Results for 'Self-consciousness as object'

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  1. The Self as an Object of Consciousness in Infancy.George Butterworth - 1995 - In P. Rochat (ed.), The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research. Elsevier.
  2.  71
    My Body as an Object: Self-Distance and Social Experience.Line Ryberg Ingerslev - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):163-178.
    In phenomenology the body is often referred to as the lived body which makes the world familiar to me. In this paper, however, I discuss bodily self-consciousness in terms of self-distance. Self-distance is the suggestion that bodily self-consciousness consist in a reflective stance where you conceive of your body as a physical thing, an object in the world as well as the subject of bodily experiences. I argue that we are bodily self-conscious because we experience our own (...)
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    Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences.D. Gasparyan - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):539-549.
    Context: Contemporary philosophy of consciousness has not yet come up with an acceptable theory of consciousness. Philosophers are still not able to reach agreement, and have come to a deadlock, since all possible approaches seem to have been exhausted and all the arguments repeatedly discussed. Problem: It may be assumed that the crisis has been caused by factors rooted in initial, wrong attitudes to knowledge or, more specifically, in epistemology focused on first-order cybernetics. The situation might be altered if philosophy (...)
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  4.  61
    The Subjectlessness of Self-Consciousness.Edward T. Bartlett - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:675-682.
    On the surface the concept of self-consciousness would seem to be understandable as consciousness of oneself. It is commonplace to resist this temptation by arguing that the self cannot properly be construed as the object of this form of consciousness. It is the subject. However, in this paper I show that any effort to see the self as the subject of consciousness converts it, willy nilly, into an object.Self-consciousness is not to be understood by determining the (...)
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  5.  99
    History of Exposure to Audiences as a Developmental Antecedent of Public Self-Consciousness.Alain Morin & Lisa Graig - 2000 - Current Research in Social Psychology 5 (3):33-46.
    Little is know about factors that influence the development of public self-consciousness. One potential factor is exposure to audiences: being repeatedly aware of one's object status could create a high disposition to focus on public self-aspects. To explore this hypothesis public self-consciousness was assessed in two groups of subjects: 62 professors and actors (high exposure to audiences) and 39 people without audience experience. Analysis show that significant differences exist for public self-consciousness in men only. Also, history (...)
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  6. Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
    The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I (...)
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  7.  78
    Consciousness as a Phenomenon in the Operational Architectonics of Brain Organization: Criticality and Self-Organization Considerations.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves - 2013 - Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 55:13-31.
    In this paper we aim to show that phenomenal consciousness is realized by a particular level of brain operational organization and that understanding human consciousness requires a description of the laws of the immediately underlying neural collective phenomena, the nested hierarchy of electromagnetic fields of brain activity – operational architectonics. We argue that the subjective mental reality and the objective neurobiological reality, although seemingly worlds apart, are intimately connected along a unified metastable continuum and are both guided by the universal (...)
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  8. Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
    At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...)
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  9.  27
    Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of (...)
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  10. A Phenomenological Theory of Self-Consciousness.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2002
    My thesis tests a novel definition of consciousness by applying it to theories of self-consciousness. This definition attempts to distinguish the phenomenon of consciousness from those of knowledge, belief, awareness, and perception by describing it as the noticing of objects and the registering of facts in thought. My investigation of self-consciousness is phenomenological in that it leaves aside questions as to whether selves exist or what their nature is and just examines what the contents of self-consciousness are. (...)
     
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  11.  22
    The Self as a Dynamic Constant. Rāmakaṇṭha’s Middle Ground Between a Naiyāyika Eternal Self-Substance and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness-Moments.Alex Watson - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (1):173-193.
    The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha’s (950–1000) contribution to the Buddhist–Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṇical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance (...)
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  12.  4
    Self-Knowledge as Non-Dual Awareness: A Comparative Study of Plotinus and Indian Advaita Philosophy.Binita Mehta - 2017 - International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2):117-148.
    _ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 117 - 148 The paper examines the problem of self-knowledge from the perspectives of Plotinus and the Indian Advaita school. Analyzing the subject-object relation, I show that according to both Plotinus and Advaita thinkers, full self-knowledge demands complete absence of otherness. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is divided into subject-object relation then one will know oneself as contemplated but not as contemplating and no real self-knowledge obtains in this case. Śaṅkara, (...)
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  13. Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
    When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for (...)
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  14. Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and (...)
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  15.  21
    Consciousness as Self-Function.Donald R. Perlis - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):509-25.
    I argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see (...)
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  16.  55
    Consciousness of the Self (COS) and Explicit Knowledge.Guy Pinku & Joseph Tzelgov - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):655-661.
