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Profile: Scott Stapleford (St. Thomas University)
  1.  36
    Imperfect Epistemic Duties and the Justificational Fecundity of Evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4065-4075.
    Mark Nelson argues that we have no positive epistemic duties. His case rests on the evidential inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence—what he calls their ‘infinite justificational fecundity’. It is argued here that Nelson’s reflections on the richness of sensory and propositional evidence do make it doubtful that we ever have an epistemic duty to add any particular beliefs to our belief set, but that they fail to establish that we have no positive epistemic duties whatsoever. A theory of epistemic (...)
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  2.  19
    Completing Epistemic Oughts.Scott Stapleford - 2014 - Philosophical Forum 45 (2):133-148.
    Our intuitions about what a person epistemically ought or ought not believe are sometimes quite clear. Keith DeRose and Richard Feldman have devised examples about which our intuitions are likely to conflict. DeRose argues that the conflict of intuitions arises from ambiguity in the epistemic ought. I argue that it results from incompleteness. The success of the argument depends on rejecting the narrow conception of evidential support according to which a person’s evidence supports some proposition P only if the person (...)
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  3. Epistemic Duties and Failure to Understand One's Evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.
    The paper defends the thesis that our epistemic duty is the duty to proportion our beliefs to the evidence we possess. An inclusive view of evidence possessed is put forward on the grounds that it makes sense of our intuitions about when it is right to say that a person ought to believe some proposition P. A second thesis is that we have no epistemic duty to adopt any particular doxastic attitudes. The apparent tension between the two theses is resolved (...)
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  4.  19
    Why There May Be Epistemic Duties.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (01):63-89.
    Chase Wrenn argues that there are no epistemic duties. When it appears that we have an epistemic duty to believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement about some proposition P, we are really under a moral obligation to adopt the attitude towards P that our evidence favours. The argument appeals to theoretical parsimony: our conceptual scheme will be simpler without epistemic duties and we should therefore drop them. I argue that Wrenn’s strategy is flawed. There may well be things that we ought (...)
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  5. The Worst Argument in the World—Defended.Scott Stapleford - forthcoming - Think.
    In this paper, I argue that Berkeley’s master argument is not the worst argument in the world—more like third or fourth.
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  6.  49
    Epistemic Value Monism and the Swamping Problem.Scott Stapleford - 2016 - Ratio 29 (3):283-297.
    Many deontologists explain the epistemic value of justification in terms of its instrumental role in promoting truth – the original source of value in the epistemic domain. The swamping problem for truth monism appears to make this position indefensible, at least for those monists who maintain the superiority of knowledge to merely true belief. I propose a new solution to the swamping problem that allows monists to maintain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over merely true belief. My trick is (...)
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  7.  37
    Epistemic Versus All Things Considered Requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.
    Epistemic obligations are constraints on belief stemming from epistemic considerations alone. Booth is one of the many philosophers who deny that there are epistemic obligations. Any obligation pertaining to belief is an all things considered obligation, according to him—a strictly generic, rather than specifically epistemic, requirement. Though Booth’s argument is valid, I will try to show that it is unsound. There are two central premises: S is justified in believing that P iff S is blameless in believing that P; S (...)
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  8.  46
    On the Contradiction in Conception Test of the Categorical Imperative.Scott Stapleford - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):306-318.
    The author argues against Christine Korsgaard's influential interpretation of Kant's contradiction in conception test of the categorical imperative. Korsgaard's rejection of the ‘teleological' interpretation is shown to be based on a misunderstanding of the role that teleology plays for Kant in ruling out immoral maxims, and her defence of the ‘practical' interpretation is shown to be less faithful to the text than the competing ‘logical' interpretation. The works of Barbara Herman and Allen Wood are also discussed and evaluated.
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  9.  92
    Locke on Sensitive Knowledge as Knowledge.Scott Stapleford - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):206-231.
    This article is an extended analysis of the most recent scholarly work on Locke's account of sensitive knowledge. Lex Newman's "dual cognitive relations" model of sensitive knowledge is examined in detail. The author argues that the dual cognitive relations model needs to be revised on both philosophical and historical grounds. While no attempt is made to defend Locke's position, the aim is to show that it is at least consistent, contrary to the received view. The final section provides textual support (...)
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  10.  41
    Transcendental Arguments: Superfluity and Scepticism.Scott Stapleford - 2005 - Theoria 71 (4):333-367.
    The paper is a sustained analysis of some recent work on transcendental arguments with a view to assessing both its relevance to Kant's philosophy and its historical accuracy. Robert Stem's reading of Kant's philosophical aims is examined and criticized narrowly, and Barry Stroud's influential objection to transcendental arguments as a class is shown to be harmless. Kant is presented as a friend rather than a foe of scepticism, and his 'proto-verificationist' criterion of meaning is shown to underpin, rather than undermine, (...)
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  11.  18
    Reid, Tetens, and Kant on the External World.Scott Stapleford - 2007 - Idealistic Studies 37 (2):87-104.
    Building on the research of Manfred Kuehn, the author argues that, whatever influence the Scottish Common Sense Philosophy of Thomas Reid may have had on the development of Immanuel Kant’s refutation of idealism, it was filtered through the thinking of Kant’s largely forgotten German contemporary, Johann Nicolaus Tetens. While the importance of Tetens for understanding Kant is examined in connection with only one idea, the aim is to demonstrate that Tetens is a figure worthy of serious historical consideration.
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  12.  35
    Kant's Transcendental Arguments as Conceptual Proofs.Scott Stapleford - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (1):119-136.
    The paper is an attempt to explain what a transcendental argument is for Kant. The interpretation is based on a reading of the 'Discipline of Pure Reason', Sections 1 and 4 of the first Critique. The author first identifies several statements that Kant makes about the method of proof he followed in the 'Analytic of Principles' which seem to be inconsistent. He then tries to remove the apparent inconsistencies by focusing on the idea of instantiation and drawing a distinction between (...)
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  13. Kenneth R. Westphal, Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism Reviewed By.Scott Stapleford - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (4):308-310.
     
