An examination of the relationship between philosophical and economic thought in the nineteenth century, Economy and Self explores how the free enterprise theory of Classical Economy influenced and was in turn influenced by the philosophical notion of alienation common in the writings of the age.

The authors address problems with “compulsory” arbitration clauses in contracts. Specifically, they note that consumers are misguided about their rights in such cases. In addition, arbitration clauses do not allow the press to cover any proceedings that may result. The arbitration clauses in contracts are written in legalese that consumers do not understand. The authors found that even university students had difficulty understanding the information in such clauses. An example of an actual case is included.

This reissued work, originally published in 1985, is a uniquely broad and original survey of theories and beliefs about the growth, behaviour, performance and reform of the governments of modern Western democracies. After analysing the external pressures which have shaped modern governments, the author examines four different schools of political thought which seek to explain the behaviour and performance of governments, and which offer different remedies for the pluralism, corporatism and bureaucracy. To examine and test these general theories, the author (...) looks closely at how governments actually work. The book is illustrated with examples drawn from various Western societies. The final chapters present the author’s own conclusion about the future role of government, the limits of market philosophy, the future of politics, and the principles and problems of institutional reform. (shrink)

This book provides a philosophical examination of the extent to which legalizing same-sex marriage can contribute to ending the discrimination and social stigma faced by LGBT men and women in the Western world.

This study investigates the three major educational philosophies behind the medical humanities programs in the United States. It summarizes the characteristics of the Cultural Transmission Approach, the Affective Developmental Approach, and the Cognitive Developmental Approach. A questionnaire was sent to 415 teachers of medical humanities asking for their perceptions of the amount of time and effort devoted by their programs to these three philosophical approaches. The 234 responses constituted a 54.6% return. The approximately 80:20 gender ratio of males to females (...) and other demographic data on age and educational background were consistent with other studies of the field of medical humanities.Reflections on the results in Table II indicate that some changes need to take place in the teaching of the medical humanities if the perceived ideal is to be achieved. In order for the current teachers of the medical humanities to think that the appropriate philosophies behind the teaching of the medical humanities are being implemented as they should be, much less time and effort need to be devoted to the Cultural Transmission Approach. With no other published reports on the educational philosophies behind the medical humanities programs, this study created a new knowledge base about this relatively young and rapidly emerging field. (shrink)

My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.

The authors address problems with “compulsory” arbitration clauses in contracts. Specifically, they note that consumers are misguided about their rights in such cases. In addition, arbitration clauses do not allow the press to cover any proceedings that may result. The arbitration clauses in contracts are written in legalese that consumers do not understand. The authors found that even university students had difficulty understanding the information in such clauses. An example of an actual case is included.

A proof is offered that aims to show that there can be no knowledge of God, excluding knowledge based on natural theology, without divine self-testimony. Both special and general revelation, if they occur, would be forms of divine self-testimony. It is argued that this indicates that the best way to model such knowledge of God is on the basis of an analogy with knowledge gained through testimony, rather than perceptual models of knowledge, such as the prominent model defended (...) by Plantinga. Appropriate causal chains and reliable cognitive processes only seem at best to ensure that a belief proposed for acceptance is the belief the testifier wants accepted; they do not ensure that it is rational to accept the belief. This particularly applies where there is much at stake, where it seems rational to seek some form of evidence, if available. Some brief comments are made on Trinitarian self-testimony. Another model of the ‘inner witness’ is briefly sketched out, based on the analogy with conscience. This model may capture some of the features of Plantinga’s approach, but leaves room for a free rejection of divine self-testimony, in a way that the perceptual analogy does not. A point connected to Plantinga’s aims is then made about the link between evidence, value and divine self-testimony, in relation to religious experience. Finally, it is suggested that the earlier proof may apply in a particular sense to all knowledge of God, including that based on natural theology. (shrink)

Increasing use is made of techniques which are supposed to make policy decisions more ‘rational’. Rather little attention, however, has been paid to the relation between these techniques and the logic of choice, the political process, value judgements and assumptions. This short paper will investigate these questions in relation to a particularly fashionable technique, that of cost-benefit analysis.