    Starting with Dienes and Perner’s distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge and the traditional philosophical distinction between COS as an object and COS as a subject, we suggest a triple classification of COS experience into three modes, each corresponding to a different state of consciousness. When one acts automatically COS is totally embedded within the representation of the environment. When one monitors or attends to one’s experience, the self is implied by an explicit representation of one’s attitudes, consistent with (...)
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  17. Indirect Representation and the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Ben Phillips - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):273-290.
    According to Uriah Kriegel’s self-representational theory of consciousness, mental state M is conscious just in case it is a complex with suitably integrated proper parts, M 1 and M 2, such that M 1 is a higher-order representation of lower-order representation M 2. Kriegel claims that M thereby “indirectly” represents itself, and he attempts to motivate this claim by appealing to what he regards as intuitive cases of indirect perceptual and pictorial representation. For example, Kriegel claims that it’s natural to (...)
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  18.  7
    Hegel the normativist the priority of practice, self-consciousness as a social achievement and subject of normative states in chapter IV of the phenomenology of spirit.Eduardo Assalone - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (158):61-84.
    Se desarrolla la concepción normativista de la autoconciencia hegeliana, de acuerdo con los aportes de los denominados "neohegelianos de Pittsburgh", así como de otros autores anglosajones como Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard y Paul Redding. Se presenta el recorrido de la autoconciencia en el capítulo IV de la Fenomenología del Espíritu, y se desarrollan algunos rasgos que pueden extraerse de dicha presentación, de acuerdo con la lectura normativista de los autores mencionados. The normativist conception of Hegelian self-consciousness according to the (...)
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  19. Phantom Body as Bodily Self-Consciousness.Przemysław Nowakowski - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1):135–149.
    In the article, I propose that the body phantom is a phenomenal and functional model of one’s own body. This model has two aspects. On the one hand, it functions as a tacit sensory representation of the body that is at the same time related to the motor aspects of body functioning. On the other hand, it also has a phenomenal aspect as it constitutes the content of conscious bodily experience. This sort of tacit, functional and sensory model is related (...)
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  20.  20
    Judgment, Self-Consciousness, and Object-Independence.Jennifer Church - 1990 - American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):51-60.
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  21.  49
    Dewey's 'Naturalized Hegelianism' in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness.Scott Johnston - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (3):453-476.
    In this paper I claim that Hegel's emergent and dialectical understanding of self-consciousness occurs in the thought of John Dewey, albeit in naturalized form. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Dewey's talk of the self, consciousness, and self-consciousness as it is developed in Experience and Nature together with some attention to Dewey's other great experiential text Art as Experience, will form the contexts for my claim. I do not argue that Dewey reproduces Hegel's dialectic or that Dewey's notion of (...)
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  22.  28
    Transcendental Philosophy and Intersubjectivity: Mutual Recognition as a Condition for the Possibility of Self‐Consciousness in Sections 1–3 of Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right.Jacob McNulty - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):788-810.
    In the opening sections of his Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte argues that mutual recognition is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. However, the argument turns on the apparently unconvincing claim that, in the context of transcendental philosophy, conceptions of the subject as an isolated individual give rise to a vicious circle the resolution of which requires the introduction of a second rational being to ‘summon’ the first. In this essay, my aim is to present a revised account (...)
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  23.  35
    The Evolution of Consciousness as a Self-Organizing Information System in the Society of Other Such Systems.Allan Combs & Sally Goerner - 1997 - World Futures 50 (1):609-616.
    (1997). The evolution of consciousness as a self‐organizing information system in the society of other such systems. World Futures: Vol. 50, No. 1-4, pp. 609-616.
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  24.  6
    Consciousness as Self-Description and the Inescapability of Reduction.S. Levin - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):561-562.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: I argue that a philosophy of consciousness refocused on second-order cybernetics in the way proposed by Gasparyan could not replace the reductionist program because the question of reduction would arise again within the framework of such an approach.
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  25.  48
    Consciousness as a Contextually Emergent Property of Self-Sustaining Systems.J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin - 2006 - Mind and Matter 4 (1):45-68.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been introduced as a speci?c kind of emergence in which some, but not all of the conditions for a higher-level phenomenon exist at a lower level. Further conditions exist in contingent contexts that provide stability conditions at the lower level, which in turn accord the emergence of novelty at the higher level. The purpose of the present paper is to propose that consciousness is a contextually emergent property of self-sustaining systems. The core assumption is (...)
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  26.  34
    The Self-Organizing Consciousness as an Alternative Model of the Mind.Pierre Perruchet & Annie Vinter - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):360-380.
