Results for 'Scientific Change'

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  1. Putnam's Account of Apriority and Scientific Change: Its Historical and Contemporary Interest.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):429-445.
    In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and (...)
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  2. Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison.Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2008 - Springer.
    The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history (...)
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  3. Scientific Change.Rogier De Langhe - unknown
  4. The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change.Ilkka Niiniluoto & Raimo Tuomela (eds.) - 1979 - North-Holland Pub. Co..
  5.  6
    Review of Nugayev's Book "Reconstruction of Scientific Theory Change". [REVIEW]J. D. North - 1992 - Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Sciences 42:176.
    The monograph is aimed at an analysis of the reasons for theory change in science. The writer develops a model of theory change according to which the origins of scientific revolutions lie not in a clash of fundamental theories with facts, but of ‘old’ fundamental theories with each other.
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  6. Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures.Otávio Bueno - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (2):213-235.
    Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version (...)
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  7. What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting.Otávio Bueno - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (1):55-81.
    In this paper a constructive empiricist account of scientific change is put forward. Based on da Costa's and French's partial structures approach, two notions of empirical adequacy are initially advanced (with particular emphasis on the introduction of degrees of empirical adequacy). Using these notions, it is shown how both the informativeness and the empirical adequacy requirements of an empiricist theory of scientific change can then be met. Finally, some philosophical consequences with regard to the role of (...)
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  8.  19
    Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
    The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?
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  9.  73
    Joint Acceptance and Scientific Change: A Case Study.Hanne Andersen - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):248-265.
    Recently, several scholars have argued that scientists can accept scientific claims in a collective process, and that the capacity of scientific groups to form joint acceptances is linked to a functional division of labor between the group members. However, these accounts reveal little about how the cognitive content of the jointly accepted claim is formed, and how group members depend on each other in this process. In this paper, I shall therefore argue that we need to link analyses (...)
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  10.  6
    The Journey From Discovery to Scientific Change: Scientific Communities, Shared Models, and Specialised Vocabulary.Sarah M. Roe - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (1):47-67.
    Scientific communities as social groupings and the role that such communities play in scientific change and the production of scientific knowledge is currently under debate. I examine theory change as a complex social interaction among individual scientists and the scientific community, and argue that individuals will be motivated to adopt a more radical or innovative attitude when confronted with striking similarities between model systems and a more robust understanding of specialised vocabulary. Two case studies (...)
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  11.  73
    Evolution and Continuity in Scientific Change.Dudley Shapere - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):419-437.
    The alleged problem of "incommensurability" is examined, and attempts to explain scientific change in terms of concepts of meaning and reference are analyzed and rejected. A way of understanding scientific change through a properly developed concept of "reasons" is presented, and the issues of reasons, meaning, and reference are placed in the context of this broader interpretation of scientific change.
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  12.  4
    Kuhnianism and Neo-Kantianism: On Friedman’s Account of Scientific Change.Thodoris Dimitrakos - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):361-382.
    Friedman’s perspective on scientific change is a sophisticated attempt to combine Kantian transcendental philosophy and the Kuhnian historiographical model. In this article, I will argue that Friedman’s account, despite its virtues, fails to achieve the philosophical goals that it self-consciously sets, namely to unproblematically combine the revolutionary perspective of scientific development and the neo-Kantian philosophical framework. As I attempt to show, the impossibility of putting together these two aspects stems from the incompatibility between Friedman’s neo-Kantian conception of (...)
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    Idealization, Abduction, and Progressive Scientific Change.Xavier de Donato Rodríguez - 2007 - Theoria 22 (3):331-338.
    After a brief comparison of Aliseda’s account with different approaches to abductive reasoning, I relate abduction, as studied by Aliseda, to idealization, a notion which also occupies a very important role in scientific change, as well as to different ways of dealing with the growth of scientific knowledge understood as a particular kind of non-monotonic process. A particularly interesting kind of abductive reasoning could be that of finding an appropriate concretization case for a theory, originally revealed as (...)
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  14.  16
    Multivariate Models of Scientific Change.Miriam Solomon - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:287 - 297.
    Social scientists regularly make use of multivariate models to describe complex social phenomena. It is argued that this approach is useful for modelling the variety of cognitive and social factors contributing to scientific change, and superior to the integrated models of scientific change currently available. It is also argued that care needs to be taken in drawing normative conclusions: cognitive factors are not instrinsically more "rational" than social factors, nor is it likely that social factors, by (...)
