A philosopher and a lawyer-economist examine the challenges of the last third of life. They write about friendship, sex, retirement communities, inheritance, poverty, and the depiction of aging women in films. These essays, or conversations, will help readers of all ages think about how to age well, or at least thoughtfully, and how to interact with older family members and friends.

This Article explores the costs and benefits of one subset of continuous and discontinuous rules. These expressions are shown to be distinct from the familiar dichotomy expressed as standards versus rules, but they share the difficulty of dividing the world of law in two. Still, regulatory approaches that focus on discontinuities can often be made more continuous, and vice versa. A speed limit is discontinuous in the sense that one drives above or below (or within) the announced limit. But it (...) is often made more continuous—even with more discontinuities— as when the stated limit is different for various kinds of vehicles. This Article works around these definitional problems to show that law often discourages useful disclosures by encouraging parties with information to offer continuous information in order to avoid after-the-fact lawsuits when specific disclosures prove to have inaccuracies. For example, it is common to hear or be warned that a medical procedure poses the risk of death, when a better-informed doctor or hospital could have given the precise percentages attached to various outcomes. Similarly, a corporation is on safe ground when it follows “generally accepted accounting principles,” when investors would have learned more from information about good and bad outcomes put in probabilistic terms. The Article works toward the suggestion that law might create a safe harbor in which probabilistic disclosures are protected when they are, or are certified to be, more useful than the ready alternative of fairly general disclosures. (shrink)

Power, Prose, and Purse is an edited collection of essays that draw connections between literature, economics and law. The essays discuss novels that explore the time period between the Industrial Revolution and the Great Depression and analyze the insights that novelists may offer to law and economics, while noting the tensions among these paradigms.

Law, broadly defined to include group-directed rulemaking and coercion, has plainly grown over time. There are many explanations for this growth, and the evolution from self-help to law. This Article develops the idea that an important contributor to the growth of law has been the fact that law begets law, and it seeks to combine this new explanation with both traditional and more intuitive explanations for law’s expansion. That law brings on more law in an addictive way means that a (...) society finds itself with laws, rather than personal interactions, in ways that it would have wished to avoid had it known earlier in time that law’s spectacular growth was in the making. The growth of law is thus much more than a product of specialization or wealth effects. For a variety of reasons, people prefer to avoid personal confrontation and to outsource their means of social control. This Article suggests that much of this addictive growth is inefficient and otherwise undesirable. The addiction might be controlled by rewarding some kinds of personal involvement in order to overcome the inclination to outsource. (shrink)

Much health and safety regulation can be understood as the product of political coalitions between two groups. The first, consisting of persons with self-control issues, enlists the government as an intermediary. The second either expects to benefit from the success of the first, or anticipates gains from a tax imposed on the first group’s behavior. A political entrepreneur might plausibly turn these groups’ preferences into law. This public choice perspective on regulation provides a positive explanation of why it is more (...) likely that a legal system will engage in some health and safety programs than in others. The important break from the conventional view of regulation, as something that either controls externalities or is imposed paternalistically, is in advancing the idea that the government is an intermediary deployed by those who want help. Internalities, associated with collective action problems or with time inconsistent preferences, deserve equal billing. The discussion considers smoking regulation and other health and safety regulation, and then contrasts these with anti-obesity efforts where private contracting is a more feasible means of controlling internalities, and where political coalitions are less likely. (shrink)

This article takes on the puzzle of why many appellate courts insist on an outright majority decision as to the immediate outcome or disposition of a case, while tolerating a plurality decision as to the precedential message, or reasoning, attached to a case. Somewhat similarly, pluralities are respected in many political settings but then not, for example, in legislative assemblies. The argument builds both on the Condorcet Jury Theorem and on the problem of dealing with voting paradoxes, or cycles. It (...) links decision rules with the likelihood of cycling and the danger of misconstruing majority decisions. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).