Results for 'Sensation'

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  1. The exteroceptive sensations.Superficial Pain Sensation - 1969 - In P. Vinken & G. Bruyn (eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neurology. North Holland.
     
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  2.  51
    Sensation seeking: A comparative approach to a human trait.Marvin Zuckerman - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (3):413-434.
  3. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories, and explores a number of important issues: the (...)
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  4. Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
  5.  43
    Unconscious sensations.Norton Nelkin - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (March):129-41.
    Having, in previous papers, distinguished at least three forms of consciousness , I now further examine their differences. This examination has some surprising results. Having argued that neither C1 nor C2 is a phenomenological state?and so different from CN?I now show that CN itself is best thought of as a subclass of a larger state . CS is the set of image?representation states. CN is that set of CS states that we are also C2 about. I argue that CN states (...)
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  6. Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1962 - Routledge.
  7. Sensation Terms.Peter Pagin - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (3):177-199.
    Are sensation ascriptions descriptive, even in the first person present tense? Do sensation terms refer to, denote, sensations, so that truth and falsity of sensation ascriptions depend on the properties of the denoted sensations? That is, do sensation terms have a denotational semantics? As I understand it, this is denied by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a denotational semantics for public language sensation terms, such as‘pain’. He also rejects the idea that speakers can recognizesensations. (...)
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  8.  64
    Projecting sensations to external objects: Evidence from skin conductance response.V. S. Ramachandran - unknown
    Subjects perceived touch sensations as arising from a table (or a rubber hand) when both the table (or the rubber hand) and their own real hand were repeatedly tapped and stroked in synchrony with the real hand hidden from view. If the table or rubber hand was then ‘injured’, subjects displayed a strong skin conductance response (SCR) even though nothing was done to the real hand. Sensations could even be projected to anatomically impossible locations. The illusion was much less vivid, (...)
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  9. Understanding sensations.Nicholas Maxwell - 1968 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):127-146.
    My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple (...)
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  10. Could Sensation be a Bodily Act?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  11. Sensations, Natural Properties, and the Private Language Argument.William Child - 2018 - In Kevin Cahill & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Wittgenstein and Naturalism. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 79-95.
    Wittgenstein’s philosophy involves a general anti-platonism about properties or standards of similarity. On his view, what it is for one thing to have the same property as another is not dictated by reality itself; it depends on our classificatory practices and the standards of similarity they embody. Wittgenstein’s anti-platonism plays an important role in the private language sections and in his discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds. In sharp contrast to Wittgenstein’s views stands the contemporary doctrine of natural (...)
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  12. Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens.Jeremy Fantl & Robert J. Howell - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.
    We argue that there is a interesting connection between the old problem of the Speckled Hen and an argument that can be traced from Russell to Armstrong to Putnam that we call the “gradation argument.” Both arguments have been used to show that there is no “Highest Common Factor” between appearances we judge the same – no such thing as “real” sensations. But, we argue, both only impugn the assumption of epistemic certainty regarding introspective reports.
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  13.  9
    Sensation seeking and augmenting-reducing: Evoked potentials and/or kinesthetic figural aftereffects?Marvin Zuckerman - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):749-754.
  14. Sensational properties: Theses to accept and theses to reject.Christopher Peacocke - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:7-24.
    The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence (...)
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  15. Sensations as Representations in Kant.Tim Jankowiak - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):492-513.
    This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ?subjective representations? and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to (...)
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  16. Are sensations still brain processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
    Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, “Sensations and Brain Processes.” It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and replies that (...)
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  17. Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism.Ned Block - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 137-142.
    Representationism 1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. I will argue that Michael Tye's heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the root of this difference.
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  18.  75
    Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology. [REVIEW]V. C. A. - 1944 - Journal of Philosophy 41 (12):334-335.
  19.  6
    Sensational Science, Archaic Hominin Genetics, and Amplified Inductive Risk.Joyce C. Havstad - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):295-320.
    More than a decade of exacting scientific research involving paleontological fragments and ancient DNA has lately produced a series of pronouncements about a purportedly novel population of archaic hominins dubbed “the Denisova.” The science involved in these matters is both technically stunning and, socially, at times a bit reckless. Here I discuss the responsibilities which scientists incur when they make inductively risky pronouncements about the different relative contributions by Denisovans to genomes of members of apparent subpopulations of current humans. This (...)
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  20. Sensations and Brain Processes.J. J. C. Smart - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  21.  56
    Sensations and the language of thought.Adam Vinueza - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.
    I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind (...)
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  22.  21
    Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology.Harlow W. Ades - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1):104-106.
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  23.  28
    Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. [REVIEW]Frank Jackson - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):614.
  24. Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
  25. Causation, sensations, and knowledge.William S. Robinson - 1982 - Mind 91 (October):524-40.
  26. Sensation and perception (1981).Fred Dretske - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
  27.  25
    Sensation of Movement.Thor Grünbaum & Mark Schram Christensen - 2017 - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
    Sensation of Movement explores the role of sensation in motor control, bodily self-recognition and sense of agency. The sensation of movement is dependent on a range of information received by the brain, from signalling in the peripheral sensory organs to the establishment of higher order goals. Through the integration of neuroscientific knowledge with psychological and philosophical perspectives, this book questions whether one type of information is more relevant for the ability to sense and control movement. Addressing conscious (...)
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  28.  76
    Sensation, intentionality, and animal consciousness: Malebranche's theory of the mind.Nicholas Jolley - 1995 - Ratio 8 (2):128-42.
    In general, seventeenth‐century philosophers seem to have assumed that intentionality is an essential characteristic of our mental life. Malebranche is perhaps the only philosopher in the period who stands out clearly against the prevailing orthodoxy; he is committed to the thesis that there is a large class of mental items ‐ sensations ‐ which have no representational content. In this paper I argue that due attention to this fact makes it possible to mount at least a partial defence of his (...)
