Results for 'Self-consciousness as subject'

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  1. A Consciência De Si Como Sujeito: Série 2 / The self-consciousness as subject.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2009 - Kant E-Prints 4:229-265.
    : In this paper, I present a new interpretation for Kant’s notion of a consciousness of oneself as Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse . My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without a conceptual content (...)
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  2.  7
    Hegel the normativist the priority of practice, self-consciousness as a social achievement and subject of normative states in chapter IV of the phenomenology of spirit.Eduardo Assalone - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (158):61-84.
    Se desarrolla la concepción normativista de la autoconciencia hegeliana, de acuerdo con los aportes de los denominados "neohegelianos de Pittsburgh", así como de otros autores anglosajones como Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard y Paul Redding. Se presenta el recorrido de la autoconciencia en el capítulo IV de la Fenomenología del Espíritu, y se desarrollan algunos rasgos que pueden extraerse de dicha presentación, de acuerdo con la lectura normativista de los autores mencionados. The normativist conception of Hegelian self-consciousness according to the (...)
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  3.  49
    The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity From Descartes to Hume.Udo Thiel - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    The Early Modern Subject explores the understanding of self-consciousness and personal identity--two fundamental features of human subjectivity--as it developed in early modern philosophy. Udo Thiel presents a critical evaluation of these features as they were conceived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He explains the arguments of thinkers such as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume, as well as their early critics, followers, and other philosophical contemporaries, and situates them within their historical contexts. Interest in the issues of (...)
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  4. Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self-Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
    At the phenomenal level, consciousness arises in a consistently coherent fashion as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness (subjectivity) with explicitly orientational characteristics—that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain. Understanding these twin elements of consciousness begins with the recognition that ultimately (and most primitively), cognitive systems serve the biological self-regulatory regime in which they subsist. The psychological structures supporting self-located subjectivity involve an evolutionary elaboration of the two basic elements necessary for extending (...)
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  5. Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
    At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes (...)
     
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  6.  36
    Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how (...)
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  7. Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
    When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, (...)
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  8.  24
    Transcendental Philosophy and Intersubjectivity: Mutual Recognition as a Condition for the Possibility of Self‐Consciousness in Sections 1–3 of Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right.Jacob McNulty - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):788-810.
    In the opening sections of his Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte argues that mutual recognition is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. However, the argument turns on the apparently unconvincing claim that, in the context of transcendental philosophy, conceptions of the subject as an isolated individual give rise to a vicious circle the resolution of which requires the introduction of a second rational being to ‘summon’ the first. In this essay, my aim is to present a revised (...)
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  9.  58
    The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity From Descartes to Hume, by Udo Thiel. [REVIEW]Angela Coventry - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):1132-1135.
    In The Early Modern Subject, Udo Thiel explores early modern writings spanning approximately the seventeenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century on two topics of self consciousness, the human subject’s ‘awareness or consciousness of one’s own self’, and personal identity, the human subject’s tendency to regard one’s own self as the same identical self or person that persists through time (p. 1). The aim of the book is twofold. First, to provide an account of (...)
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  10. Self-Consciousness and the Critique of the Subject: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Poststructuralists.Simon Lumsden - 2014 - Columbia University Press.
    Poststructuralists hold Hegel responsible for giving rise to many of modern philosophy's problematic concepts--the authority of reason, self-consciousness, the knowing subject. Yet, according to Simon Lumsden, this animosity is rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of Hegel's thought, and resolving this tension can not only heal the rift between poststructuralism and German idealism but also point these traditions in exciting new directions. Revisiting the philosopher's key texts, Lumsden calls attention to Hegel's reformulation of liberal and Cartesian conceptions of subjectivity, (...)
     
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  11.  2
    Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences.D. Gasparyan - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):539-549.
    Context: Contemporary philosophy of consciousness has not yet come up with an acceptable theory of consciousness. Philosophers are still not able to reach agreement, and have come to a deadlock, since all possible approaches seem to have been exhausted and all the arguments repeatedly discussed. Problem: It may be assumed that the crisis has been caused by factors rooted in initial, wrong attitudes to knowledge or, more specifically, in epistemology focused on first-order cybernetics. The situation might be altered if philosophy (...)
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  12. Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
    The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I (...)
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  13. Aesthetics as Investigation of Self, Subject, and Ethical Agency Under Trauma in Kawabata's Post-War Novel The Sound of the Mountain.Mara Miller - forthcoming - Philosophy and Literature.
