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Selmer Bringsjord [91]Selmer C. Bringsjord [1]
  1.  92
    What Robots Can and Can't Be.Selmer Bringsjord - 1992 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This book argues that (1) AI will continue to produce machines with the capacity to pass stronger and stronger versions of the Turing Test but that (2) the "Person Building Project" (the attempt by AI and Cognitive Science to build a machine which is a person) will inevitably fail. The defense of (2) rests in large part on a refutation of the proposition that persons are automata -- a refutation involving an array of issues, from free will to Godel to (...)
  2. Computers, Justification, and Mathematical Knowledge.Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (2):185-202.
    The original proof of the four-color theorem by Appel and Haken sparked a controversy when Tymoczko used it to argue that the justification provided by unsurveyable proofs carried out by computers cannot be a priori. It also created a lingering impression to the effect that such proofs depend heavily for their soundness on large amounts of computation-intensive custom-built software. Contra Tymoczko, we argue that the justification provided by certain computerized mathematical proofs is not fundamentally different from that provided by surveyable (...)
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  3.  9
    Computer Science as Immaterial Formal Logic.Selmer Bringsjord - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology:1-9.
    I critically review Raymond Turner’s Computational Artifacts – Towards a Philosophy of Computer Science by placing beside his position a rather different one, according to which computer science is a branch of, and is therefore subsumed by, immaterial formal logic.
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  4. Creativity, the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test.Selmer Bringsjord, P. Bello & David A. Ferrucci - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):3-27.
    The Turing Test is claimed by many to be a way to test for the presence, in computers, of such ``deep'' phenomena as thought and consciousness. Unfortunately, attempts to build computational systems able to pass TT have devolved into shallow symbol manipulation designed to, by hook or by crook, trick. The human creators of such systems know all too well that they have merely tried to fool those people who interact with their systems into believing that these systems really have (...)
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  5. On How to Build a Moral Machine.Paul Bello & Selmer Bringsjord - 2013 - Topoi 32 (2):251-266.
    Herein we make a plea to machine ethicists for the inclusion of constraints on their theories consistent with empirical data on human moral cognition. As philosophers, we clearly lack widely accepted solutions to issues regarding the existence of free will, the nature of persons and firm conditions on moral agency/patienthood; all of which are indispensable concepts to be deployed by any machine able to make moral judgments. No agreement seems forthcoming on these matters, and we don’t hold out hope for (...)
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  6. The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind.Selmer Bringsjord - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41 - 69.
    Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.
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  7. Ethical Robots: The Future Can Heed Us. [REVIEW]Selmer Bringsjord - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):539-550.
    Bill Joy’s deep pessimism is now famous. Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, his defense of that pessimism, has been read by, it seems, everyone—and many of these readers, apparently, have been converted to the dark side, or rather more accurately, to the future-is-dark side. Fortunately (for us; unfortunately for Joy), the defense, at least the part of it that pertains to AI and robotics, fails. Ours may be a dark future, but we cannot know that on the basis of (...)
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  8.  11
    A Vindication of Program Verification.Selmer Bringsjord - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (3):262-277.
    Fetzer famously claims that program verification is not even a theoretical possibility, and offers a certain argument for this far-reaching claim. Unfortunately for Fetzer, and like-minded thinkers, this position-argument pair, while based on a seminal insight that program verification, despite its Platonic proof-theoretic airs, is plagued by the inevitable unreliability of messy, real-world causation, is demonstrably self-refuting. As I soon show, Fetzer is like the person who claims: ‘My sole claim is that every claim expressed by an English sentence and (...)
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  9.  50
    Given the Web, What is Intelligence, Really?Selmer Bringsjord & Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (4):464-479.
    This article argues that existing systems on the Web cannot approach human-level intelligence, as envisioned by Descartes, without being able to achieve genuine problem solving on unseen problems. The article argues that this entails committing to a strong intensional logic. In addition to revising extant arguments in favor of intensional systems, it presents a novel mathematical argument to show why extensional systems can never hope to capture the inherent complexity of natural language. The argument makes its case by focusing on (...)
