom to explore the natural world, individually or as part of investigative associations. The Moravian Agricultural and Natural Science Society, organized by Christian Carl André, was one such group of keen practitioners of theoretical and applied scientific disciplines. Headquartered in the “Moravian Manchester” Brünn, the centre of the textile industry, society members debated the improvement of sheep wool to fulfil the needs of the Habsburg armies (...) fighting in the Napoleonic Wars. Wool, as the raw material of soldiers' clothing, could influence the war’s outcome. During the early nineteenth century, wool united politics, economics, and science in Brno, where breeders and natural scientists investigated the possibilities of increasing wool production. They regularly discussed how “climate” or “seed” characteristics influenced wool quality and quantity. Breeders and academics put their knowledge into immediate practice to create sheep with better wool traits through consanguineous matching of animals and artificial selection. This apparent disregard for the incest taboo, however, was viewed as violating natural laws and cultural norms. The debate intensified between 1817 and 1820, when a Hungarian veteran soldier, sheep breeder, and self-taught natural scientist, Imre Festetics, displayed his inbred Mimush sheep, which yielded wool extremely well suited for the fabrication of light but strong garments. Members of the Society questioned whether such “bastard sheep” would be prone to climatic degeneration, should be regarded as freaks of nature, or could be explained by natural laws. The exploration of inbreeding in sheep began to be distilled into hereditary principles that culminated in 1819 with Festetics’s “laws of organic functions” and “genetic laws of nature,” four decades before Gregor Johann Mendel’s seminal work on heredity in peas. (shrink)

Scholars who favor shareholder primacy usually claim either that managers should not fulfill corporate duties of beneficence or that, if they are required to fulfill them, they do so by going against their obligations to shareholders. Distinguishing between structurally different types of duties of beneficence and recognizing the full force of the normative demands imposed on managers reveal that this view needs to be qualified. Although it is correct to think that managers, when acting on behalf of shareholders, are not (...) required to fulfill wide duties of charity, they are nevertheless required to fulfill a variety of narrow duties of beneficence. What is more, the obligation to fulfill these duties arises precisely because they are acting on behalf of shareholders. As such, this article 1) refines our understanding of the duties of corporate beneficence and 2) helps to identify which duties of beneficence are imposed on managers when they are acting on behalf of shareholders. (shrink)

This paper introduces a body of research on Organizational Behavior and Industrial/organizational Psychology that expands the range of empirical evidence relevant to the ongoing character-situation debate. This body of research, mostly neglected by moral philosophers, provides important insights to move the debate forward. First, the OB/io scholarship provides empirical evidence to show that social environments like organizations have significant power to shape the character traits of their members. This scholarship also describes some of the mechanisms through which this process of (...) reshaping character takes place. Second, the character-situation debate has narrowly focused on situational influences that affect behavior episodically and haphazardly. The OB/io research, however, highlights the importance of distinguishing such situational influences from influences that, like organizational influences, shape our character traits because they are continuous and coordinated. Third, the OB/io literature suggests that most individuals display character traits that, while local to the organization, can be consistent across situations. This puts pressure on the accounts of character proposed by traditional virtue ethics and situationism and provides empirical support to interactionist models based on cognitive-affective processing system theories of personality. Finally, the OB/io literature raises important challenges to the possibility of achieving virtue, provides valuable and untapped resources to cultivate character, and suggests new avenues of normative and empirical research. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The distinction between what I call nonelective obligations and discretionary obligations, a distinction that focuses on one particular thread of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, helps us to identify the obligations that carry over from principals to agents. Clarity on this issue is necessary to identify the moral obligations within “shareholder primacy”, which conceives of managers as agents of shareholders. My main claim is that the principal-agent relation requires agents to fulfill nonelective obligations, but it does not always (...) require discharging discretionary obligations. I show that the requirement to fulfill nonelective obligations is more far-reaching than has been acknowledged by most defenders and critics of shareholder primacy. But I also show that managers are not bound by certain discretionary obligations like charity, showing that their moral obligations are more circumscribed than the obligations that apply to human beings in general. (shrink)

