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Seamus Bradley
University of Leeds
  1. Should Subjective Probabilities Be Sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - unknown
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga, that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We (...)
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  2. Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist.Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele - unknown
    This paper considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid `free' evidence before making a decision, and rational agents may have imprecise beliefs and/or desires. Indeed, we show that Good's theorem concerning the invariable choice-worthiness of free evidence does not generalise to the imprecise realm, given the plausible existing decision theories for handling imprecision. A key ingredient in the analysis, and a potential source of controversy, is the (...)
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  3.  26
    A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Theoria 85 (1):18-30.
    There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an agent's degrees of belief are imprecise; represented by a set of probability functions. I show that decision rules recently discussed by Sarah Moss, Susanna Rinard and Rohan Sud all suffer from the same defect: they all struggle to rationalize diachronic ambiguity aversion. Since ambiguity aversion is among the motivations for imprecise credence, this suggests that the search for an adequate imprecise decision rule is not yet over.
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  4.  39
    Laplace’s Demon and the Adventures of His Apprentices.Roman Frigg, Seamus Bradley, Hailiang Du & Leonard A. Smith - unknown
    The sensitive dependence on initial conditions associated with nonlinear models imposes limitations on the models’ predictive power. We draw attention to an additional limitation than has been under-appreciated, namely structural model error. A model has SME if the model-dynamics differ from the dynamics in the target system. If a nonlinear model has only the slightest SME, then its ability to generate decision-relevant predictions is compromised. Given a perfect model, we can take the effects of SDIC into account by substituting probabilistic (...)
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  5.  46
    Modelling Inequality.Karim Thébault, Seamus Bradley & Alexander Reutlinger - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):691-718.
    Econophysics is a new and exciting cross-disciplinary research field that applies models and modelling techniques from statistical physics to economic systems. It is not, however, without its critics: prominent figures in more mainstream economic theory have criticized some elements of the methodology of econophysics. One of the main lines of criticism concerns the nature of the modelling assumptions and idealizations involved, and a particular target are ‘kinetic exchange’ approaches used to model the emergence of inequality within the distribution of individual (...)
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  6.  36
    Constraints on Rational Theory Choice.Seamus Bradley - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):639-661.
    ABSTRACT In a recent article, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational enterprise. In this article, I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to sidestep this argument. In doing so, I present a new argument in favour of voluntarism of the type favoured by van Fraassen. I then show how such a (...)
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  7.  8
    Models on the Move: Migration and Imperialism.Seamus Bradley & Karim Thebault - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
    We introduce ‘model migration’ as a species of cross-disciplinary knowledge transfer whereby the representational function of a model is radically changed to allow application to a new disciplinary context. Controversies and confusions that often derive from this phenomenon will be illustrated in the context of econophysics and phylogeographic linguistics. Migration can be usefully contrasted with concept of ‘imperialism’, that has been influentially discussed in the context of geographical economics. In particular, imperialism, unlike migration, relies upon extension of the original model (...)
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  8.  39
    Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation.Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1287-1303.
    Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.
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  9. Scientific Uncertainty: A User's Guide.Seamus Bradley - 2012 - Grantham Institute on Climate Change Discussion Paper.
    There are different kinds of uncertainty. I outline some of the various ways that uncertainty enters science, focusing on uncertainty in climate science and weather prediction. I then show how we cope with some of these sources of error through sophisticated modelling techniques. I show how we maintain confidence in the face of error.
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  10.  27
    Probabilistic Forecasting: Why Model Imperfection is a Poison Pill.Roman Frigg, Seamus Bradley, Reason L. Machete & Leonard A. Smith - 2013 - In .
    This volume is a serious attempt to open up the subject of European philosophy of science to real thought, and provide the structural basis for the interdisciplinary development of its specialist fields, but also to provoke reflection on the idea of ‘European philosophy of science’. This efforts should foster a contemporaneous reflection on what might be meant by philosophy of science in Europe and European philosophy of science, and how in fact awareness of it could assist philosophers interpret and motivate (...)
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  11. Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2012 - In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer.
  12. A Literary Approach to Scientific Practice.Seamus Bradley - 2011 - Metascience 20 (2):363--367.
    A literary approach to scientific practice: Essay Review of R.I.G. Hughes' _The Theoretical Practices of Physics_.
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  13.  17
    Are Objective Chances Compatible with Determinism?Seamus Bradley - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (8):e12430.
    We review the question of whether objective chances are compatible with determinism. We first outline what we mean by chance and what we mean by determinism. We then look at the alleged incompatibility between those concepts. Finally, we look at some ways that one might attempt to overcome the incompatibility.
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  14.  29
    Lewis' Account of Counterfactuals is Incongruent with Lewis' Account of Laws of Nature.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani & Seamus Bradley - unknown
    In this paper we argue that there is a problem with the conjunction of David Lewis' account of counterfactual conditionals and his account of laws of nature. This is a pressing problem since both accounts are individually plausible, and popular.
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  15.  21
    Nonprobabilistic Chance?Seamus Bradley - unknown
    "Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas. It is often assumed -- without argument -- that chances are probabilities. I explore the extent to which this assumption is really sanctioned by what we understand by the concept of chance.
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  16.  19
    Rational Theory Choice: Arrow Undermined, Kuhn Vindicated.Seamus Bradley - unknown
    In a recent paper, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational entreprise. In this paper I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to avoid Okasha’s conclusion. I go on to argue that making further assumptions about the space of possible scientific theories allows us to make scientific rationality more contentful. I then (...)
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  17.  11
    Vague Chance?Seamus Bradley - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
  18.  13
    Nonclassical Probability and Convex Hulls.Seamus Bradley - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):87-101.
    It is well known that the convex hull of the classical truth value functions contains all and only the probability functions. Work by Paris and Williams has shown that this also holds for various kinds of nonclassical logics too. This note summarises the formal details of this topic and extends the results slightly.
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  19.  1
    Laplace's Demon and Climate Change.Roman Frigg, Seamus Bradley, Hailiang Du & Leonard A. Smith - unknown
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