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  10. Cognition is Not Computation: The Argument From Irreversibility.Selmer Bringsjord - 1997 - Synthese 113 (2):285-320.
    The dominant scientific and philosophical view of the mind – according to which, put starkly, cognition is computation – is refuted herein, via specification and defense of the following new argument: Computation is reversible; cognition isn't; ergo, cognition isn't computation. After presenting a sustained dialectic arising from this defense, we conclude with a brief preview of the view we would put in place of the cognition-is-computation doctrine.
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  11.  10
    Analogy, Explanation, and Proof.John E. Hummel, John Licato & Selmer Bringsjord - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  12. Meeting Floridi's Challenge to Artificial Intelligence From the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness.Selmer Bringsjord - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312.
    Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to (...)
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  13. Superminds People Harness Hypercomputation, and More.Selmer Bringsjord & Michael John Zenzen - 2003
  14.  54
    Belief in the Singularity is Logically Brittle.Selmer Bringsjord - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (7-8):14.
  15.  83
    Offer: One Billion Dollars for a Conscious Robot; If You're Honest, You Must Decline.Selmer Bringsjord - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):28-43.
    You are offered one billion dollars to 'simply' produce a proof-of-concept robot that has phenomenal consciousness -- in fact, you can receive a deliciously large portion of the money up front, by simply starting a three-year work plan in good faith. Should you take the money and commence? No. I explain why this refusal is in order, now and into the foreseeable future.
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  16. Are There Set Theoretic Possible Worlds?Selmer Bringsjord - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):64 -.
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  17. Why Did Evolution Engineer Consciousness?Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel - 2002 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
  18. In Defense of Impenetrable Zombies.Selmer Bringsjord - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):348-351.
    Moody is right that the doctrine of conscious inessentialism is false. Unfortunately, his zombie-based argument against , once made sufficiently clear to evaluate, is revealed as nothing but legerdemain. The fact is -- though Moody has convinced himself otherwise -- certain zombies are impenetrable: that they are zombies, and not conscious beings like us, is something beyond the capacity of humans to divine.
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  19.  64
    The ‘Mental Eye’ Defence of an Infinitized Version of Yablo's Paradox.Selmer Bringsjord & Bram Van Heuveln - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):61–70.
  20.  31
    The Logicist Manifesto: At Long Last Let Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence Become a Field Unto Itself.Selmer Bringsjord - 2008 - Journal of Applied Logic 6 (4):502-525.
  21.  63
    In Defense of the Unprovability of the Church-Turing Thesis.Selmer Bringsjord - unknown
    One of us has previously argued that the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), contra Elliot Mendelson, is not provable, and is — light of the mind’s capacity for effortless hypercomputation — moreover false (e.g., [13]). But a new, more serious challenge has appeared on the scene: an attempt by Smith [28] to prove CTT. His case is a clever “squeezing argument” that makes crucial use of Kolmogorov-Uspenskii (KU) machines. The plan for the present paper is as follows. After covering some necessary preliminaries (...)
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  22. Toward a Formal Philosophy of Hypercomputation.Selmer Bringsjord & Michael Zenzen - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (2):241-258.
    Does what guides a pastry chef stand on par, from the standpoint of contemporary computer science, with what guides a supercomputer? Did Betty Crocker, when telling us how to bake a cake, provide an effective procedure, in the sense of `effective' used in computer science? According to Cleland, the answer in both cases is ``Yes''. One consequence of Cleland's affirmative answer is supposed to be that hypercomputation is, to use her phrase, ``theoretically viable''. Unfortunately, though we applaud Cleland's ``gadfly philosophizing'' (...)
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  23.  53
    The Modal Argument for Hypercomputing Minds.Selmer Bringsjord - 2004 - Theoretical Computer Science 317.
  24.  20
    Psychometric Artificial General Intelligence: The Piaget-MacGuyver Room.Selmer Bringsjord & John Licato - 2012 - In Pei Wang & Ben Goertzel (eds.), Theoretical Foundations of Artificial General Intelligence. Springer. pp. 25--48.