Xenophon’s conception of the dialectical method shares many similarities with Antisthenes’ point of view regarding the relation between language and reality. The key element supporting this reading is the parallel between Xenophon’s method of dialegein kata genē and Antisthenes’ method of episkepsis tōn onomatōn. In this paper, I claim that a correct understanding of both methods yields a clear structural proximity between the two Socratics on the issue of dialectics. Although they present some significant differences, which I will also explore, (...) I will argue that both variants express a single Socratic motive with regard to dialectics. That is that dialectics, in its basic structure, consists of organizing reality through discourse in order to make it comprehensible. In particular, this is done through establishing unified instances capable of comprehending a multiplicity. This nuclear position could also be extended to include middle Plato’s concept of dialectics. This concurrence takes up different forms in Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes. Nevertheless, they share the same structure, which indicates quite plausibly a major characteristic of Socratic philosophies, as opposed to previous attempts by the Presocratics and the Sophists. (shrink)

The scholarship on meaningful work has approached the topic mostly from the perspective of the subjective experience of the individual worker. This has led the literature to under-theorize, if not outright ignore, the cultural and normative dimension of meaningful work. In particular, it has obscured that a person’s ability to find meaning in her life in general, and her work in particular, is typically anchored and dependent on shared institutions and cultural aspirations. Reflecting on the future of work, particularly on (...) the dangers posed by the threat of technological unemployment, helps us recognize this cultural and normative dimension of meaningful work. I argue that a world with few work opportunities is a world devoid of a core structuring ideal around which our society has organized itself and, as such, will strain our ability to make sense of what it means to find life meaningful. To make this case I show that work operates as a central organizing _telos_ around which our contemporary lives gravitate. Work touches everyone and everything, defining the rhythms of our days and weeks and providing a center of gravity around which our lives are structured. Work constitutes a central dimension of human flourishing. Through work we provide for our material needs, develop our skills and virtues, build community, and contribute to the common good. As such, work constitutes a central organizing ideal in contemporary Western societies, a fact has significant normative force and plays an important role in our finding work meaningful. (shrink)

El propósito de este ensayo consiste en echar luz sobre la renovación de la que el comunismo ha sido objeto durante los últimos años. Para ello se concede atención a los principales argumentos propues- tos por las nuevas perspectivas filosófico-políticas de las izquierdas (i). Hecho esto, se atienden algunos de los escritos de Marx, con el objetivo de dilucidar cómo el término adquiere sus connotaciones clásicas (ii) y se vincula, además, con la idea de comunidad (iii). Se espera poder demostrar (...) que en la actualidad las izquierdas conti- núan encontrándose en deuda con Marx. (shrink)

The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bohm (EPRB) experiment performed with random variable and spatially separated analyzers is a milestone test in the controversy between Objective Local Theories (OLT) and Quantum Mechanics (QM). Only a few OLT are still possible. Some of the surviving OLT (specifically, the so called non-ergodic theories) would be undetectable in the averaged statistical values, but they may leave their trace in the time dynamics. For, while QM predicts random processes, the OLT of this kind predict the existence of regularities that (...) may be revealed as a low dimensional object in the phase space. We perform a numerical analysis of the time-resolved data recorded in that experiment to unveil any hypothetical low dimensional dynamics that may be present. We find no consistent indication of such dynamics except for one data file, the longest of all in the real time. The possible causes of these dynamics are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue for an instrumental form of existence, inspired by Hilbert’s method of ideal elements. As a case study, we consider the existence of contradictory objects in models of non-classical set theories. Based on this discussion, we argue for a very liberal notion of existence in mathematics.