    Through the concept of self-organizing consciousness (SOC), we posit that the dynamic of the mind stems from the recurrent interplay between the properties of conscious experiences and the properties of the world, hence making it unnecessary to postulate the existence of an unconscious mental level. In contrast, arguments are provided by commentators for the need for a functional level of organization located between the neural and the conscious. Other commentaries challenge us concerning the ability of our model to account for (...)
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  27. Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?G. P. Ramachandra - 1997 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 15 (1):83-85.
     
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  28.  37
    Treating Yourself as an Object: Self-Objectification and the Ethical Dimensions of Antidepressant Use.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (1):165-178.
    In this paper, I offer one moral reason to eschew antidepressant medication in favor of cognitive therapy, all other things being equal: taking antidepressants can be a form of self-objectification. This means that, by taking antidepressants, one treats oneself, in some sense and some cases, like a mere object. I contend that, morally, this amounts to a specific form of devaluing oneself. I argue this as follows. First, I offer a detailed definition of “objectification” and argue for the possibility (...)
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  29. Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  30.  3
    The Self-Determination of Force: Desire and Practical Self-Consciousness in Kant and Hegel.Thomas Khurana - 2018 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Begehren / Desire. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. pp. 179-204.
    In a broadly Kantian context, it is often assumed that practical self-consciousness and rational self-determination can only be understood in opposition to pleasure and desire. I argue instead that, already for Kant, rational self-determination is itself a determination of our faculty of desire. Drawing on resources from Kant and Hegel, the paper shows that sensible desire can be understood as a self-determination of our vital forces which is connected to a sensible awareness of our practical existence. In order to (...)
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  31.  2
    Neurocognitve Dimensions of Self-Consciousness.Dario Grossi & Mariachiara Longarzo - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):75-82.
    : Self-consciousness is considered in a framework comprising four dimensions which are theoretically defined and supported by clinical neuropsychological evidence. Self-monitoring is defined as the ability to reflect on one’s own behaviour, with supporting evidence for deficits in this capacity noted in anosognosia syndrome. Self-feeling is defined as the capacity to feel all sensations related to one’s own body, with supporting evidence from deficiencies occurring in alexithymia, psychosomatic states and Cotard’s delusion. Identity refers to the capacity to recognize an (...)
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  32.  49
    Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self–Consciousness.Dorothée Legrand - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press. pp. 204--227.
    This article examines the multi-dimensions of bodily self-consciousness. It explains the distinction between the self-as-subject and the self-as-object and argues that each act of consciousness is adequately characterized by two modes of givenness. These are the intentional mode of givenness by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects and the subjective mode by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects as experienced by him. It clarifies the relationship of these modes of givenness to the transitivity and (...)
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  33.  22
    Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: On Being Bodily in the World.Dorothee Peggy Martine Legrand - 2007 - Janus Head 9 (2):493-519.
    Empirical and experiential investigations allow the distinction between observational and non-observational forms of subjective bodily experiences. From a first-person perspective, the biological body can be an “opaque body” taken as an intentional object of observational consciousness, a “performative body” pre-reflectively experienced as a subject/agent, a “transparent body” pre-reflectively experienced as the bodily mode of givenness of objects in the external world, or an “invisible body” absent from experience. It is proposed that pre-reflective bodily experiences rely on sensori-motor integrative mechanisms (...)
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  34.  22
    The Neural Correlates of Work and Play: What Brain Imaging Research and Animal Cartoons Can Tell Us About Social Displays, Self-Consciousness, and the Evolution of the Human Brain.Charles Whitehead - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):93-121.
    Children seem to have a profound implicit knowledge of human behaviour, because they laugh at Bugs Bunny cartoons where much of the humour depends on animals behaving like humans and our intuitive recognition that this is absurd. Scientists, on the other hand, have problems defining what this 'human difference' is. I suggest these problems are of cultural origin. For example, the industrial revolution and the protestant work ethic have created a world in which work is valued over play, object (...)
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  35. A Consciência De Si Como Sujeito: Série 2 / The self-consciousness as subject.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2009 - Kant E-Prints 4:229-265.
    : In this paper, I present a new interpretation for Kant’s notion of a consciousness of oneself as Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse . My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without a conceptual content and (...)
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  36. Inner Speech as a Mediator of Self-Awareness, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge: An Hypothesis.Alain Morin & James Everett - 1990 - New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.
    Little is known with regard to the precise cognitive tools the self uses in acquiring and processing information about itself. In this article, we underline the possibility that inner speech might just represent one such cognitive process. Duval and Wicklund’s theory of self-awareness and the selfconsciousness, and self-knowledge body of work that was inspired by it are reviewed, and the suggestion is put forward that inner speech parallels the state of self-awareness, is more frequently used among highly self-conscious persons, and (...)
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  37. Memory and Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Andy Hamilton - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):409-417.
    In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a common objection (...)