Background The fourth section of the 1967 Abortion Act states that individuals (including health care practitioners) do not have to participate in an abortion if they have a conscientious objection. A conscientious objection is a refusal to participate in abortion on the grounds of conscience. This may be informed by religious, moral, philosophical, ethical, or personal beliefs. Currently, there is very little investigation into the impact of conscientious objection on service users in Britain. The perspectives of service users are imperative (...) in understanding the real-world consequences and potential impact of conscientious objection and should be considered when creating and reviewing policies and guidelines. This research provided a platform for women and those who can become pregnant to share their experiences and opinions at a time when these voices are largely excluded in the great tradition of Western political philosophy and law-making processes. Method Five service users were interviewed using a narrative interview approach to uncover their abortion journeys and experiences of conscientious objection. Findings The findings were presented as found poems and uncovered that doctors are not always: informing service users that they have a conscientious objection to abortion, giving service users enough information to access abortion (indirect referral), treating them non-judgmentally, and providing medically correct information. Service users did not experience burdens such as long waiting times and were still able to access legal abortion. However, service users did experience negative emotional effects, as they were often left feeling scared, angry, and hopeless when they were not referred and/or were mistreated. Conclusions Findings indicate that conscientious objection could work in practice. However, it is currently failing some individuals on an emotional level, as not all doctors are adhering to guidelines. Conscientious objection in Britain needs to be addressed, to ensure service users receive fair, impartial, non-judgmental care. (shrink)

In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful hermeneutical ignorance and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants misrecognize themselves (...) in their own privileged racial specificity, and they misrecognize others in their own marginal racial specificity. Such misrecognition preserves the cultural imperialism of Australia’s dominant social imaginary—a means of oppression that perpetuates epistemic insensitivity.Bringing this dual misrecognition to light best captures the indignity that is suffered by the victims of the aforementioned epistemic injustices. I argue that it is only when we truly recognize difference in its own terms, shifting the dominant social imaginary, that “mainstream Australians”can do their part in bringing about a just society. (shrink)

This article offers a critique of research practices typical of experimental philosophy. To that end, it presents a review of methodological issues that have proved crucial to the quality of research in the biobehavioral sciences. It discusses various shortcomings in the experimental philosophy literature related to (1) the credibility of self-report questionnaires, (2) the validity and reliability of measurement, (3) the adherence to appropriate procedures for sampling, random assignment, and handling of participants, and (4) the meticulousness of (...) study reporting. It argues that the future standing of experimental philosophy will hinge upon improvements in research methods. (shrink)

Hillel Steiner’s left-libertarian theory of justice is the most serious recent attempt to reconcile the ideals of (luck-egalitarian) equality and freedom. This attempt consists in an argument that a universal right to equal freedom, which in Steiner’s view means also a universal right to maximal freedom, implies a universal right to self-ownership and to an egalitarian share of the world’s natural resources. In this article, I argue that this argument fails on Steiner’s own terms. I argue that, on Steiner’s (...) conceptions of freedom, self-ownership, and an egalitarian share of the world’s natural resources, insofar as the right to equal freedom implies the right to self-ownership and to an egalitarian share of the world’s natural resources, it is incompatible with (luck-egalitarian) equality. (shrink)

Some self-knowledge must be arrived at by the subject herself, rather than being transmitted by another’s testimony. Yet in many cases the subject interacts with an expert in part because she is likely to have the relevant knowledge of their mind. This raises a question: what is the expert’s knowledge like that there are barriers to simply transmitting it by testimony? I argue that the expert’s knowledge is, in some circumstances, proleptic, referring to attitudes the subject would hold were (...) she to reflect in certain ways. The expert’s knowledge cannot be transmitted by testimony because self-knowledge cannot be proleptic. (shrink)

Stephen Mulhall presents a series of multiply interrelated essays which explore the idea of selfhood as a matter of non-self-identity: for example, as becoming or self-overcoming, or as being doubled or divided. He draws on Nietzsche, Sartre, and Wittgenstein, but also on works of opera, cinema, and fiction.