In this paper, I compare the Megarian thesis of Metaphysics IX 3 with other sources on the Megarians in order to clarify two questions: that of the unity and nature of the so-called Megarian school and that of Aristotle’s broader argument in IX 3. I first review the disputed issue of the status of the Megarian school and then examine two hypotheses regarding the identity behind Aristotle’s allusion in IX 3. Third, I explore the connection between Megarianism and Plato’s Euthydemus, (...) a task that helps us to contextualize Aristotle’s anti-Megarian polemic. Lastly, I build on the preceding argument in a re-examination of the Eleatic hypothesis with regard both to the Megarians as a whole and to the thesis that Aristotle transmits. (shrink)

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...) cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties. (shrink)

L'œuvre de Clément Rosset cherche à établir une 'théorie du réel', comprenant par là avant tout une critique de l'illusion. Trois figures principales n'ont de cesse de revenir du premier au dernier de ses livres : le réel, le double, la joie. Ces trois concepts ont cependant prêté aux malentendus les plus farfelus, en dépit de l'écriture claire et lumineuse de Rosset : les commentaires que son œuvre suscite çà et là donnent souvent l'impression de passer à côté de l'essentiel, (...) de ne retenir de ces trois figures que le son creux de leur nom. Cet essai tente de montrer au contraire la spécificité de la 'philosophie tragique' de Rosset, en la prenant pour une tentative cohérente et rigoureuse d'aborder l'expérience humaine du désir qui rende compte de la paradoxale et énigmatique joie de vivre"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Duties of beneficence are said to allow for leeway to discharge them. By distinguishing between two different types of leeway, Mejia identified three structurally different duties of beneficence. In this Commentary I deploy those distinctions to clarify the nature of a fourth type of duty of beneficence, one prompted by a global pandemic, a duty with a peculiar, and seldom recognized, conceptual logic. I provide some guidelines that should orient managers when they take themselves to be fulfilling such a duty (...) on behalf of shareholders. (shrink)

According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S. It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination-based skepticism. I identify several principles that must be true if ED is to be uniquely placed to attain this goal. After (...) that, I use those principles to formulate a diachronic skeptical argument. This argument yields the counterintuitive conclusion that understanding a global skeptical hypothesis is all it takes for a rational subject to lose all her perceptual knowledge of the world. Next, I show that a popular Austinian move must reject one or another of the principles that underlie ED. I close by delineating a novel strategy that can block the diachronic skeptical argument while preserving all the principles. The key idea is that perceptual knowledge is grounded in primitive, perceptual and recognitional abilities. This view sheds new light on some puzzling features of global skepticism that have been noted by Descartes and Hume, among others. (shrink)

