Results for 'Sayward Charles'

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  1. Pragmatics and Indexicality.Charles Sayward - 1975 - Pragmatics Microfiche 1 (4):D5-D11.
    A conception of pragmatics distinguishes pragmatics from semantics proper in terms of indexicality: semantics is conceived as the quest for a truth definition for languages without indexical expressions; pragmatics is conceived as a quest for a truth definition for languages with indexical expressions. I argue that indexicality is not a feature that can be used to capture anything like what Morris and Carnap had in mind.
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  2.  78
    True Propositions: A Reply to C.J.F. Williams.Charles Sayward - 1972 - Analysis 32 (3):101-106.
    This paper replies to points Williams makes to his reply to Sayward’s criticism of Williams’s proposal of ‘for some p ___ states that p & p’ as an analysis of ‘___ is true’.
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  3.  18
    More on Assertion and Belief.Charles Sayward - 1971 - Philosophical Studies 22 (1-2):20 - 24.
    In an earlier paper Sayward argued that a speaker could not make an assertion by uttering a sentence of form “p, but I believe not-p” given that the speaker spoke honestly and literally. Robert Imlay criticized some things said in that earlier paper. This paper responds to those criticisms.
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  4. What Truth is There in Psychological Egoism?Charles Sayward - 2006 - Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):145-159.
    Psychological egoism says that a purposive action is self-interested in a certain sense. The trick is to say in what sense. On the one hand, the psychological egoist wants to avoid a thesis that can be falsified by trivial examples. On the other hand, what is wanted is a thesis that lacks vacuity. The paper’s purpose is to arrive at such a thesis and show that it is a reasonable guess with empirical content.
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  5.  15
    Intentionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of Arthur Prior.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1996 - kluwer.
    This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.
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  6. Null Sentences.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.
    In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
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  7. Quine and His Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality.Charles Sayward - 2007 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends that (...)
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  8. A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Mathematics.Charles Sayward - 2005 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (2):55-69.
    Three theses are gleaned from Wittgenstein’s writing. First, extra-mathematical uses of mathematical expressions are not referential uses. Second, the senses of the expressions of pure mathematics are to be found in their uses outside of mathematics. Third, mathematical truth is fixed by mathematical proof. These theses are defended. The philosophy of mathematics defined by the three theses is compared with realism, nominalism, and formalism.
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  9. Has Nozick Justified the State?Charles Sayward & Wayne Wasserman - 1981 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (4):411-415.
    In ANARCY, STATE AND UTOPIA Robert Nozick says that the fundamental question of political philosophy, one that precedes questions about how the state should be organized, is whether there should be any state at all. In the first part of his book he attempts to justify the state. We argue that he is not successful.
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  10. Are All Tautologies True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  11. Is Moral Relativism Consistent?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):40-44.
    Let C1 and C2 be distinct moral codes formulated in English. Let C1 contain a norm N and C2 its negation. The paper construes the moral relativist as saying that if both codes are consistent, then, in the strongest sense of correctness applicable to moral norms, they are also both correct in the sense that they contain only correct moral norms. If we believe that the physical statements of English are true (false) in English, we will reject an analogous statement (...)
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  12. Bound Variables and Schematic Letters.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Logique Et Analyse 95 (95):425-429.
    The paper purports to show, against Quine, that one can construct a language , which results from the extension of the theory of truth functions by introducing sentence letter quantification. Next a semantics is provided for this language. It is argued that the quantification is neither substitutional nor requires one to consider the sentence letters as taking entities as values.
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  13. Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Theory and Decision 50:67-75.
    Fundamental to Quine’s philosophy of logic is the thesis that substitutional quantification does not express existence. This paper considers the content of this claim and the reasons for thinking it is true.
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  14. Propositions and Eternal Sentences.Charles Sayward - 1968 - Mind 77 (308):537-542.
    Two different uses of ‘proposition’ are distinguished: the meaning of an eternal sentence is distinguished from that which can be asserted, believed, conjectured, and so on. It is argued that, in the second sense of ‘proposition’, it is not the case that every proposition can be expressed by an eternal sentence.
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  15.  65
    The Province of Logic.Charles Sayward - 1975 - Analysis 36 (1):47-48.
    Quine criticizes Strawson’s account of the province of logic. Robert Hadley proposes a refutation of Quine. This paper proposes a refutation of Hadley.
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  16. Must Synonymous Predicates be Coextensive?Charles Sayward - 1981 - Logique Et Analyse 95 (95):430-435.
    Two cases are distinguished. In one case two predicates belong to distinct languages. A straight-forward argument is presented that the predicates might be synonymous without being coextensive. In the second case the predicates belong to the same language. Here the issue is more involved, but the same conclusion is reached.
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  17. The Structure of Type Theory.Stephen H. Voss & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (5):241-259.
    Formal principals are isolated to reveal a structure embedded in a wide range of studies, each of which partitions a domain of individuals into types and categories. It is thought that any reasonable theory of types should include these principles.
