Results for 'Sensation'

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  1. The Exteroceptive Sensations.Superficial Pain Sensation - 1969 - In P. Vinken & G. Bruyn (eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neurology. North Holland.
     
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  2. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories, and explores a number of important issues: the (...)
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  3. Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
  4. Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1962 - Routledge.
  5. Sensations and Brain Processes.J. J. C. Smart - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  6.  43
    Sensation Seeking: A Comparative Approach to a Human Trait.Marvin Zuckerman - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (3):413-434.
  7.  40
    Unconscious Sensations.Norton Nelkin - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (March):129-41.
    Having, in previous papers, distinguished at least three forms of consciousness , I now further examine their differences. This examination has some surprising results. Having argued that neither C1 nor C2 is a phenomenological state?and so different from CN?I now show that CN itself is best thought of as a subclass of a larger state . CS is the set of image?representation states. CN is that set of CS states that we are also C2 about. I argue that CN states (...)
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  8.  63
    Projecting Sensations to External Objects: Evidence From Skin Conductance Response.V. S. Ramachandran - unknown
    Subjects perceived touch sensations as arising from a table (or a rubber hand) when both the table (or the rubber hand) and their own real hand were repeatedly tapped and stroked in synchrony with the real hand hidden from view. If the table or rubber hand was then ‘injured’, subjects displayed a strong skin conductance response (SCR) even though nothing was done to the real hand. Sensations could even be projected to anatomically impossible locations. The illusion was much less vivid, (...)
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  9.  72
    Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology. [REVIEW]V. C. A. - 1944 - Journal of Philosophy 41 (12):334-335.
  10. Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism.Ned Block - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 137-142.
    Representationism 1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. I will argue that Michael Tye's heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the root of this difference.
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  11. Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject.Christopher Peacocke - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:7-24.
    The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence (...)
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  12. Understanding Sensations.Nicholas Maxwell - 1968 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):127-146.
    My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple (...)
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  13. Valence, Sensations and Appraisals Co-Occurring with Feeling Moved: Evidence on Kama Muta Theory From Intra-Individually Cross-Correlated Time Series.Anders K. Herting & Thomas W. Schubert - forthcoming - Cognition and Emotion:1-17.
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  14.  25
    Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. [REVIEW]Frank Jackson - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):614.
  15. Sensations as Representations in Kant.Tim Jankowiak - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):492-513.
    This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ?subjective representations? and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to (...)
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  16.  21
    Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology.Harlow W. Ades - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1):104-106.
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  17. Sensational Sentences Switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
  18. Are Sensations Still Brain Processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
    Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, “Sensations and Brain Processes.” It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and replies that (...)
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  19. Sensations, Natural Properties, and the Private Language Argument.William Child - 2018 - In Kevin Cahill & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Wittgenstein and Naturalism. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 79-95.
    Wittgenstein’s philosophy involves a general anti-platonism about properties or standards of similarity. On his view, what it is for one thing to have the same property as another is not dictated by reality itself; it depends on our classificatory practices and the standards of similarity they embody. Wittgenstein’s anti-platonism plays an important role in the private language sections and in his discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds. In sharp contrast to Wittgenstein’s views stands the contemporary doctrine of natural (...)
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  20. Sensation Terms.Peter Pagin - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (3):177-199.
    Are sensation ascriptions descriptive, even in the first person present tense? Do sensation terms refer to, denote, sensations, so that truth and falsity of sensation ascriptions depend on the properties of the denoted sensations? That is, do sensation terms have a denotational semantics? As I understand it, this is denied by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a denotational semantics for public language sensation terms, such as‘pain’. He also rejects the idea that speakers can recognizesensations. (...)
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  21.  28
    From Sensations to Concepts: A Proposal for Two Learning Processes.Peter Gärdenfors - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):441-464.
    This article presents two learning processes in order to explain how children at an early age can transform a complex sensory input to concepts and categories. The first process constructs the perceptual structures that emerge in children’s cognitive development by detecting invariants in the sensory input. The invariant structures involve a reduction in dimensionality of the sensory information. It is argued that this process generates the primary domains of space, objects and actions and that these domains can be represented as (...)
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  22. Perception, Sensation and Verification.Bede Rundle - 1972 - Oxford University Press.
  23. Sensations, Swatches, and Speckled Hens.Jeremy Fantl & Robert J. Howell - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.
    We argue that there is a interesting connection between the old problem of the Speckled Hen and an argument that can be traced from Russell to Armstrong to Putnam that we call the “gradation argument.” Both arguments have been used to show that there is no “Highest Common Factor” between appearances we judge the same – no such thing as “real” sensations. But, we argue, both only impugn the assumption of epistemic certainty regarding introspective reports.
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  24. On Sensations of Position.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):55.
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  25.  20
    Sensation of Movement.Thor Grünbaum & Mark Schram Christensen - 2017 - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
    Sensation of Movement explores the role of sensation in motor control, bodily self-recognition and sense of agency. The sensation of movement is dependent on a range of information received by the brain, from signalling in the peripheral sensory organs to the establishment of higher order goals. Through the integration of neuroscientific knowledge with psychological and philosophical perspectives, this book questions whether one type of information is more relevant for the ability to sense and control movement. Addressing conscious (...)
