Results for 'Self-Ascription'

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  1. Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se.Richard Holton - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell.
    There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension of de dicto thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of self-ascription. It is crucial to LewisÕs account that this is understood as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: (...)-ascription of a property is not ascription of a property to the self, on a par with ascription to someone else. This has been overlooked in much recent discussion, especially when Lewis's account is understood in terms of centered worlds. When it is back in focus it brings problems. An almost Cartesian starting point is required; and first-person plural ascriptions, and those with first person pronouns other than in subject position, become unmanageably complex. (shrink)
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  2.  95
    Understanding SelfAscription.Frank Jackson & Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):141-155.
    David Lewis argues that believing something is self‐ascribing a property rather than holding true a proposition. But what is selfascription? Is it some new mysterious primitive? Is Lewis saying that every belief you have is about you? Several recent authors have suggested that, in the light of these questions, Lewis's theory should be rejected, despite its enormous influence. But this neglects the fact that Lewis makes two relevant proposals about belief: one about belief de se , another (...)
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  3. Metacognitive Feelings, Self-Ascriptions and Metal Actions.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):145-162.
    The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. (...)
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  4. Self-ascription and the de se.James Openshaw - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2039-2050.
    This paper defends Lewis’ influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained. It is shown that Lewis’ treatment can be reconstructed in a way which provides clear responses. This sheds light on the explanatory ambitions of those engaged in Lewis’ project.
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  5. Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion.George Graham - 2004 - In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press. pp. 89.
  6.  66
    Why Self-Ascriptions Are Difficult and Develop Late.Radu J. Bogdan - 2005 - In B. Malle & S. Hodges. (eds.), Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others. Guilford Press. pp. 190--206.
    Many philosophers and a few psychologists think that we understand our own minds before we understand those of others. Most developmental psychologists think that children understand their own minds at about the same time they understand other minds, by using the same cognitive abilities. I disagree with both views. I think that children understand other minds before they understand their own. Their self-understanding depends on some cognitive abilities that develop later than, and independently of, the abilities involved in understanding (...)
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  7. SelfAscription, Self‐Knowledge, and the Memory Argument.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):211-219.
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  8. Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness.Neil Feit - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--213.
     
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  9. Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes From the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker. Oxford, UK: Routledge. pp. 54-74.
    According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of (...)
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  10.  82
    Self-Ascription of Intention: Responsibility, Obligation and Self-Control.David R. Olson - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):297 - 314.
    In the late preschool years children acquire a "theory of mind", the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children's ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children's developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability (...)
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  11. Self Ascriptions of Beliefs.Pascal Engel - unknown
    An analysis of the first/third person asymmetry and in the light of Moore's paradox and Shoemaker's views on first person perspective.
     
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  12. Self-Ascriptions of Belief and Transparency.Pascal Engel - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
    Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.
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  13. Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case Study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  14. Self-Ascription and Belief de Re.Neil Feit - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
  15. Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription.M. Frank - 1995 - Common Knowledge 4:30--50.
  16.  45
    Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription.Quassim Cassam - 1995 - In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press. pp. 311--336.
  17.  20
    Self-Ascription of Belief and Desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.
  18. Antirealism and the Self-Ascription of Attitudes.Fabrice Pataut - unknown
    In a nutshell, semantic antirealism is the doctrine that if a statement is true, then it must be possible, at least in principle, to determine that it is true. Consider the particular case of self-ascriptions of attitudes such as beliefs, desires and intentions, i.e. statements of the form "I φ [that] p", where φ ranges over propositional attitude verbs and p provides the content of whatever is φd by the self-ascriber. Should we be semantic antirealists about these when (...)
     
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  19. De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness.Florian L. Wüstholz - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):401-422.
    De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, (...)
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  20.  34
    Self-Ascription and Objectivity.Nathan Rotenstreich - 1981 - Philosophia 10 (3-4):189-198.
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  21.  12
    Interpreting Self-Ascriptions.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):393-395.
  22. Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription.Stephan Torre - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
    I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I (...)