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  18. What’s So Special About Sentences?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1995 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 28 (4):409-25.
    This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in (...)
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  19. Prior’s Theory of Truth.Charles Sayward - 1987 - Analysis 47 (2):83-87.
    This paper is a critical exposition of Prior’s theory of truth as expressed by the following truth locutions: (1) ‘it is true that’ prefixed to sentences; (2) ‘true proposition’; (3) true belief’, ‘true assertion’, ‘true statement’, etc.; (4) ‘true sentence’.
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  20.  62
    Williams’ Definition of ‘X is True’.Charles Sayward - 1970 - Analysis 30 (3):95-97.
    C. J. F, Williams proposed ‘for some p ___ states that p & p’ as a satisfactory analysis of ‘___ is true’. This paper takes issue with this claim.
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  21. A Problem About Conversational Implicature.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1):19 - 25.
    Conversational implicatures are easy to grasp for the most part. But it is another matter to give a rational reconstruction of how they are grasped. We argue that Grice's attempt to do this fails. We distinguish two sorts of cases: (1) those in which we grasp the implicature by asking ourselves what would the speaker have to believe given that what he said is such as is required by the talk exchange; (2) those in which we grasp the implicature by (...)
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  22.  63
    Austin on Whether Every Proposition Has a Contradictory.Charles Sayward & Michael Durrant - 1967 - Analysis 27 (5):167 - 170.
  23. Strawson on Categories.Charles Sayward - 1978 - Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (3):83-87.
    A type theory constructed with reference to a particular language will associate with each monadic predicate P of that language a class of individuals C(P) of which it is categorically significant to predicate P (or which P spans, for short). The extension of P is a subset of C(P), which is a subset of the language’s universe of discourse. The set C(P) is a category discriminated by the language. The relation 'is spanned by the same predicates as' divides the language’s (...)
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  24. Does Scientific Realism Entail Mathematical Realism?Charles Sayward - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5:173-182.
    Hilary Putnam suggests that the essence of the realist conception of mathematics is that the statements of mathematics are objective so that the true ones are objectively true. An argument for mathematical realism, thus conceived, is implicit in Putnam's writing. The first premise is that within currently accepted science there are objective truths. Next is the premise that some of these statements logically imply statements of pure mathematics. The conclusion drawn is that some statements of pure mathematics are objectively true. (...)
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  25. Expressing Propositions.Charles Sayward - 1980 - Proceedings of the 1979 Mid America Linguistics Conference 10:93-100.
    The paper’s purpose is to get clearer on what it is to express a proposition. A proposition is understood as anything that can be asserted, assumed, conjectured, stated, believed, and so on. It is not something that can be asked, ordered, requested, and so on. The paper tries to provide groundwork for a successful analysis by making distinctions and clarifying problems.
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  26.  50
    Expressions and Tokens.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Analysis 41 (4):181-187.
    The purpose of this paper is to uncover and correct several confusions about expressions, tokens and the relations between them that crop up in even highly sophisticated writing about language and logic.
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  27.  97
    Tarski and Proper Classes.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Analysis 40 (4):6-11.
    In this paper the authors argue that if Tarski’s definition of truth for the calculus of classes is correct, then set theories which assert the existence of proper classes (classes which are not the member of anything) are incorrect.
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  28.  81
    The Tree Theory and Isomorphism.Charles Sayward - 1980 - Analysis 41 (1):6-11.
    A main thesis of Fred Sommers' type theory, is that an isomorphism exists between any natural language and the categories discriminated by that language. Here the author gives an explanation of what this claim comes to. And then it is argued that, so understood, the claim is incompatible with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Finally, it is argued against trying to salvage the isomorphism thesis by appealing to some other set theory.
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  29.  91
    Steiner Versus Wittgenstein: Remarks on Differing Views of Mathematical Truth.Charles Sayward - 2005 - Theoria 20 (3):347-352.
    Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
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  30.  89
    The Internal/External Question.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1994 - Grazier Philosophishe Studien 47:31-41.
    For Rudolf Carnap the question ‘Do numbers exist?’ does not have just one sense. Asked from within mathematics, it has a trivial answer that could not possibly divide philosophers of mathematics. Asked from outside of mathematics, it lacks meaning. This paper discusses Carnap ’s distinction and defends much of what he has to say.
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  31.  96
    There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2002 - Theoria 68 (1):4-12.
    Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a some-quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth-conditions of the sentences of the language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: it fails to articulate the truth-conditions of the quantifications with which it is concerned. This is what is defended in (...)
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  32.  86
    Applying the Concept of Pain.Charles Sayward - 2003 - Iyyun 52 (July):290-300.
    This paper reaches the conclusion that, while there are ordinary cases in which the pretending possibility is reasonable, these cases always contain some element that makes it reasonable. This will be the element we ask for when we ask why pretending possibility is raised. Knowledge that someone else is in pain is a matter of eliminating the proposed element or neutralizing its pain-negating aspect.
