17 found
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  1. Modal Fictionalism and Analysis.Seahwa Kim - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 116.
  2. Counterfactuals as Short Stories.Seahwa Kim & Cei Maslen - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):81-117.
    We present an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of stories and combine it with an account similar to Walton’s account of truth in fiction to yield truth conditions for counterfactuals. We discuss unusual features of this account, and compare it to other main approaches. In particular, we argue that our analysis succeeds in accounting for counterpossibles and counterfactuals with true antecedents while the other two main approaches fail, and we give reasons for thinking that it is important to have an (...)
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  3. Modal Fictionalism Generalized and Defended.Seahwa Kim - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (2):121 - 146.
    In this paper, I will defend modalfictionalism. The paper has two parts. In thefirst part, I will suggest a revised version ofmodal fictionalism which can avoid certaintechnical problems. In the second part, I willpropose a nominalized version of modalfictionalism and a general scheme offictionalism for the nominalist.
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  4. World-Indexed Descriptivism and an Illusory Problem of Empty Names.Seahwa Kim - 2006 - Philosophy 101:277-298.
  5.  36
    The Real Puzzle From Radford.Seahwa Kim - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):29-46.
    In this paper, I will argue that Radfords real question is not the conceptual one, as it is usually taken, but the causal one, and show that Waltons account, which treats Radfords puzzle as the conceptual question, is not a satisfactory solution to it. I will also argue that contrary to what Walton claims, the causal question is not only important, but also closely related to the conceptual and normative questions. What matters is not that Walton has not solved Radfords (...)
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  6.  36
    Understanding Yagisawa's Worlds.Seahwa Kim - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):293-301.
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  7.  46
    A Defence of Semantic Pretence Hermeneutic Fictionalism Against the Autism Objection.Seahwa Kim - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):321-333.
    I defend pretence hermeneutic fictionalism against the Autism Objection. The objection is this: since people with autism have no difficulty in engaging with mathematics even if they cannot pretend, it is not the case that engagement with mathematics involves pretence. I show that a previous response to the objection is inadequate as a defence of the kind of pretence hermeneutic fictionalism put forward as a semantic thesis about the discourse in question. I claim that a more general response to the (...)
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  8.  20
    An Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics: A Reader Eds. By Marcus, Russell and Mark McEvoy: London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, Pp. Xxx + 815, £75. [REVIEW]Seahwa Kim - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):831-831.
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  9. Fiction, Mathematics and Modality: A Unified Fictionalism.Seahwa Kim - 1999 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    I defend a unified fictionalism about modality and mathematics. First, I defend each view separately against internal objections. Then, I attempt a unified fictionalism by giving an analysis of truth in fiction which is neither modal nor platonistic. Finally, I explore the prospects for nominalistic unified fictionalism. ;In the first chapter, I defend modal fictionalism: the view that statements about possible worlds are best understood as claims about the content of a fiction, the 'many-worlds story'. I address the Brock-Rosen objection (...)
     
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  10.  90
    Modal Tense and the Absolutely Unrestricted Quantifier.Seahwa Kim - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):73-76.
    In this paper, I examine Takashi Yagisawa’s response to van Inwagen’s ontic objection against David Lewis. Van Inwagen criticizes Lewis’s commitment to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘there is,’ and Yagisawa claims that by adopting modal tenses he avoids commitment to absolutely unrestricted quantification. I argue that Yagisawa faces a problem parallel to the one Lewis faces. Although Yagisawa officially rejects the absolutely unrestricted sense of a quantifying expression, he is still committed to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘is a (...)
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  11.  51
    On Gilmore’s Definition of ‘Dead’.Seahwa Kim - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):105-110.
    Gilmore proposes a new definition of ‘dead’ in response to Fred Feldman’s earlier definition in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies.’ In this paper, I critically examine Gilmore’s new definition. First, I explain what his definition is and how it is an improvement upon Feldman’s definition. Second, I raise an objection to it by noting that it fails to rule out the possibility of a thing that dies without becoming dead.
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  12.  27
    The Rationality of Emotion Toward Fiction.Seahwa Kim - 2010 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):106-119.
  13.  12
    Priest’s Theory of Unity and the Superabundance of Gluons.Seahwa Kim - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):550-554.
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  14.  47
    Counterlegals and the 'Makes No Difference' Argument.Seahwa Kim - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):419 - 426.
    In his 2003 paper, “Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference?”, Alan Baker criticizes what he terms the ‘Makes No Difference’ (MND) argument by arguing that it does not succeed in undermining platonism. In this paper, I raise two objections. The first objection is that Baker is wrong in claiming that the premise of the MND argument lacks a truth-value. The second objection is that the theory of counterlegals which he appeals to in his argument is incompatible with (...)
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  15.  8
    If-Thenism and Fictionalism.Seahwa Kim - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):189-195.
    ABSTRACTStandard theories treat A→C and A→D as equivalent when C and D coincide on A. However, Yablo's incremental conditional does not behave in this way. Consider the following: a = b→Fa. a = b→Fb.According to Yablo, the real content of is Fb and the real content of is Fa. In worlds where a = b is true, both and have the same truth-value. However, ‘Fa can come apart truth-value-wise from Fb in worlds where a isn't b.’ In this paper, I (...)
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  16.  13
    A New Interpretation of the Indispensability Argument.Seahwa Kim - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):189 - 201.
    The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument runs as follows: We have reason to believe in Fs if Fs are indispensable to our best available science. Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best available science. Therefore, we have reason to believe in mathematical entities.According to the standard understanding, in order to refute the argument the nominalist has to show that mathematical entities are dispensable by providing an at least as good theory of the same phenomena that is not ontologically committed to mathematical entities. (...)
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  17.  6
    Counterlegals and the ‘Makes No Difference’ Argument.Seahwa Kim - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):419-426.
    In his 2003 paper, "Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference?", Alan Baker criticizes what he terms the 'Makes No Difference' argument by arguing that it does not succeed in undermining platonism. In this paper, I raise two objections. The first objection is that Baker is wrong in claiming that the premise of the MND argument lacks a truth-value. The second objection is that the theory of counterlegals which he appeals to in his argument is incompatible with actual (...)
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