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  23.  37
    Belief, Self-Ascription, and Ontology.James E. Tomberlin - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:233-259.
  24. Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection: An Kantian Approach.Johannes Haag - 2010 - In Gasser G. (ed.), Personal Identity ans Resurrection. How do we survive our death. Ashgate. pp. 127-143.
  25.  12
    Conceptual Necessity, Causality and Self-Ascriptions of Sensation.Frederik Kaufman - 1990 - International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):3-11.
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  26.  52
    Conceptual Necessity, Causality and Self-Ascriptions of Sensation.Frederik Kaufman - 1990 - International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):3-11.
  27. Wittgenstein, Psychological Self-Ascriptions and the Moral Dimension of Our Inner Lives.Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen - 2019 - In Joel Backström, Hannes Nykänen, Niklas Toivakainen & Thomas Wallgren (eds.), Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind. Springer Verlag. pp. 179-202.
    The aim of this chapter is to open the question of this pervasiveness of the moral by arguing for the impossibility of delimiting the moral in one specific case, that of psychological self-ascription. The first part presents two views of the relationship between nature and morality found in forms of scientific and relaxed naturalism. In the main part, I argue, first, that psychological self-ascriptions are in most cases not to be understood on the standard model of observation (...)
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  28.  41
    The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions*: Dialogue.A. Minh Nguyen - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (1):103-.
    ABSTRACT: What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According to Rockney Jacobsen, self-ascriptions each enjoy a presumption of truth because they are systematically reliable. They are systematically reliable because they are typically both truth-assessable and expressive. Such self-ascriptions, if sincere, are certain to be true. This article presents a defence and a critique of Jacobsen's theory. It (...)
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  29. Propositional Attitudes as Self Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. Routledge.
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  30. Inside Loops: Developmental Premises of Self-Ascriptions.Radu J. Bogdan - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):235-252.
    Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations.
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  31.  20
    Egocentric Omniscience and Self-Ascriptive Belief.Brian Macpherson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:125-140.
    David Lewis’s property-centered account of belief falls prey to the problem of egocentric omniscience: In self-ascribing the property of being an eye doctor, an agent is thereby self-ascribing the property of being an oculist. It is argued that the problem of egocentric omniscience can be made palatable for Lewis’s property-centered account of belief, at least for the case of linguistic beliefs. Roughly, my solution is as follows: An agent can believe that he or she has the property of (...)
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  32.  8
    Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription.Andrew J. Pierce - 2012 - Lexington Books.
    Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription argues that groups have an irreducibly collective right to determine the meaning of their shared group identity, and that such a right is especially important for historically oppressed groups. It provides a novel approach to issues of identity politics, group rights, and racial identity, one which combines and develops the insights of contemporary critical theory and race theory, and will thus be of special interest to scholars in these fields.
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  33.  35
    Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
  34.  31
    Hume, Demonstratives, and Self-Ascriptions of Identity.Andrew Ward - 1985 - Hume Studies 11 (1):69-93.
  35.  19
    Authoritatively Avowing Your Imaginings by Self-Ascriptively Expressing Them.Benjamin Winokur - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-7.
    Neo-expressivism is the view that avowals—first-personal, present tense self-ascriptions of mental states—ordinarily express the very mental states that they semantically represent, such that they carry a strong presumption of truth and are immune to requests for epistemic support. Peter Langland-Hassan (2015. “Self-Knowledge and Imagination.” Philosophical Explorations 18 (2): 226–245) has argued that Neo-expressivism cannot accommodate avowals of one’s imaginings. In this short paper I argue that Neo-expressivism can, in fact, accommodate them.
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  36. Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge: Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription.Manfred Frank - 2000 - In Willem van Reijen & Willem G. Weststeijn (eds.), Subjectivity. Rodopi.
  37. Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:405-454.
  38.  62
    Faces and Ascriptions: Mapping Measures of the Self.Dan Zahavi & Andreas Roepstorff - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):141-148.
    The ‘self’ is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self ascription task. We show how the (...)