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  15.  6
    Outsiders Enabling Scientific Change: Learning From the Sociohistory of a Mathematical Proof.Andersen Line Edslev - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (2):184-191.
    It has been a common belief among scientists, including mathematicians, that young scientists are especially good at bringing about scientific change. A number of studies suggest, however, that older scientists are not more resistant to change than young scientists are. It is nonetheless worth examining why a scientist’s or mathematician’s outsider status – due to age, educational background, or something else – can sometimes be effective in enabling scientific change. This paper focuses on the case (...)
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  16.  38
    Scientific Change.Hanne Andersen & Brian Hepburn - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Scientific Change How do scientific theories, concepts and methods change over time? Answers to this question have historical parts and philosophical parts. There can be descriptive accounts of the recorded differences over time of particular theories, concepts, and methods—what might be called the shape of scientific change. Many stories of scientific change attempt to give […].
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  17.  33
    Are Kant's Concepts and Methodology Inconsistent with Scientific Change? Constitutivity and the Synthetic Method in Kant.Paul L. Franco - 2012 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (2):321-353.
    Sympathetic commentators on Kant’s account of physical knowledge agree that while philosophy of science has much to gain from Kant’s notion of constitutive a priori principles, Kant’s conceptual and methodological resources are inconsistent with the possibility of scientific change. In this article, I argue that this received view is lacking since Kant’s claim that a unique set of a priori principles structures our knowledge for all time is not central to his account of the constitutive a priori. Two (...)
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  18.  35
    Pavlov's View of the Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics as It Relates to Theses Concerning Scientific Change.George Windholz & P. A. Lamal - 1991 - Synthese 88 (1):97 - 111.
    Pavlov's position on the inheritance of acquired characteristics was used to test selected theses of Laudan et al. (1986) concerning scientific change. It was determined that, despite negative experimental findings, Pavlov continued to accept the possibility of the inheritance of acquired habits. This confirms the main thesis I that, once accepted, theories persist despite negative experimental evidence. Pavolv's adherence to the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics might possibly be explained by his early experiences. Adolescent readings of a (...)
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  19. Idealization, Abduction, and Progressive Scientific Change.Xavier Donato Rodríguedez - 2007 - Theoria 22 (3):331-338.
    After a brief comparison of Aliseda’s account with different approaches to abductive reasoning, I relate abduction, as studied by Aliseda, to idealization, a notion which also occupies a very important role in scientific change, as well as to different ways of dealing with the growth of scientific knowledge understood as a particular kind of non-monotonic process. A particularly interesting kind of abductive reasoning could be that of finding an appropriate concretization case for a theory, originally revealed as (...)
     
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  20. Empiricism, Scientific Change and Mathematical Change.Otávio Bueno - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):269-296.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelled (...)
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  21. Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change.Arthur Donovan, Larry Laudan, Rachel Laudan & John Preston - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):1063-1065.
  22.  31
    Climate Change Conceptual Change: Scientific Information Can Transform Attitudes.Michael Andrew Ranney & Dav Clark - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):49-75.
    Of this article's seven experiments, the first five demonstrate that virtually no Americans know the basic global warming mechanism. Fortunately, Experiments 2–5 found that 2–45 min of physical–chemical climate instruction durably increased such understandings. This mechanistic learning, or merely receiving seven highly germane statistical facts, also increased climate-change acceptance—across the liberal-conservative spectrum. However, Experiment 7's misleading statistics decreased such acceptance. These readily available attitudinal and conceptual changes through scientific information disconfirm what we term “stasis theory”—which some researchers and (...)
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  23. The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change.Hasok Chang - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (3):413-429.
    Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists’ decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging and disturbing the commonly accepted continuities (...)
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  24.  6
    Reconstruction of Scientific Theory Change.Rinat M. Nugayev & Christian Suhm - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):206-210.
    In his book “Reconstruction of Scientific Change” R.M. Nugayev proposes a new model of theory change by analyzing the reasons for theory change in science. Nugayev’s theoretical concept is based on a realist’s philosophical attitude. The most important notions of Nugayev’ s conception of theory change are “theories’ cross” and “crossbred objects”, which he takes from the terminology of other Russian philosophers of science (Bransky, Podgoretzky, Smorodinsky). His investigations often refer to several famous Western philosophers. (...)
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  25.  19
    Repertoires: A Post-Kuhnian Perspective on Scientific Change and Collaborative Research.Rachel A. Ankeny & Sabina Leonelli - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 60:18-28.