    Yasunari Kawabata’s 1952 novel The Sound of the Mountain is widely praised for its aesthetic qualities, from its adaptation of aesthetics from the Tale of Genji, through the beauty of its prose and the patterning of its images, to the references to arts and nature within the text. This article, by contrast, shows that Kawabata uses these features to demonstrate the effects of the mass trauma following the Second World War and the complicated grief it induced, on the psychology of (...)
     
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  14. Subject and Consciousness: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Self-Consciousness.Oded Balaban - 1989 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    Title on spine: Subject & consciousness.
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  15.  67
    Consciousness as a Phenomenon in the Operational Architectonics of Brain Organization: Criticality and Self-Organization Considerations.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves - 2013 - Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 55:13-31.
    In this paper we aim to show that phenomenal consciousness is realized by a particular level of brain operational organization and that understanding human consciousness requires a description of the laws of the immediately underlying neural collective phenomena, the nested hierarchy of electromagnetic fields of brain activity – operational architectonics. We argue that the subjective mental reality and the objective neurobiological reality, although seemingly worlds apart, are intimately connected along a unified metastable continuum and are both guided by the universal (...)
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  16.  43
    Self-Consciousness in Chimps and Pigeons.Lawrence H. Davis - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):249-59.
    Chimpanzee behaviour with mirrors makes it plausible that they can recognise themselves as themselves in mirrors, and so have a 'self-concept'. I defend this claim, and argue that roughly similar behaviour in pigeons, as reported, does not in fact make it equally plausible that they also have this mental capacity. But for all that it is genuine, chimpanzee self-consciousness may differ significantly from ours. I describe one possibility I believe consistent with the data, even if not very plausible: that (...)
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  17.  19
    Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is (...)
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  18. Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):183-197.
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this (...)
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  19. Editor's Introduction: Transcending Self-Consciousness.Gregory Nixon - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (7):889-1022.
    What is this thing we each call “I” and consider the eye of consciousness, that which beholds objects in the world and objects in our minds? This inner perceiver seems to be the same I who calls forth memories or images at will, the I who feels and determines whether to act on those feelings or suppress them, as well as the I who worries and makes plans and attempts to avoid those worries and act on those plans. Am I (...)
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  20.  21
    First-Personal Self-Reference and the Self-as-Subject☆.D. Zahavi - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):600-603.
  21.  56
    The Subjectlessness of Self-Consciousness.Edward T. Bartlett - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:675-682.
    On the surface the concept of self-consciousness would seem to be understandable as consciousness of oneself. It is commonplace to resist this temptation by arguing that the self cannot properly be construed as the object of this form of consciousness. It is the subject. However, in this paper I show that any effort to see the self as the subject of consciousness converts it, willy nilly, into an object.Self-consciousness is not to be understood by determining the (...)
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  22.  40
    On the Joint Engagement of Persons: Self-Consciousness, the Symmetry Thesis and Person Perception.James M. Dow - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):1-27.
    In The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Jose Luis Bermúdez presents an abductive argument for what he calls ‘the Symmetry Thesis’ about self-ascription: in order to have the ability to self-ascribe psychological predicates to oneself, one must be able to ascribe psychological predicates to other subjects like oneself. Bermúdez discusses joint engagement as a key phenomenon that underwrites his abductive argument for the Symmetry Thesis. He argues that the ability to self-ascribe is “constituted” by the intersubjective relations that are realized in (...)
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  23.  2
    Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2).
    This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness and, second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content. First, I aim to show that the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of (...)
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  24. Fichte's Developmental View of Self-Consciousness.Gabriel Gottlieb - 2016 - In Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right: A Critical Guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92-116.
    Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right develops an intersubjective view of individual self-consciousness. The central concept of this view is his notion of the summons, which he characterizes as upbringing. I argue that Fichte has a developmental view of self-consciousness in which a subject is brought up, through relations of recognition, to be first an individual human being that is capable of responding to reasons and second a political individual that respects other political individuals’ rights. My argument shows (...)
     
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  25.  20
    The Self as a Dynamic Constant. Rāmakaṇṭha’s Middle Ground Between a Naiyāyika Eternal Self-Substance and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness-Moments.Alex Watson - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (1):173-193.
    The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha’s (950–1000) contribution to the Buddhist–Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṇical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance (...)
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  26. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Modern Self.Klaus Brinkmann - 2005 - History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):27-48.