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  38.  7
    Self-Consciousness and World-Consciousness.Dorothee Legrand - 2012 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
    Is self-consciousness intentional? Consciousness of oneself-as-object is, in the sense that the subject is there taken as its own object of intentional consciousness. Contrastively, it has been argued that consciousness of oneself-as-subject is not intentional, precisely in that it does not involve taking oneself as an intentional object. Here, it is rather proposed that consciousness of oneself-as-subject is tied to intentionality in that it involves being conscious of oneself as an intentional subject, i.e. as a subject (...)
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  39.  12
    Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness?: Comments on Chapter 9 of Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker.Ralf Busse - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):109-117.
    A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations ‘as such’ and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or ‘self-made-ness’ of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations ‘as such’ should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to (...)
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  40.  99
    History of Exposure to Self-Focusing Stimuli As a Developmental Antecedent of Self-Consciousness.Alain Morin - 1997 - Psychological Reports 80:1252-1254.
    Szmimary.—The present report investigated the question of how individual differences in self-consciousness devdop. Rimé and LeBon proposed that high self-consciousness follows a history of frequent exposure to selffocusing stimuli, i.e., mirrors, audiences, audio and video devices, and cameras. To explore this hypothesis private and public self-consciousness and past exposure to self-focusing stimuli were assessed in 438 subjects. Analysis indicated that history of frequent exposure to self-focusing stimuli is significantly but weakly related to high private self-consciousness in (...)
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  41.  49
    Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how (...)
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  42. Humans as Applied Motivation Scientists: Self-Consciousness From "Shared Reality" and "Becoming".E. Tory Higgins - 2005 - In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  43.  57
    Neural Correlates of First-Person Perspective as One Constituent of Human Self-Consciousness.Kai Vogeley, M. May, A. Ritzl, P. Falkai, K. Zilles & Gereon R. Fink - 2004 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (5):817-827.
  44.  55
    Consciousness It/Self.Steven W. Laycock - 2002 - In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Imprint Academic. pp. 141-152.
    For better or for worse, I find myself in the company of the `misers' of Galen Strawson's portrayal who, in response to the question, `Is there such a thing as the self?' rejoin: `Well, there is something of which the sense of the self is an accurate representation, but it does not follow that there is any such thing as the self' . Far from representing a form of `metaphysical excess' , the rejoinder seems faithfully and reliably phenomenological. We need (...)
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  45. The Schizophrenias as Disorders of Self Consciousness.Sean E. Baumann - 2005 - South African Psychiatry Review 8 (3):95-99.
  46.  95
    On Being the Object of Attention: Implications for Self-Other Consciousness.Vasudevi Reddy - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (9):397-402.
  47. Self-Consciousness as the Monitoring of Cognitive States: A Theoretical Perspective.Robert G. Kunzendorf - 1988 - Imagination, Cognition and Personality 7:3-22.
     
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  48. Consciousness and Self Awareness. 1. Consciousness (1), Consciousness (2), and Consciousness (3).T. Natsoulas - 1997 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):53-74.
    Published in two parts, the present article addresses whether self-awareness is necessarily involved in each of the six kinds of consciousness that The Oxford English Dictionary identifies under the word consciousness. Part I inquires into how, if at all, self-awareness enters consciousness1: a cognitive relation between people in which they have joint and mutual cognizance; consciousness2: a psychological process of conceiving of oneself in certain sorts of respects on a firsthand evidentiary basis; and consciousness3: being occurrently aware of anything at (...)
     
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  49. Consciousness and Self-Awareness: Part I: Consciousness1, Consciousness2, and Consciousness3.Thomas Natsoulas - 1997 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):53-74.
    Published in two parts, the present article addresses whether self-awareness is necessarily involved in each of the six kinds of consciousness that The Oxford English Dictionary identifies under the word consciousness. Part I inquires into how, if at all, self-awareness enters consciousness1: a cognitive relation between people in which they have joint and mutual cognizance; consciousness2: a psychological process of conceiving of oneself in certain sorts of respects on a firsthand evidentiary basis; and consciousness3: being occurrently aware of anything at (...)
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  50. Consciousness and Self Awareness. 2. Consciousness (4), Consciousness (5), and Consciousness (6).Thomas Natsoulas - 1997 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):53-74.
    Published in two parts, the present article addresses whether self-awareness is necessarily involved in each of the six kinds of consciousness that The Oxford English Dictionary identifies under the word consciousness. Part I inquires into how, if at all, self-awareness enters consciousness1: a cognitive relation between people in which they have joint and mutual cognizance; consciousness2: a psychological process of conceiving of oneself in certain sorts of respects on a firsthand evidentiary basis; and consciousness3: being occurrently aware of anything at (...)
     
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