Special volume of "Thaumàzein - Rivista di Filosofia" dedicated to the theme of Socratic Eudaimonia and care for others. It is a multilingual volume comprising twenty papers divided into six sections with an introduction by Linda Napolitano. Edited by Santiago Chame, Donald Morrison, and Linda Napolitano. -/- Despite the appearances given by certain texts, the moral psychology of Socrates needs not imply selfishness. On the contrary, a close look at passages in Plato and Xenophon (see Plato, Meno 77-78; Protagoras (...) 358; Gorgias 466-468; Euthydemus 278; Lysis 219; Xenophon, Memorabilia III 9, 4-5) suggests that the “egoist”’s welfare depends upon the welfare of others (i.e. family, friends or the whole city). Since the welfare of his family, friends and city is part of his own eudaimonìa, the “egoist” (phìlautos) has a direct and intrinsic motive to promote the welfare of these others. -/- This multilingual issue explores the role that other peoples’ welfare plays in Socratic ethics. Special attention is paid to test-cases in which the principle that moral action is always good only for the agent seems to have no validity. I.e., under which circumstances is the self-sacrifice for the sake of others (such as the soldier’s self-sacrifice on the battlefield) good for the agent (as in Alcibiades I 115a-116d)? Essays deal with contradictions or tensions of this sort, and relate them to more general views on eudaimonìa held within Socratic literature. Comparison between different Socratic authors is used as a means to identify the distinctive features of Socratic eudaimonìa if compared to other Greek theories of happiness, such as the Aristotelian theory of philautìa (NE IX, 1166a-1166b; 1168a-1169b). (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est dans la continuite de la reflexion de Santiago Espinosa, qui etend ses vues sur la musique a l'art en general, et qui aborde des sujets plus vastes comme la science physique (l'auteur fait observer que les scientifiques contemporains adoptent la perspective critiquee des lors qu'ils cherchent a faire une image de l'univers). A cette perspective, Espinosa oppose la perception auditive, plus prompte a saisir le mouvement et le changement, non susceptible par surcroit d'en faire une image (...) ou meme une chose. Il fait remarquer l'interet de certains philosophes pour l'intuition du silence de l'interpretation, aucune chose ne pouvant etre le signe (ou l'image) d'une autre, n'etant que ce qu'elle est, ou plutot devient. Il revient enfin a la mise en rapport de la perspective imaginative et les affections de l'angoisse, la melancolie et la nausee afin de montrer que ces dernieres relevent parfois de l'illusion que les choses semblent, dans la mesure ou elles sont prises pour des images, se repeter sans cesse. Pour l'ouie, sensible a la singularite de ce qui passe, tout ce qui arrive est en revanche d'une surprenante nouveaute, ce qui, pour l'affirmateur de la realite, peut se reveler etre aussi une source de joie. (shrink)

Socrates’ inquiry into the nature of the virtues and human excellence led him to experience Socratic ignorance, a practical puzzlement experienced by his recognition that his central life commitments were conceptually problematic. This practical perplexity was not, however, an epistemic weakness but a reflection of his wisdom. I argue that Socratic ignorance, a concept that has not received scholarly attention in business ethics, is a central aim that business practitioners should seek. It is what a truthful, thorough, and courageous inquiry (...) into their professional roles and commitments leads to. It wakes them up from the moral complacency engendered by organizations, forcing them to become much more critical of their day-to-day activities and more intentional about living virtuously. It curbs the corrupting potential of authority positions and prevents the tendency of subordinates to routinely conform to sanctioned norms and expectations. Finally, it opens up novel and creative moral avenues and provides a promising model to deal with the conflicts posed by our globalized and increasingly polarized world. (shrink)

La musique, disait Strawinsky, est inexpressive par essence. Elle n'exprime ni les idees ni les emotions humaines; elle n'exprime qu'elle-meme. Le sens et la beaute de la musique sont essentiellement musicaux: ils se trouvent dans les arrangements des sons dans le temps; toute autre "signification" de la musique est extra-musicale, et par la non-musicale. Aussi ce sens et cette beaute sont-ils inherents a l'objet musical, c'est-a-dire a un objet qui n'existe qu'au present, dans la mobilite, l'instantane, l'ephemere. En cela la (...) musique se rapproche de la vie et constitue ainsi un objet merveilleux permettant a l'homme de se reconcilier avec le temps, d'ou ce pouvoir infaillible qu'elle a, lorsqu'on lui prete l'oreille, de susciter la joie. De l'inexpressivite de la musique a l'inexpressivite du reel, et vice versa; de la joie musicale a la joie de vivre, et inversement. (shrink)