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  39.  14
    Real Ascriptions of Self-Deception Are Fallible Moral Judgments.Edward A. Johnson - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):117-118.
    Mele's jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception preclude definitive ascriptions of self-deception in practice. Consequently, actual ascriptions of self-deception require large inferences and may frequently be in error. It is recommended that attention be directed toward actual practices of ascription to understand how children learn and adults dispense what is ultimately a moral judgment.
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  40. Spontaneous Activity in Default-Mode Network Predicts Ascriptions of Self-Relatedness to Stimuli.Pengmin Qin, Georg Northoff, Timothy Lane & et al - 2016 - Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience:xx-yy.
    Spontaneous activity levels prior to stimulus presentation can determine how that stimulus will be perceived. It has also been proposed that such spontaneous activity, particularly in the default-mode network (DMN), is involved in self-related processing. We therefore hypothesised that pre-stimulus activity levels in the DMN predict whether a stimulus is judged as self-related or not. Method: Participants were presented in the MRI scanner with a white noise stimulus that they were instructed contained their name or another. They then (...)
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  41.  56
    Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children.James Russell - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.
    The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as 'the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts' [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432—451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes the form of (...)
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  42. Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism.Kevin Falvey & Joseph Owens - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37.
    Psychological externalism is the thesis that the contents of many of a person's propositional mental states are determined in part by relations he bears to his natural and social environment. This thesis has recently been thrust into prominence in the philosophy of mind by a series of thought experiments due to Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. Externalism is a metaphysical thesis, but in this work I investigate its implications for the epistemology of the mental. I am primarily concerned with the (...)
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  43. Self-Knowledge and the Phenomenological Transparency of Belief.Markos Valaris - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    I develop an account of our capacity to know what we consciously believe, which is based on an account of the phenomenology of conscious belief. While other recent authors have suggested that phenomenally conscious states play a role in the epistemology of self-ascriptions of belief, they have failed to give a satisfying account of how exactly the phenomenology is supposed to help with the epistemology — i.e., an account of the way “what it is like” for the subject of (...)
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  44. A Self for the Body.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (...)
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  45.  45
    Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato.Fiona Leigh - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (3):247-280.
    In some of Plato’s early dialogues we find a concern with correctly ascertaining the contents of a particular kind of one’s own psychological states, cognitive states. Indeed, one of the achievements of the elenctic method is to facilitate cognitive self-knowledge. In the Alcibiades, moreover, Plato interprets the Delphic injunction, ‘know yourself’, as crucially requiring cognitive self-knowledge, and ending in knowing oneself as subject to particular epistemic norms. Epistemic authority for self-knowledge is, for Plato, conferred on the basis (...)
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  46. The Body and the Self.José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel & Naomi Eilan (eds.) - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Table of Contents Acknowledgments 1 Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction by Naomi Eiland, Anthony Marcel and José Luis Bermúdez 2 The Body Image and Self-Consciousness by John Campbell 3 Infants’ Understanding of People and Things: From Body Imitation to Folk Psychology by Andrew N. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore 4 Persons, Animals, and Bodies by Paul F. Snowdon 5 An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Self by George Butterworth 6 Objectivity, Causality, and Agency by (...)
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  47.  40
    Self-Knowledge and Communication.Johannes Roessler - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):153-168.
    First-person present-tense self-ascriptions of belief are often used to tell others what one believes. But they are also naturally taken to express the belief they ostensibly report. I argue that this second aspect of self-ascriptions of belief holds the key to making the speaker's knowledge of her belief, and so the authority of her act of telling, intelligible. For a basic way to know one's beliefs is to be aware of what one is doing in expressing them. This (...)
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  48.  6
    The Varieties of Self-Knowledge.Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - London: Palgrave.
    This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary (...)
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  49.  18
    Mind And Belief: Psychological Ascription And The Concept Of Belief.Mitchell Ginsberg - 1972 - Ny: Humanities Press.
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  50. Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):35-51.
    The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the sense (...)
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