  26.  16
    Using Conceptual Spaces to Exhibit Conceptual Continuity Through Scientific Theory Change.George Masterton, Frank Zenker & Peter Gärdenfors - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):127-150.
    There is a great deal of justified concern about continuity through scientific theory change. Our thesis is that, particularly in physics, such continuity can be appropriately captured at the level of conceptual frameworks using conceptual space models. Indeed, we contend that the conceptual spaces of three of our most important physical theories—Classical Mechanics, Special Relativity Theory, and Quantum Mechanics —have already been so modelled as phase-spaces. Working with their phase-space formulations, one can trace the conceptual changes and continuities (...)
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  27.  75
    Scientific Realism and Scientific Change.John Worrall - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (128):201-231.
    The topic of the paper is the "realism-Instrumentalism" debate concerning the status of scientific theories. Popper's contributions to this debate are critically examined. In the first part his arguments against instrumentalism are considered; it is claimed that none strikes home against better versions of the doctrine (specifically those developed by duhem and poincare). In the second part, Various arguments against realism propounded by duhem and/or poincare (and much discussed by more recent philosophers) are evaluated. These are the arguments from (...)
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  28. Scientific Change as Political Action: Franz Boas and the Anthropology of Race.Mark Risjord - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (1):24-45.
    A theory is value-neutral when no constitutive values are part of its content. Nonneutral theories seem to lack objectivity because it is not clear how the constitutive values could be empirically confirmed. This article analyzes Franz Boas’s famous arguments against nineteenth-century evolutionary anthropology and racial theory. While he recognized that talk of "higher civilizations" encoded a constitutive, political value with consequences for slavery and colonialism, he argued against it on empirical and methodological grounds. Boas’s arguments thus provide a model of (...)
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  29. The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change.Hasok Chang - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 26 (2):121-136.
    Many of the experiments that produced the empirical basis of quantum mechanics relied on classical assumptions that contradicted quantum mechanics. Historically this did not cause practical problems, as classical mechanics was used mostly when it did not happen to diverge too much from quantum mechanics in the quantitative sense. That fortunate circumstances, however, did not alleviate the conceptual problems involved in understanding the classical experimental reasoning in quantum-mechanical terms. In general, this type of difficulty can be expected when a coherent (...)
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  30. Scientific Change, Emerging Specialties, and Research Schools.Gerald L. Geison - 1981 - History of Science 19 (43 pt 1):20-40.
  31.  23
    Exemplars and Scientific Change.David L. Hull - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:479 - 503.
    Philosophers have distinguished a metaphysical category which they term "historical entities" or "continuants". Such particulars are spatiotemporally localized and develop continuously through time while retaining internal cohesiveness. Species, social groups and conceptual systems can be profitably treated as historical entities. No damage is done to preanalytic intuitions in treating social groups as historical entities; both biological species and conceptual systems can be construed as historical entities only by modifying the ordinary way of viewing both. However, if species and conceptual systems (...)
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  32.  7
    Explaining Scientific Change: Integrating the Cognitive and the Social.Paul Thagard - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:298 - 303.
    Cognitive and social explanations of science should be complementary rather than competing. Mind, society, and nature interact in complex ways to produce the growth of scientific knowledge. The recent development and wide acceptance of the theory that ulcers are caused by bacteria illustrates the interaction of psychological, sociological, and natural factors. Mind-nature interactions are evident in the use of instruments and experiments. Mind-society interactions are evident in collaborative research and the flow of information among researchers. Finally, nature-society interactions are (...)
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  33.  38
    From Galen's Theory to William Harvey's Theory: A Case Study in the Rationality of Scientific Theory Change.Bryan Mowry - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (1):49-82.
    The history of science is that of older theories being challenged and eventually being superseded by newer theories. The rationality of this process of scientific theory change is a central issue in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper aims to elucidate this topic by examining an episode in the history of medical science, namely the change from Galen's theory of the movement of the heart and blood to Harvey’s theory of the circulation of the blood. In Part (...)
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  34.  69
    The Threshold Model of Scientific Change and the Continuity of Scientific Knowledge.Martti Kuokkanen & Timo Tuomivaara - 1994 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 25 (2):327 - 335.
    The continuity thesis of the Poznań school threshold model of the growth of scientific knowledge is considered in the light of the example of Van der Waals' and Boyle-Mariotte's laws. It is argued - using both traditional logical means and the structuralist reconstruction of the example - that the continuity thesis does not hold. A distinction between 'a historical and a systematic point of view' is introduced and it is argued that the continuity thesis of the threshold model presupposes (...)