    The concept of the self is embedded in a web of relationships of other concepts and phenomena such as consciousness, self-consciousness, personal identity and the mind–body problem. The article follows the ontological and epistemological roles of the concept of selfconsciousness and the structural co-implication of consciousness and self-consciousness from Descartes and Locke to Kant and Sartre while delineating its subject matter from related inquiries into the relationship between the mind and the body, personal identity, and the question (...)
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  27. Self-Knowledge as Non-Dual Awareness: A Comparative Study of Plotinus and Indian Advaita Philosophy.Binita Mehta - 2017 - International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2):117-148.
    _ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 117 - 148 The paper examines the problem of self-knowledge from the perspectives of Plotinus and the Indian Advaita school. Analyzing the subject-object relation, I show that according to both Plotinus and Advaita thinkers, full self-knowledge demands complete absence of otherness. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is divided into subject-object relation then one will know oneself as contemplated but not as contemplating and no real self-knowledge obtains in this case. Śaṅkara, (...)
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  28.  65
    My Body as an Object: Self-Distance and Social Experience.Line Ryberg Ingerslev - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):163-178.
    In phenomenology the body is often referred to as the lived body which makes the world familiar to me. In this paper, however, I discuss bodily self-consciousness in terms of self-distance. Self-distance is the suggestion that bodily self-consciousness consist in a reflective stance where you conceive of your body as a physical thing, an object in the world as well as the subject of bodily experiences. I argue that we are bodily self-conscious because we experience our own (...)
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  29. Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore (...)
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  30.  21
    Consciousness as Self-Function.Donald R. Perlis - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):509-25.
    I argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see (...)
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  31.  51
    Consciousness of the Self (COS) and Explicit Knowledge.Guy Pinku & Joseph Tzelgov - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):655-661.
    Starting with Dienes and Perner’s distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge and the traditional philosophical distinction between COS as an object and COS as a subject, we suggest a triple classification of COS experience into three modes, each corresponding to a different state of consciousness. When one acts automatically COS is totally embedded within the representation of the environment. When one monitors or attends to one’s experience, the self is implied by an explicit representation of one’s attitudes, consistent with (...)
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  32. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain: Review Article.Douglas F. Watt - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):77-82.
    Once deemed not respectable as a scientific domain, when behaviourist doctrine held sway, emotion is now an exploding subject of compelling attraction to a wide range of disciplines in psychology and neuroscience. Recent work suggests that the concept of 'affective regulation' has become a buzzword in these areas. Disciplines involved include not only affective neuroscience, but also cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, clinical psychiatric studies into syndromes of emotion dys-regulation , various psychotherapy approaches, and several others, e.g. the increasingly popular (...)
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  33. Consciousness Evolves When the Self Dissolves.James H. Austin - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):209-230.
    We need to clarify at least four aspects of selfhood if we are to reach a better understanding of consciousness in general, and of its alternate states. First, how did we develop our self-centred psychophysiology? Second, can the four familiar lobes of the brain alone serve, if only as preliminary landmarks of convenience, to help understand the functions of our many self-referent networks? Third, what could cause one's former sense of self to vanish from the mental field during an extraordinary (...)
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  34. Unity of Consciousness and the Self.David M. Rosenthal - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.
    The so-called unity of consciousness consists in the compelling sense we have that all our conscious mental states belong to a single conscious subject. Elsewhere I have argued that a mental state's being conscious is a matter of our being conscious of that state by having a higher-order thought (HOT) about it. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, this HOT model affords a natural explanation of our sense that our conscious states all belong to a single conscious subject. (...)
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  35. Indirect Representation and the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Ben Phillips - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):273-290.
    According to Uriah Kriegel’s self-representational theory of consciousness, mental state M is conscious just in case it is a complex with suitably integrated proper parts, M 1 and M 2, such that M 1 is a higher-order representation of lower-order representation M 2. Kriegel claims that M thereby “indirectly” represents itself, and he attempts to motivate this claim by appealing to what he regards as intuitive cases of indirect perceptual and pictorial representation. For example, Kriegel claims that it’s natural to (...)
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  36. Consciousness and the Self.Roland Breeur - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):415-436.
    With his notion of absolute consciousness, Sartre tries to rethink the relation between consciousness and the self. What is the origin of subjectivity in relation to a consciousness that is characterized as impersonal and as a radical lucidity? In this article, I attempt to question that origin and the nature as such of the subject in its relation to a consciousness that in its essence is not yet subjective. On the contrary, it is characterized by a selfpresence that is (...)
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  37. Phantom Body as Bodily Self-Consciousness.Przemysław Nowakowski - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1):135–149.