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  14.  14
    A Refutation of Idealism From 1777.Scott Stapleford - 2010 - Idealistic Studies 40 (1/2):139-146.
    The paper identifies a possible precedent for Kant’s Refutation of Idealism in the work of Johann Nicolaus Tetens. An attempt is made to reconstruct the reasoning that led Tetens to reject idealism as a false starting point, and some parallels are drawn between Tetens’s psychologistic approach to the problem andKant’s transcendental methodology.
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  15.  10
    Strawson and Schaumann on the Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism.Scott Stapleford - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):273-279.
    The paper is a limited defence of one of P. F. Strawson's least popular declarations about the nature of Kant's transcendental idealism. An attempt is made to relate Strawson's reading to an interpretative controversy that emerged in the years immediately following the publication of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Johann Christian Gottlob Schaumann, an otherwise unremarkable figure, is considered as an early defender of the thoroughly idealistic interpretation in the distinctive form articulated by Strawson.
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  16.  6
    Tom Sorell, G. A. J. Rogers, and Jill Kraye, Eds. , 'Scientia' in Early Modern Philosophy: Seventeenth-Century Thinkers on Demonstrative Knowledge From First Principles . Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Scott Stapleford - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (6):438-441.
  17.  9
    Review: Guyer, Kant.Scott Stapleford - 2007 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):420-422.
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  18.  3
    Tetens' Refutation of Idealism and Properly Basic Belief.Scott Stapleford - 2014 - In Gideon Stiening Udo Thiel (ed.), Johann Nikolaus Tetens (1736-1807): Philosophie in der Tradition des europäischen Empirismus. De Gruyter. pp. 147-168.
  19.  1
    Kant. [REVIEW]Scott Stapleford - 2007 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):420-422.
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  20.  17
    Berkeley’s Principles: Expanded and Explained.George Berkeley, Tyron Goldschmidt & Scott Stapleford - 2016 - Routledge.
    Berkeley's Principles: Expanded and Explained includes the entire classical text of the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge in bold font, a running commentary blended seamlessly into the text in regular font and analytic summaries of each section. The commentary is like a professor on hand to guide the reader through every line of the daunting prose and every move in the intricate argumentation. The unique design helps students learn how to read and engage with one of modern philosophy's (...)
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  21. Locke’s Essay: Expanded and Explained.Scott Stapleford & Tyron Goldschmidt - 2019 - Routledge.
     
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  22. Hume's Enquiry: Expanded and Explained.Scott Stapleford & Tyron Goldschmidt - forthcoming - Routledge.
  23. Kurt Mosser, Necessity and Possibility: The Logical Strategy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.Scott Stapleford - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (6):430.
     
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  24. Kant's Transcendental Arguments: Disciplining Pure Reason.Scott Stapleford - 2008 - Continuum.
    Two currents of thought dominated Western philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism. Despite the gradual dissemination of British ideas on the Continent in the first decades of the eighteenth century, these fundamentally disparate philosophical outlooks seemed to be wholly irreconcilable. However, the publication of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 presented an entirely new method of philosophical reasoning that promised to combine the virtues of Rationalism with the scientific rigour of Empiricism. This (...)
     
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  25. Paul Guyer, Ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy.Scott Stapleford - 2007 - Philosophy in Review 27 (3):182.
     
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  26. Seeing a Flower in the Garden: Common Sense, Transcendental Idealism.Scott Stapleford - forthcoming - In Elizabeth Robinson & Chris Surprenant (eds.), Kant and The Scottish Enlightenment. New York: Routledge. pp. 326–341.
    Stapleford (2007) identified Johann Nicolaus Tetens as the missing link between Reid’s common sense treatment of external world scepticism and Kant’s transcendental Refutation of Idealism. While that account is arguably correct, it failed to recognize the distinction between being justified in believing P and being justified in believing that my belief in P is justified. This paper corrects the oversight and explains its implications. Tetens emerges as a weak externalist regarding knowledge of external objects, situated roughly halfway between Reid’s moderate (...)
     
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  27. What's the Point of a Dreaming Argument?Scott Stapleford - forthcoming - Think.
    In this paper, I argue that dreaming arguments are no cause for alarm.
     
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