A permanent state of suspension or deferment -- How theory became history -- "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences" -- "I will teach you differences" -- An assembling of reminders -- ". . . a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing" -- Gedankenwegen: on import and interpretation -- "Of which we cannot speak . . .": philosophy and the humanities -- What is (film) philosophy? -- Order out of chaos -- Idea, image, and intuition (...) -- The world, time -- The ordinary necessity of philosophy -- "Art now exists in the condition of philosophy" -- Falling in love with the world -- Ontology and desire, or a moving response to skepticism -- Automatism and the declaration of existence in time -- Ethical practices of the ordinary -- Perfectionism as self-disobedience -- Comedy and community -- A digression on difference and interpretation -- Perfectionism's ironic transport -- An elegy for theory. (shrink)

This important book investigates the emergence and development of a distinct concept of self-awareness in post-classical, pre-modern Islamic philosophy. Jari Kaukua presents the first extended analysis of Avicenna's arguments on self-awareness - including the flying man, the argument from the unity of experience, the argument against reflection models of self-awareness and the argument from personal identity - arguing that all these arguments hinge on a clearly definable concept of self-awareness as pure first-personality. He substantiates his (...) interpretation with an analysis of Suhrawardī's use of Avicenna's concept and Mullā Sadrā's revision of the underlying concept of selfhood. The study explores evidence for a sustained, pre-modern and non-Western discussion of selfhood and self-awareness, challenging the idea that these concepts are distinctly modern, European concerns. The book will be of interest to a range of readers in history of philosophy, history of ideas, Islamic studies and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is central to his attempt to re-instantiate the question of being. This paper examines Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics by looking at the relationship between metaphysics and thought. This entails an identification of the intimate relationship Heidegger maintains exists between philosophy and metaphysics, an analysis of Heidegger’s critique of this association, and a discussion of his proposal that philosophy has been so damaged by its association with metaphysics that it must be replaced with meditative thinking. (...) It is not quite clear, however, how the overcoming of metaphysical thinking is to occur especially given Heidegger’s insistence that relying on human will to effect an alteration in thinking simply re-instantiates the metaphysical perspective to be overcome. While several critics have argued Heidegger has no solution to this issue, instead holding that thought must simply be open to being’s ‘self’-transformation if and when it occurs, I turn to Heidegger’s notion of trace and a number of scattered comments on the relationship between meditative thinking and willing as non-willing to show Heidegger: (a) was aware of this issue; and (b) tried to resolve it by recognising a reconceptualised notion of willing not based on or emanating from the aggressive willing of metaphysics. (shrink)

This remarkable open-access collection of scholarly studies by internationally distinguished experts explores the intricate and multifaceted philosophical concepts of the Self as understood in Graeco-Roman antiquity and the early modern period. The contributors weave together a rich tapestry of historical and comparative case studies that highlight tensions as well as connections between ancient and early modern perspectives on the Self.

The past two decades have been a time of heightened interest in the moral aspects of the practice of medicine. This interest has been reflected in medical education by the establishment of medical humanities programs in both preclinical and clinical education in many medical schools. It has also been reflected in the literature with a dramatic increase in journal articles on medical ethics as well as the development of medical ethics in textbooks. A number of journals have developed that are (...) specifically devoted to medical ethics, including The Journal of Medical Ethics, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, The Journal of Medical Humanities, Theoretical Medicine, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, just to name a few. The literature includes both theoretical foundations and conceptual analyses of particular issues as well as practical advice and general suggestions for how to implement programs in medical humanities. (shrink)

Self-evidence is plausibly taken to be a status that marks propositions as capable of being justifiedly believed on the basis of understanding them. This paper explicates and defends that view. The paper shows that the broadly linguistic kind of understanding implied by basic semantic comprehension of a formulation of a self-evident proposition does not entail being justified in believing that proposition; that the kind of understanding adequate to yield such justification is multi-dimensional; and that there are many variables (...) partly constitutive of such understanding—all philosophically interesting in themselves—that a theory of self-evidence must account for. The paper also shows why self-evident propositions need not be obvious, need not be unprovable, and, far from being beyond dispute, can be rationally disputed. The concluding section shows how knowledge of self-evident propositions is possible even if, on the one hand, their elements are abstract and causally inert and, on the other, beliefs constituting knowledge must meet both causal and reliability conditions connected with their truthmakers. (shrink)

Knowledge of one's self -- Composition of the world as it is -- Things that will improve this world and its nations -- Treatments and remedies of proper medicine -- Proper medicine derived from human nature -- Brief exposition on human nature : foundations of the art of -- Medicine -- Proper philosophy of the nature of composite things, of humans.