    In the article, I propose that the body phantom is a phenomenal and functional model of one’s own body. This model has two aspects. On the one hand, it functions as a tacit sensory representation of the body that is at the same time related to the motor aspects of body functioning. On the other hand, it also has a phenomenal aspect as it constitutes the content of conscious bodily experience. This sort of tacit, functional and sensory model is related (...)
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  38.  46
    Dewey's 'Naturalized Hegelianism' in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness.Scott Johnston - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (3):453-476.
    In this paper I claim that Hegel's emergent and dialectical understanding of self-consciousness occurs in the thought of John Dewey, albeit in naturalized form. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Dewey's talk of the self, consciousness, and self-consciousness as it is developed in Experience and Nature together with some attention to Dewey's other great experiential text Art as Experience, will form the contexts for my claim. I do not argue that Dewey reproduces Hegel's dialectic or that Dewey's notion of (...)
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  39.  6
    Consciousness as Self-Description and the Inescapability of Reduction.S. Levin - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):561-562.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: I argue that a philosophy of consciousness refocused on second-order cybernetics in the way proposed by Gasparyan could not replace the reductionist program because the question of reduction would arise again within the framework of such an approach.
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  40.  32
    The Evolution of Consciousness as a Self-Organizing Information System in the Society of Other Such Systems.Allan Combs & Sally Goerner - 1997 - World Futures 50 (1):609-616.
    (1997). The evolution of consciousness as a self‐organizing information system in the society of other such systems. World Futures: Vol. 50, No. 1-4, pp. 609-616.
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  41.  44
    Consciousness as a Contextually Emergent Property of Self-Sustaining Systems.J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin - 2006 - Mind and Matter 4 (1):45-68.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been introduced as a speci?c kind of emergence in which some, but not all of the conditions for a higher-level phenomenon exist at a lower level. Further conditions exist in contingent contexts that provide stability conditions at the lower level, which in turn accord the emergence of novelty at the higher level. The purpose of the present paper is to propose that consciousness is a contextually emergent property of self-sustaining systems. The core assumption is (...)
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  42.  30
    The Self-Organizing Consciousness as an Alternative Model of the Mind.Pierre Perruchet & Annie Vinter - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):360-380.
    Through the concept of self-organizing consciousness (SOC), we posit that the dynamic of the mind stems from the recurrent interplay between the properties of conscious experiences and the properties of the world, hence making it unnecessary to postulate the existence of an unconscious mental level. In contrast, arguments are provided by commentators for the need for a functional level of organization located between the neural and the conscious. Other commentaries challenge us concerning the ability of our model to account for (...)
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  43.  12
    How Does the Self-Consciousness of the Subject of a General Will Relate to Rödl’s Account of Self-Consciousness?: A Response to Sebastian Rödl.Gabriele Gava - 2015 - In Andreas Speer, Wolfram Hogrebe & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter. pp. 221-224.
  44.  1
    Self-immolation as a Gift The Idea of the Subject in Gianni Vattimo.Alonzo Loza Baltazar - 2016 - Ideas Y Valores 65 (160):225-238.
    Se muestran los rasgos generales de la noción posmoderna de sujeto moral en Vattimo desde la interpretación que hace de Nietzsche y Heidegger, según la cual la continuidad entre estos pensadores solo se da en el horizonte de una nueva ontología. Esta se especifica con el hilo conductor de la noción de don que desarrolla Bataille, lo que la hace una ontología nihilista del don. Por su parte, el sujeto se determina como agente del don, capaz de recibir el don (...)
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  45. Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness?G. P. Ramachandra - 1997 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 15 (1):83-85.
     
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  46. Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  47.  47
    Self-Consciousness and the Critique of the Subject: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Poststructuralists, by Simon Lumsden. [REVIEW]David Kolb - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):402-405.
    A review of Simon Lumsden's book on self consciousness in Hegel and in Postmodern authors.
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  48. Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment (...)
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    Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self–Consciousness.Dorothée Legrand - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press. pp. 204--227.
    This article examines the multi-dimensions of bodily self-consciousness. It explains the distinction between the self-as-subject and the self-as-object and argues that each act of consciousness is adequately characterized by two modes of givenness. These are the intentional mode of givenness by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects and the subjective mode by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects as experienced by him. It clarifies the relationship of these modes of givenness to the (...)
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    The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness.Stephane Savanah - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):713-720.
    This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a correlation between intelligence in (...)
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