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Sarah Wright [13]Sarah Bird Wright [1]
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Profile: Sarah Wright (Birkbeck College)
Profile: Sarah Wright (Oregon State University)
Profile: Sarah Wright (University of Georgia)
  1.  74
    Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1):95-114.
    : Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism and methodological contextualism. I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for (...)
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  2.  44
    The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues.Sarah Wright - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):91-112.
    If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to (...)
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  3.  25
    Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach.Sarah Wright - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):99-111.
    Attributor contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism both suggest ways in which our concept of knowledge depends on a context. Both offer approaches that incorporate traditionally non-epistemic elements into our standards for knowledge. But neither can account for the fact that the social role of a subject affects the standards that the subject must meet in order to warrant a knowledge attribution. I illustrate the dependence of the standards for knowledge on the social roles of the knower with three types of examplesand (...)
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  4.  65
    Internalist Virtues and Knowledge.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132.
    What role can intellectual virtues play in an account of knowledge when we interpret those virtues internalistically, i.e., as depending only on internal states of the cognizer? Though it has been argued that internalist virtues are ill suited to play any role in an account of knowledge, I will show that, on the contrary, internalist virtues can play an important role in recent accounts of knowledge developed to utilize externalist virtues. The virtue account of knowledge developed by Linda Zagzebski is (...)
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  5.  18
    A Neo‐Stoic Approach to Epistemic Agency.Sarah Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):262-275.
    What is the best model of epistemic agency for virtue epistemology? Insofar as the intellectual and moral virtues are similar, it is desirable to develop models of agency that are similar across the two realms. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics present a model of the virtues on which the moral and intellectual virtues are unified. The Stoics’ materialism and determinism also help to explain how we can be responsible for our beliefs even when we cannot believe otherwise. In this paper I (...)
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  6.  13
    What Nozick Did for Decision Theory.David Schmidtz & Sarah Wright - 2008 - In Person, Polis, Planet: Essays in Applied Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 282-294.
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  7. The Stoic Epistemic Virtues of Groups.Sarah Wright - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  8.  34
    How Boots Befooled the King: Wisdom, Truth, and the Stoics.Sarah Wright - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):113-126.
    Abstract Can the wise person be fooled? The Stoics take a very strong view on this question, holding that the wise person (or sage) is never deceived and never believes anything that is false. This seems to be an implausibly strong claim, but it follows directly from some basic tenets of the Stoic cognitive and psychological world-view. In developing an account of what wisdom really requires, I will explore the tenets of the Stoic view that lead to this infallibilism about (...)
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  9.  14
    Comments on “What the Internalist Should Say to the Tortoise".Sarah Wright - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):219-223.
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  10.  33
    Invasive Species and the Loss of Beta Diversity.Sarah Wright - 2011 - Ethics and the Environment 16 (1):75-98.
    As I travel the highways of Georgia, I am regularly appalled by the ubiquitous presence of kudzu. It covers trees, telephone poles, open swathes of land, and old houses, making many locations indistinguishable from one another; all I can see from the road is a wave of green covering any formerly distinctive markings. Thinking back to the intentional introduction of kudzu to the American southeast, I recognize that those individuals who encouraged the planting of kudzu made a serious mistake.1 Their (...)
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  11.  34
    What Nozick Did for Decision Theory.David Schmidtz & Sarah Wright - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):282–294.
  12. The Norms of Assertion and the Aims of Belief.Sarah Wright - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.
  13. Hume on Testimony: A Virtue-Theoretic Defense.Sarah Wright - 2011 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (3):247.