Study of philosophy of self in Sāṅkhyakārikā by Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa and Essay concerning human understanding by John Locke, 1632-1704.

This piece is a review essay on Victor Tadros’s The Ends of Harm. Tadros rejects retributive desert but believes punishment can be justified instrumentally without succumbing to the problems of thoroughgoing consequentialism and endorsing using people as means. He believes he can achieve these results through extension of the right of self-defense. I argue that Tadros fails in this endeavor: he has a defective account of the means principle; his rejection of desert leads to gross mismatches of punishment and (...) culpability; and he cannot account for punishment of inchoate crimes. (shrink)

What if self-questioning could provoke an extreme attentiveness to a rich inner life? In pursuit of this question, a mixed group of highly fallible thinkers gather together in the north of England. Will they be able to respond to the actual events of their lives, and reinvent philosophy as a collective spiritual exercise?

In this paper I revisit the early Nyāya argument for the existence of a self. In section 1, I reconstruct the argument in Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.10 as an argument from recognition following the interpretation in the Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya and the Nyāya-Vārttika. In Section 2, I reassess the plausibility of the Nyāya argument from memory/recognition in the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika in the light of recent empirical research. I conclude that the early Nyāya version of the argument from recognition can only establish (...) a minimal conclusion that self is a unitary and persisting conscious agent, in contrast to the ontological conclusion that the self is distinct a substance qualified by consciousness. In the final section, I address the tension between the two conclusions in Nyāya and suggest how it might be resolved. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical critique of professional stereotypes in medicine. In the course of this critique, we also offer a detailed analysis of the concept of care in health care. The paper first considers possible explanations for the traditional stereotype that caring is a province of nurses and women, while curing is an arena suited for physicians and men. It then dispels this stereotype and fine tunes the concept of care. A distinction between ‘caring for’ and ‘caring about’ is (...) made, and concomitant notions of parentalism are elaborated. Finally, the paper illustrates, through the use of cases, diverse models of caring. Our discussion reveals the complexity of care and the alternative modes of caring in health care. (shrink)

It has been argued that we cannot trust the agent to be able to give a true account of his own actions. And that, where self?deception is involved, hermeneutics can do little more than participate in it. Only a rigorous science of the mind can take us towards the truth in these matters. The aim of this paper is to sketch a hermeneutics that can deal with self?deception. It examines the relation between what the agent does and his (...) own account of it. and the relation of both to the communal practices wherein they are both situated. The agent's account and the scientist's will both have to be measured against that of the reflective and experienced practitioner. (shrink)

Socialism grew up in opposition to capitalism, just as liberalism developed in reaction to feudalism. Both liberalism and socialism combined potent critiques of the existing socio‐economic order with blueprints for a desirable future society. However, liberalism provides a rather more coherent body of thought than does socialism, and its theories are linked with the emergence of a dominant system combining capitalism and liberal democracy. By contrast, no widespread socio‐economic order has as yet emerged which can be confidently or closely associated (...) with the ideas of socialism. In both cases the relationship between theories and actual systems is a contestable one, but it has been particularly problematic in the history of socialism. (shrink)

Analysis of metaphysical, ethical, and religious nature of the self; articles, some previously published.

