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  1. Normative Practices of Other Animals.Sarah Vincent, Rebecca Ring & Kristin Andrews - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. New York: pp. 57-83.
    Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions. However, until relatively recently, there has been little focus on the possibility that nonhuman animals have any role to play in morality, save being the objects of moral concern. Moreover, when nonhuman cases are (...)
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  2. A Comparative Perspective on Social Cognition From the 4-E Approach.Sarah Vincent - forthcoming - In Frank Grasso, Jose Burgos, Oscar Garcia-Leal & Romana Akram (eds.), Mind Reading Brains.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike often emphasize the role of the brain or cognitive processes “in the head” when trying to understand the mind – in contrast to considering cognition as involving the organism as a whole. This is evident in some contemporary theory of mind approaches that require the ability to make mental attributions to others either via inferences from folk psychology or via simulation. But there are numerous problems with adopting such theories of mind. In contrast, we should (...)
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  3. From False Beliefs to True Interactions: Are Chimpanzees Socially Enactive?Sarah Vincent & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. pp. 280-288.
    In their 1978 paper, psychologists David Premack and Guy Woodruff posed the question, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” They treated this question as interchangeable with the inquiry, “Does a chimpanzee make inferences about another individual, in any degree or kind?” Here, we offer an alternative way of thinking about this issue, positing that while chimpanzees may not possess a theory of mind in the strict sense, we ought to think of them as enactive perceivers of practical and (...)
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    Interspecies Intersubjectivity: On its Possibilities and Limitations.Sarah Vincent - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1):139-146.
    The present work explores interspecies intersubjectivity, including its content and limitations, through the paradigmatic instances of such relationships that are present among companion species. I aim to defend the claim that meaningful relationships are possible and do in fact occur between humans and nonhuman animals by appealing to both philosophical and empirical literature. I will also begin to delineate the content and limitations of these interspecies relationships.
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  5. The Myth of the Mental (Illness).Sarah Vincent - 2014 - In David Boersema (ed.), Dimensions of Moral Agency. Cambridge Scholars. pp. 30-37.
    Thomas Szasz has wrestled with the following question: Does mental illness even exist? Here, I sketch two provocative papers by Szasz and detail his reasons for criticizing the concept ‘mental illness.’ I will proceed to highlight where I think Szasz’s writing is philosophically dubious, despite its role in forcing us to think critically about ‘mental illness.’ I will conclude that his argument is best left behind as an antiquated take on neurodivergence. Finally, I will propose what I think is a (...)
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