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  35.  45
    From Stratospheric Ozone to Climate Change: Historical Perspective on Precaution and Scientific Responsibility.Gérard Mégie & Robert McGinn - 2006 - Science and Engineering Ethics 12 (4):596-606.
    The issue of the impact of human activities on the stratospheric ozone layer emerged in the early 1970s. But international regulations to mitigate the most serious effects were not adopted until the mid-1980s. This case holds lessons for addressing more complex environmental problems. Concepts that should inform discussion include “latency,’ ‘counter-factual scenario based on the Precautionary Principle,’ ‘inter-generational burden sharing,’ and ‘estimating global costs under factual and counter-factual regulatory scenarios.’ Stringent regulations were adopted when large scientific uncertainty existed, and (...)
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  36.  28
    Paradigm Shifts, Scientific Revolutions, and the Unit of Scientific Change: Towards a Post-Kuhnian Theory of Types of Scientific Development.Paul C. L. Tang - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:125 - 136.
    One of the central problems arising from just the descriptive aspect of Kuhn's theory of scientific development by revolutions concerns the problem of generality. Is Kuhn's theory general enough to encompass the development of all the sciences, including both the natural sciences and the social sciences? The answer to this question is no. It is argued that this negative answer is due not to the nature of the sciences themselves but to the nature of Kuhn's theory and, in particular, (...)
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  37.  27
    Objectivity, Rationality, and Scientific Change.Dudley Shapere - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:637 - 663.
    "Objectivity" and "rationality" of science do not depend on freedom from all "presuppositions", but are inextricably bound with the employment of background beliefs, so long as those background beliefs satisfy certain constraints. These latter have developed through application of the same kind of reasoning that they themselves dictate, and change in response to changes in the reasoning-patterns which they themselves generate. This interaction of constraints and reasoning does not eventuate in a vicious circle; rather, what results is a mutual (...)
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  38.  5
    Las Salvedades (Provisos) y la Magnitud Del Cambio Teórico (Provisos and the Magnitude of Scientific Change).Hernán Miguel, Jorge Paruelo & Guillermo Pissinis - 2002 - Critica 34 (101):43 - 71.
    Las fallas predictivas obligan a alguna modificación en las teorías, lo cual, en muchos casos, consiste en detectar algún factor que ha interferido en el experimento. Podría ser que se tratara de un factor de un tipo ya reconocido por la teoría o bien que fuera necesario proponer un factor de un tipo no conocido hasta el momento. En este trabajo proponemos un ordenamiento de los cambios en las teorías de acuerdo con el tipo de factor propuesto en la modificación. (...)
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  39.  2
    Translation and Scientific Change'.Veikko Rantala - 1995 - In HerfelWilliam (ed.), Theories and Models in Scientific Processes. Rodopi. pp. 249--268.
  40.  91
    Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research.Larry Laudan, Arthur Donovan, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard & Steve Wykstra - 1986 - Synthese 69 (2):141 - 223.
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  41. European Science and Scholarship in Exile: Conformity and Disparity Mitchell Ash and Alfons Söllner, Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigre German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars After 1933. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1996.A. C. Garrett - 1996 - History of the Human Sciences 9 (4):139-149.
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  42.  9
    The Justification of Scientific Change.Carl R. Kordig - 1971 - Dordrecht: Reidel.
    Based on author's dissertation--Yale University.
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  43.  17
    Reasoning in Scientific Change: Charles Darwin, Hugo de Vries, and the Discovery of Segregation.Lindley Darden - 1976 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (2):127-169.
  44. The Nature of Technological Knowledge Are Models of Scientific Change Relevant?Rachel Laudan - 1984
     
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  45.  26
    Scientific Change: Gradual or Catastrophic?Mario Bunge - 1988 - Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 4:792-796.
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  46. Meaning and Scientific Change.Dudley Shapere - 1966 - In R. Colodny (ed.), Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 41--85.
  47. Scientific Change: Perspectives and Proposals.J. E. McGuire - 1992 - In Merrilee H. Salmon (ed.), Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Hackett. pp. 132--178.
     
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  48.  46
    Revolution or Reform The Chemical Revolution and Eighteenth Century Concepts of Scientific Change.C. E. Perrin - 1987 - History of Science 25 (4):395-423.
  49.  41
    Scientific Change.H. F. Kearney - 1964 - Philosophical Studies 13:243-245.
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  50.  56
    The Recent Revolution in Geology and Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Change.Rachel Laudan - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:227 - 239.
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