For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to each of the contributors in (...) a way that provides a lively dialogue on the topic. The book begins with an introduction by Audi that presents a thematic overview of his philosophy and connects his views in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and action. Each of the thirteen chapters that follow concentrates on one or another of these three main areas. The chapters are followed by Audi's replies. (shrink)

When doing philosophy, there is one norm-like common basis of which we have our pre-theoretic understanding (the “same-object-recognizing” understanding for short) to the effect that, given an object (to be under examination), there is a way that the object objectively is such that we can all talk about that same object even though we may say different things about it, neither resulting in “anything goes” nor bringing about radically different objects thus without genuine engagement. A theoretic examination of the (...) metaphysical issue of the self-identity (as sameness) of given objects (or, in plain words and in a semantic ascent way, “how is it possible to talk about the same object differently?”) can enhance and refine the “same-object-recognizing” understanding as one significant common normative basis of doing philosophy in a constructive-engaging way. In this essay, with relevant theoretic resources of the enhanced account of relative identity and the refined characterization of the law of identity as explained in the recent literature, I examine the metaphysical issue of the self-identity (as sameness) of given objects in two closely related layers, i.e., the “way” layer and the “being” layer of “the way things are” regarding self-identities of given objects. In a holistic way, I first examine several distinct but representative types of (relative) sameness involved in the “way” part of self-identities of given objects; I then focus on five representative types of existential sameness in the “being” part at the “base” level of given objects. Their relation can be highlighted in this way: metaphysically, in the sense to be explained, distinct types of sameness at the “way” layer without existential sameness at the “being”-base layer is “empty” of base, while existential sameness at the “being”-base layer without distinct types of sameness at the “way” layer is “blind” to differentiation. (shrink)

This book provides a new argument for the tensed theory of time and emergentism about the self. This argument derives in part from theories which establish our nature as rational and emotional beings whose behavior is responsive to reasons which are facts. It is argued that there must be reasons, hence facts, that can only be captured by tensed and/or first-personal language if our behavior is to be by and large rational and appropriate. This establishes the tensed theory of (...) time and emergentism or dualism about the self, given the physical body can plausibly be fully described non-first-personally. In the course of this discussion the book also clarifies and defends a notion of fact and responds to McTaggart’s paradox and Wittgenstein’s private language argument. (shrink)

A study of the methods, approaches, prayers, etc to realize the 'unity experience' with THE ONE REAL SELF (Vedanta, Hinduism, ) God (Judaism), Gottheit (Christianity), Buddha mind (Buddhism), The Beloved (Sufism, Islam) of a number of mystics from several religious traditions. I wrote about this in a number of books and articles, for example about methods, techniques, practices and methodology here: as well as exploring and illustrating the subject-matter of philosophizing here: Explorations, questions and searches not put down on (...) paper are probably more important than the ones mentioned above. These were occurrences for almost as long as I can remember. They took many forms, endless questions about everything under the sun, unsatisfied with unexplained socio-cultural institutions, communities, social relationships, social roles, behaviour, values, norms and much more – I had to question them rather than merely submit to them or act in accordance with them. Although I expressed these questions and queries about the status quo in many areas such as sport, art, social sciences, endless reading and marginal groups and relationships I realized that they form part of the philosophical discourse. Not the discourse that has become the expression of the professionalization of philosophy the last few hundred years, but of the not-institutionalized practice of original thinking, of creative philosophical thinking. As examples of the latter, Socrates, of course, the pre-Socratics, Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Plotinus, writers on Mysticism such as Meister Eckhart, van Ruysbroeck, John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, from Advaita, Zen and other Buddhist schools, Wittgenstein, Hume, German Idealists, Rumi, novelists and poets, Paul Klee and other visual artists and many names who form part of the seeking for the unity-experience as explored in History of Mysticism (those who seek the unity experience, to become ONE with THE ONE, Godhead, the one real Self, Buddha mind, Sophos, etc). History of Mysticism *was first published by Atma Books in 1987, now and is a unique compendium of the lives and teachings of the world's best known mystics. They are presented in chronological order, and include representatives of every religious tradition, revealing the broad universality of genuine religious experience. expanded and revised Thirtieth Anniversary edition is available as a free downloadable PDF document on this website at my Downloads page. This book is fundamental for seasoned scholars of philosophy and religion as well as anyone new to the study of Mysticism. (shrink)