  25.  58
    Computationalism is Dead; Now What?Selmer Bringsjord - unknown
    In this paper I place Jim Fetzer's esemplastic burial of the computational conceptionof mind within the context of both my own burial and the theory of mind I would put in place of this dead doctrine. My view..
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  26.  70
    In Computation, Parallel is Nothing, Physical Everything.Selmer Bringsjord - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):95-99.
    Andrew Boucher (1997) argues that ``parallel computation is fundamentally different from sequential computation'' (p. 543), and that this fact provides reason to be skeptical about whether AI can produce a genuinely intelligent machine. But parallelism, as I prove herein, is irrelevant. What Boucher has inadvertently glimpsed is one small part of a mathematical tapestry portraying the simple but undeniable fact that physical computation can be fundamentally different from ordinary, ``textbook'' computation (whether parallel or sequential). This tapestry does indeed immediately imply (...)
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  27.  9
    A Response to Núñez Et Al.'S “What Happened to Cognitive Science?”.Marjorie McShane, Selmer Bringsjord, James Hendler, Sergei Nirenburg & Ron Sun - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (4):914-917.
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  28.  84
    Computation, Among Other Things, is Beneath Us.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):469-88.
    What''s computation? The received answer is that computation is a computer at work, and a computer at work is that which can be modelled as a Turing machine at work. Unfortunately, as John Searle has recently argued, and as others have agreed, the received answer appears to imply that AI and Cog Sci are a royal waste of time. The argument here is alarmingly simple: AI and Cog Sci (of the Strong sort, anyway) are committed to the view that cognition (...)
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  29.  56
    Toward Formalizing Common-Sense Psychology: An Analysis of the False-Belief Task.Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord - 2008 - In Tu-Bao Ho & Zhi-Hua Zhou (eds.), Pricai 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 17--29.
  30. Animals, Zombanimals, and the Total Turing Test: The Essence of Artificial Intelligence.Selmer Bringsjord - 2000 - Journal of Logic Language and Information 9 (4):397-418.
    Alan Turing devised his famous test (TT) through a slight modificationof the parlor game in which a judge tries to ascertain the gender of twopeople who are only linguistically accessible. Stevan Harnad hasintroduced the Total TT, in which the judge can look at thecontestants in an attempt to determine which is a robot and which aperson. But what if we confront the judge with an animal, and arobot striving to pass for one, and then challenge him to peg which iswhich? (...)
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  31. Searle on the Brink.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 1.
    In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second.
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  32.  24
    By Disanalogy, Cyberwarfare Is Utterly New.Selmer Bringsjord & John Licato - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (3):339-358.
    We provide an underlying theory of argument by disanalogy, in order to employ it to show that cyberwarfare is fundamentally new. Once this general case is made, the battle is won: we are well on our way to establishing our main thesis: that Just War Theory itself must be modernized. Augustine and Aquinas had a stunningly long run, but today’s world, based as it is on digital information and increasingly intelligent information-processing, points the way to a beast so big and (...)
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  33. Logic and Artificial Intelligence: Divorced, Still Married, Separated ...? [REVIEW]Selmer Bringsjord & David A. Ferrucci - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):273-308.
    Though it''s difficult to agree on the exact date of their union, logic and artificial intelligence (AI) were married by the late 1950s, and, at least during their honeymoon, were happily united. What connubial permutation do logic and AI find themselves in now? Are they still (happily) married? Are they divorced? Or are they only separated, both still keeping alive the promise of a future in which the old magic is rekindled? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions (...)
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  34. Real Robots and the Missing Thought-Experiment in the Chinese Room Dialectic.Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel - 2003 - In John Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. pp. 144--166.
  35.  76
    A Refutation of Penrose's Godelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence.Selmer Bringsjord - manuscript
    Having, as it is generally agreed, failed to destroy the computational conception of mind with the G\"{o}delian attack he articulated in his {\em The Emperor's New Mind}, Penrose has returned, armed with a more elaborate and more fastidious G\"{o}delian case, expressed in and 3 of his {\em Shadows of the Mind}. The core argument in these chapters is enthymematic, and when formalized, a remarkable number of technical glitches come to light. Over and above these defects, the argument, at best, is (...)