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  33.  78
    Domains of Discourse.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Logique Et Analyse 117 (17):173-176.
    Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English, then everything of which any predicate is true is a member of that domain. If English has a domain of discourse, then, since ‘is a domain of discourse of English’ is itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus English has no domain of discourse. We defend this argument and go on to argue to (...)
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  34.  78
    Quine’s Way Out.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1975 - Analysis 36 (1):28-37.
    As a way of dealing with the semantical paradoxes Quine has suggested: that semantical expressions such as ‘true’ and ‘true of’ be used with numerical subscripts; that when a truth locution T is applied to a sentence S, the subscript on T is greater than any within S; otherwise, the result of applying T to S is ill formed. A problem is that this introduces infinitely many semantical primitives. The paper suggests a way around the problem. The paper raises a (...)
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  35.  83
    Kripke on Necessity and Identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.
    It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.
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  36.  80
    What is the Logic of Propositional Identity?Charles Sayward - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (1):3-15.
    Propositional identity is not expressed by a predicate. So its logic is not given by the ordinary first order axioms for identity. What are the logical axioms governing this concept, then? Some axioms in addition to those proposed by Arthur Prior are proposed.
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  37.  65
    Steiner Versus Wittgenstein.Charles Sayward - 2005 - Theoria 20 (3):347-352.
    Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
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  38.  72
    Prior’s Theory of Propositions.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1977 - Analysis 37 (3):104-112.
    Prior propounded a theory that, if correct, explains how it is possible for a statement about propositions to be true even if there are no propositions. The major feature of his theory is his treatment of sentence letters as bindable variables in non-referential positions. His theory, however, does not include a semantical account of the resulting quantification. The paper tries to fill that gap.
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  39.  75
    Austin On Whether Every Proposition Has A Contradictory.Michael Durrant & Charles Sayward - 1967 - Analysis 27 (April):167-170.
    Austin rejects the contention that every proposition has a contradictory. This paper finds problems with the case Austin makes for rejecting the contention in question.
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  40.  41
    Frege on Identities.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2000 - History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.
    The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an (...)
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  41.  91
    Convention T and Basic Law V.Charles Sayward - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):289–292.
    It is argued that Convention T and Basic Law V of Frege’s Grungesetze share three striking similarities. First, they are universal generalizations that are intuitively plausible because they have so many obvious instances. Second, both are false because they yield contradictions. Third, neither gives rise to a paradox.
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  42.  69
    Offices and God.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Sophia 29:29-34.
    Pavel Tichy presents an interpretation of Anselm’s Proslogion III argument. Tichy presents an interpretation of this argument and raises doubts about one of the premises. The authors contend that Tichy’s interpretation of Anselm is wrong. The argument Tichy comes to raise doubts about is not Anselm’s.
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  43.  49
    More on Propositional Identity.Charles Sayward & Philip Hugly - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):129-132.
    We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) = (.. (...)
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  44.  82
    Moral Relativism and Deontic Logic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Synthese 85 (1):139 - 152.
    If a native of India asserts "Killing cattle is wrong" and a Nebraskan asserts "Killing cattle is not wrong", and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral (...)
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  45.  36
    More on Propositional Identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):129-132.
    We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) = (.. (...)
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  46.  58
    The Lessons of the Liar.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Theory and Decision 11 (1):55-70.
    The paper argues that the liar paradox teaches us these lessons about English. First, the paradox-yielding sentence is a sentence of English that is neither true nor false in English. Second, there is no English name for any such thing as a set of all and only true sentences of English. Third, ‘is true in English’ does not satisfy the axiom of comprehension.
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  47.  55
    What is a Second Order Theory Committed To?Charles Sayward - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (1):79 - 91.
    The paper argues that no second order theory is ontologically commited to anything beyond what its individual variables range over.
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  48.  57
    Semantical Hierarchies and Semantical Primitives.Charles Sayward - 1975 - In Hassan Sharifi (ed.), From Meaning to Sound: Proceedings of the 1974 Mid-American Linguistics Conference, 5: 38-40. college of arts and sciences, university of nebraska.
    Quine’s way of dealing with the semantical paradoxes (Ways of Paradox, pp. 9-10) is criticized. The criticism is based on three premises: (1) no learnable language has infinitely many semantical primitives; (2) any language of which Quine’s theory is true has infinitely many semantical primitives; (3) English is a learnable language. The conclusion drawn is that Quine’s theory is not true of English.
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  49.  74
    Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.
    The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language is possible.
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  50.  56
    Do Moral Explanations Matter?Charles Sayward - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
    Nicholas Sturgeon has claimed that moral explanations constitute one area of disagreement between moral realists and noncognitivists. He claims that the correctness of such explanation is consistent with moral realism but not with noncognitivism. Does this difference characterize all other anti-realist views. This paper argues that it does not. Moral relativism is a distinct anti-realist view. And the correctness of moral explanation is consistent with moral relativism.
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