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  26. Sensation's Ghost: The Nonsensory Fringe of Consciousness.Bruce Mangan - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Non-sensory experiences represent almost all context information in consciousness. They condition most aspects of conscious cognition including voluntary retrieval, perception, monitoring, problem solving, emotion, evaluation, meaning recognition. Many peculiar aspects of non-sensory qualia (e.g., they resist being 'grasped' by an act of attention) are explained as adaptations shaped by the cognitive functions they serve. The most important nonsensory experience is coherence or "rightness." Rightness represents degrees of context fit among contents in consciousness, and between conscious and non-conscious processes. Rightness (not (...)
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  27.  11
    Victorian Sensation: The Extraordinary Publication, Reception, and Secret Authorship of "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation".James A. Secord & John M. Lynch - 2001 - Journal of the History of Biology 34 (3):565-579.
  28. Causation, Sensations, and Knowledge.William S. Robinson - 1982 - Mind 91 (October):524-40.
  29.  26
    The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas.Julius Sensat - 1978 - Studies in Soviet Thought 23 (1):77-79.
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  30.  19
    Bodily Sensations.J. T. Stevenson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):543.
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  31. The Analysis of Sensations.Ernst Mach - 1959 - Dover Publications.
    Born in 1838, Mach was a pioneer in the field of physics, having even made an impression on Einstein in his younger life who credited him with being the "Philosophical forerunner of relativity theory." His name is also associated with the speed of sound (as in traveling at Mach "insert-number-here") as well as the Doppler effect. Throughout his career, he was particularly interested in the biological and sensory relationship to physics and science, and naturally, this interest expanded to that of (...)
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  32. Sensation and Perception (1981).Fred Dretske - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
  33. Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.
    Bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings, are commonly characterized in terms of their phenomenal character. In order to account for this phenomenal character, many philosophers adopt strong representationalism. According to this view, bodily sensations are essentially and entirely determined by an intentional content related to particular conditions of the body. For example, pain would be nothing more than the representation of actual or potential tissue damage. In order to motivate and justify their view, strong representationalists often (...)
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  34. Tactile Sensation Via Spatial Perception.Ned Block - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7):285-286.
  35.  12
    Perception, Sensation and Verification.Richard W. Miller - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (3):403.
  36. Could Sensation Be a Bodily Act?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  37. Bodily Sensation and Tactile Perception.Louise Richardson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):134-154.
  38.  43
    Spatial Content of Painful Sensations.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Philosophical considerations regarding experiential spatial content have focused on exteroceptive sensations presenting external entities, and not on interoceptive experiences that present states of our own body. A notable example is studies on interoceptive touch, in which it is argued that interoceptive tactile experiences have rich spatial content such that tactile sensations are experienced as located in a spatial field. This paper investigates whether a similarly rich spatial content can be attributed to experiences of acute, cutaneous pain. It is argued that (...)
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  39. Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology.Charles H. Kahn - 1966 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 48 (1-3):43-81.
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    Plastic Bodies: Rebuilding Sensation After Phenomenology.Tom Sparrow - 2015 - Open Humanities Press.
    Sensation is a concept with a conflicted philosophical history. It has found as many allies as enemies in nearly every camp from empiricism to poststructuralism. Polyvalent, with an uncertain referent, and often overshadowed by intuition, perception, or cognition, sensation invites as much metaphysical speculation as it does dismissive criticism. -/- The promise of sensation has certainly not been lost on the phenomenologists who have sought to ‘rehabilitate’ the concept. In Plastic Bodies, Tom Sparrow argues that the phenomenologists (...)
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  41.  55
    Sensations and the Language of Thought.Adam Vinueza - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.
    I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind (...)
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  42.  19
    Sensation Seeking and Gonadal Hormones.Reid J. Daitzman, Marvin Zuckerman, Paul Sammelwitz & Venkataseshu Ganjam - 1978 - Journal of Biosocial Science 10 (4):401-408.
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    How Sensations Get Their Names.Norton Nelkin - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):325-39.
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    Sensations and Situations: A Sensorimotor Integrationist Approach.A. Noe - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (5-6):66-79.
    In this short paper I propose that the sensorimotor approach to perception is a tree yielding two distinct theoretical fruits. One fruit is sensorimotor reductionism. The other is sensorimotor integrationism. In this paper I try to explain what makes these fruits different.
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  45. Sensations and Brain Processes.Hans Flohr - 1995 - Behavioral Brain Research 71:157-61.
    A hypothesis on the physiological conditions of consciousness is presented. It is assumed that the occurrence of states of consciousness causally depends on the formation of complex representational structures. Cortical neural networks that exhibit a high representational activity develop higher-order, self-referential representations as a result of self-organizing processes. The occurrence of such states is identical with the appearance of states of consciousness. The underlying physiological processes can be identified. It is assumed that neural assemblies instantiate mental representations; hence consciousness depends (...)
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  46. Action, Control and Sensations of Acting.Benjamin Mossel - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.
    Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the (...)
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  47.  23
    The Political Life of Sensation.Davide Panagia - 2009 - Duke University Press.
    Prologue : narratocracy and the contours of political life -- From nomos to nomad : Kant, Deleuze, and Rancière on sensation -- The piazza, the edicola, and the noise of the utterance -- Machiavelli's theory of sensation and Florence's vita festiva -- The viewing subject : Caravaggio, Bacon, and the ring -- "You're eating too fast!" slow food's ethos of convivium -- Epilogue : "the photographs tell it all" : on an ethics of appearance.
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  48.  53
    Sensations in a Language of Thought.Georges Rey - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:73-112.
  49. Perception, Sensation, and Non-Conceptual Content.David W. Hamlyn - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53.
    Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense which (...)
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  50. Sensational Sentences.Georges Rey - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Blackwell.
     
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