O objeto da reflexão, neste artigo, são as propostas curriculares veiculadas a partir da segunda metade do século XIX, no Brasil e na Argentina. A questão que se coloca é perceber quais os conteúdos que estão incluídos sobre a América Latina, nestas propostas curriculares, se há semelhanças e diferenças entre estes documentos e se os conteúdos veiculados nas propostas curriculares implantadas a partir de 1995, nestes dois países, refletem as mudanças no ensino de história, sugeridas pelo MERCOSUL Educacional. O texto (...) foi dividido em dois subtemas, sendo que no primeiro, estão dispostos os dados referentes à América Latina no ensino secundário das propostas curriculares veiculadas nos séculos XIX até a década de 1980, do século XX e no segundo, são trazidos os conteúdos da América Latina que estão propostos para o sétimo e o oitavo anos, nos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais, do Brasil e para o oitavo e nonos anos, nos Contenidos Básicos Comunes, da Argentina. Foi possível concluir que o lugar da América Latina foi bastante escasso, inclusive no contexto em que ascenderam suas preocupações com o nacionalismo. No caso do Brasil, o currículo foi fabricado de modo a tanto valorizar a história europeia e estadunidense, como modelo a ser seguido, e, num segundo plano, a valorizar a sua própria história. Esta lógica foi igualmente percebida na Argentina, que tinha a sua história como apêndice de uma história universal, privilegiando o olhar sobre o Estado, excluindo os conteúdos sobre a América Latina. Já as propostas curriculares veiculadas a partir de 1995, no Brasil e na Argentina, apresentaram mais permanências do que mudanças, uma vez que colocaram os conteúdos da História da América Latina na condição de ser a sobremesa de um menu, cujo prato principal ainda é a história europeia. Palavras-chave: Ensino de História da América. Mercosul Educacional. Propostas curriculares. (shrink)

Nos textos aqui reunidos, o professor de filosofia da USP Homero Santiago explora um campo situado entre servidão e liberdade. A partir da pergunta de Espinosa retomada por Deleuze e Guattari - por que lutamos por nossa servidão como se lutássemos por nossa liberdade? -, o livro compreende servidão e liberdade como essencialmente correlativos e avessos a qualquer sentido absoluto: servidão remete a impotência, liberdade remete a potência; ora uma predomina, ora outra. Aqui aparece o problema ético fundamental: como (...) passar de uma situação de predomínio da primeira para o predomínio da segunda? Um cartão-postal de Nietzsche é mote para ressaltar e analisar alguns aspectos do espinosismo que, embora longe de serem inéditos, servem para desacreditar a compreensão e, sobretudo, a louca pretensão de um enfrentamento intelectualista da servidão. Esta não se combate só pelo saber, está enraizada em nosso próprio ser: aquilo mesmo que pode nos tornar livres é capaz de nos fazer servos e vice-versa. Em meio a Espinosa, Nietzsche e Antonio Negri, o livro trata do problema do possível, delimitando seu lugar no interior de um determinismo radical (o espinosano) e tateando suas implicações. O possível, como uma espécie de perspectiva que torna factível o trânsito entre servidão e liberdade, descortinando, assim, o campo próprio da ação humana, especialmente a política. A partir de temas recorrentes em nossa realidade social e na situação brasileira recente - a polícia e seu pendor à violenta obediência abstrata, o papel do Estado, o dinheiro e a liberdade - o apelo às experiências tem a função de alargar as possibilidades de se pensar e aplicar os conceitos de servidão e liberdade."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Le grand maitre des apparences, Baltasar Gracián, dit que ce qui ne se voit pas est comme s'il n'était pas. Il n'a sans doute pas livré là, peut-être par prudence, le fond de sa pensée : ce qui ne se perçoit pas n'existe pas. Telle est la thèse en tout cas du présent traité.

In response to the growing criticisms to shareholder primacy, Oliver Hart, a Nobel Economics Prize recipient, and Luigi Zingales, a very well-known finance professor, have offered a revision to Milton Friedman’s dominant account. Seeking to incorporate social and moral concerns into the objective function of the firm, they have proposed that managers should maximize shareholder welfare instead of shareholder value. Their account has been highly influential and reflects many of the substantive and methodological assumptions of corporate governance scholars within the (...) law and economics literature. In this paper, we engage closely with their account from a normative perspective, unearthing and criticizing the implications of many of these assumptions. In doing so, we also formulate a set of principles necessary to ensure the ethical legitimacy of any proposal that puts shareholders at the center of the firm’s objective function. (shrink)