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  36. On Building Robot Persons: Response to Zlatev. [REVIEW]Selmer Bringsjord - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):381-385.
    Zlatev offers surprisingly weak reasoning in support of his view that robots with the right kind of developmental histories can have meaning. We ought nonetheless to praise Zlatev for an impressionistic account of how attending to the psychology of human development can help us build robots that appear to have intentionality.
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  37. On the Provability, Veracity, and AI-Relevance of the Church-Turing Thesis.Selmer Bringsjord & Konstantine Arkoudas - 2006 - In A. Olszewski, J. Wole'nski & R. Janusz (eds.), Church's Thesis After Seventy Years. Ontos Verlag. pp. 68-118.
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  38.  51
    Could, How Could We Tell If, and Should - Androids Have Inner Lives?Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - In Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.), Android Epistemology. MIT Press.
  39.  62
    Is the Connectionist-Logicist Debate One of Ai's Wonderful Red Herrings?Selmer Bringsjord - 1991 - Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 3:319-49.
  40.  18
    Consciousness by the Lights of Logic and Commonsense.Selmer Bringsjord - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):144-146.
    I urge return by the lights of logic and commonsense to a dialectical tabula rasa – according to which: (1) consciousness, in the ordinary pre-analytic sense of the term, is identified with P-consciousness, and “A-consciousness” is supplanted by suitably configured terms from its Blockian definition; (2) the supposedly fallacious Searlean argument for the view that a function of P-consciousness is to allow flexible and creative cognition is enthymematic and, when charitably specified, quite formidable.
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  41. Why Did Evolution Engineer Consciousness?Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel - 1998 - In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
  42.  89
    Rage Against the Machine.Selmer Bringsjord & Joe Johnson - 2012 - The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):90-95.
  43.  53
    Is Gödelian Model-Based Deductive Reasoning Computational?Selmer Bringsjord - 1998 - Philosophica 61.
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  44.  47
    Christianity and Pacifism: A Reply to Kellenberger.Selmer Bringsjord - 1989 - Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):88-94.
    In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, James Kellenberger argues that the “ethics of love” aspect of Christianity entails pacifism, In response, I present an argument designed to show that Christian doctrine entails the falsity of pacifism, I go on to show, however, that the spirit of Kellenberger’s point may survive, for perhaps Christ’s teaching regarding “mental sin” prohibits the war-related activity known as nuclear deterrence.
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  45.  45
    Grim on Logic and Omniscience.Selmer Bringsjord - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):186 - 189.
  46.  28
    Newell's Program, Like Hilbert's, is Dead; Let's Move On.Yingrui Yang & Selmer Bringsjord - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5):627-627.
    We draw an analogy between Hilbert's program (HP) for mathematics and Newell's program (NP) for cognitive modeling. The analogy reveals that NP, like HP before it, is fundamentally flawed. The only alternative is a program anchored by an admission that cognition is more than computation.
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  47.  18
    Piagetian Roboethics Via Category Theory Moving Beyond Mere Formal Operations to Engineer Robots Whose Decisions Are Guaranteed to Be Ethically Correct.Selmer Bringsjord, Joshua Taylor, Bram van Heuveln, Konstantine Arkoudas, Micah Clark & Ralph Wojtowicz - 2011 - In M. Anderson S. Anderson (ed.), Machine Ethics. Cambridge Univ. Press.
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  48.  18
    In Defense of Logical Minds.Selmer Bringsjord, E. Bringsjord & R. Noel - 1998 - In M. A. Gernsbacher & S. J. Derry (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawerence Erlbaum. pp. 173--178.
  49.  25
    An Argument for P = NP.Selmer Bringsjord - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (4):663-672.
    I articulate a novel modal argument for P=NP.
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  50.  24
    In Defense of Copying.Selmer Bringsjord - 1989 - Public Affairs Quarterly 3 (1):1-9.
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