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  29.  35
    Sensations, raw feels, and other minds.Eddy M. Zemach - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 20 (2):317-40.
    IT IS POSSIBLE to discern three main types of answers commonly given to the question about the nature of sensations. The first is the classical "private access" theory, according to which I can sense my own pain, while the pains of others can never be subject to direct inspection by me. The presence of overt pain behavior may inductively confirm the hypothesis that the body thus behaving is besouled [[sic]] and subject to a sensation of pain, but I can (...)
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  30.  52
    Stimulus, sensation, and meaning.Glenn D. Higginson - 1935 - Journal of Philosophy 32 (24):645-650.
    We can find no place in psychology for the concept of stimulus as a physical agent to which an individual responds in a psychological manner. Moreover, we can find no place for sensation and image when considered as simple mental elements. We would also purge ...
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  31.  57
    Sensation, perception and immediacy: Mead and Merleau-ponty.Sandra Rosenthal & Patrick Bourgeois - 1990 - Southwest Philosophy Review 6 (1):105-111.
    A focus on the relation between sensation and the perceptual object in the philosophies of G H Mead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty points toward their shared views of perception as non-reductionistic and holistic, as inextricably tied to the active role of the sensible body, and as involving a new understanding of the nature of immediacy within experience. This essay explores these shared views.
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  32. Perception, Sensation and Verification.Bede Rundle - 1972 - Oxford University Press.
  33.  36
    From Sensations to Concepts: a Proposal for Two Learning Processes.Peter Gärdenfors - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):441-464.
    This article presents two learning processes in order to explain how children at an early age can transform a complex sensory input to concepts and categories. The first process constructs the perceptual structures that emerge in children’s cognitive development by detecting invariants in the sensory input. The invariant structures involve a reduction in dimensionality of the sensory information. It is argued that this process generates the primary domains of space, objects and actions and that these domains can be represented as (...)
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  34.  53
    Sensations in a language of thought.Georges Rey - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:73-112.
  35.  77
    Anscombe, sensation and intentional objects.Douglas Odegard - 1972 - Dialogue 11 (1):69-77.
    Let us use ‘sensation’ such that we can talk about ‘visual sensation’ and ‘auditory sensation’, and such that ‘sensation’ cannot readily be pluralized. It then makes sense to talk about the “objects” involved in sensation. For example, if someone sees red, where his seeing red is a case of sensation, then there is an “object” involved in the situation in the sense that we can talk about “what” he sees. One of the enduring problems (...)
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  36.  58
    Sensations, experiences, and brain processes.John Heil - 1970 - Philosophy 45 (July):221-6.
    In his defence of the identity theory, Professor Smart has attempted to show that reports of mental states are strictly topic-neutral. If this were the case then it would follow that there is nothing logically wrong with the claim that the mind is the brain or that mental states are really nothing but brain states. Some phillosophers have argued that a fundamental objection to any form of materialism is that the latter makes an obvious logical blunder in identifying the mental (...)
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  37. On Sensations of Position.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):55-58.
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  38.  62
    How sensations get their names.Norton Nelkin - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):325-39.
  39. Sensation's ghost: The nonsensory fringe of consciousness.Bruce Mangan - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Non-sensory experiences represent almost all context information in consciousness. They condition most aspects of conscious cognition including voluntary retrieval, perception, monitoring, problem solving, emotion, evaluation, meaning recognition. Many peculiar aspects of non-sensory qualia (e.g., they resist being 'grasped' by an act of attention) are explained as adaptations shaped by the cognitive functions they serve. The most important nonsensory experience is coherence or "rightness." Rightness represents degrees of context fit among contents in consciousness, and between conscious and non-conscious processes. Rightness (not (...)
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  40. Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology.Charles H. Kahn - 1966 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 48 (1-3):43-81.
  41. Sensualismus und Sensation: zum Verhältnis von Natur, Moral und Ästhetik in der Spätaufklärung und im Fin de Siècle.Johanna Borek - 1983 - Wien: Böhlau.
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  42.  32
    Sensation and Representation a Study of Intentionalist Accounts of the Bodily Sensations.David Bain - 2000 - Dissertation,
    There are good reasons for wanting to adopt an intentionalist account of experiences generally, an account according to which having an experience is a matter of representing the world as being some way or other—according to which, that is, such mental episodes have intrinsic, conceptual, representational content. Such an approach promises, for example, to provide a satisfying conception of experiences’ subjectivity, their phenomenal character, and their crucial role in constituting reasons for our judgements about the world. It promises this, moreover, (...)
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  43.  25
    Phantom Sensations: A Neurophenomenological Exploration of Body Memory.Thiemo Breyer - 2018 - Neuroethics 14 (1):73-81.
    This paper brings neuroscientific experiments into relation with concepts from phenomenological philosophy to investigate phantom sensations from the perspective of embodied subjectivity. Using a mirror device to create intersensory effects in subjects experiencing phantom sensations, one can create illusions aiming at alleviating phantom pain. Neuroplasticity as a general property of the brain and cortical remapping as a specific mechanism underlying the success of this procedure are interpreted with the phenomenological notions of body image, body schema, and body memory. It is (...)
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  44.  22
    Functionalism, sensations, and materialism.Larry J. Eshelman - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (June):255-74.
    I wish to defend a functionalist approach to the mind-body problem. I use the word ‘functionalist’ with some reluctance, however; for although it has become the conventional label for the sort of approach taken by such philosophers as H. Putnam and D. C. Dennett, I believe it is somewhat misleading. The functionalist, as I understand him, tries to show how there can be machine analogues of mental states and then argues that just as we are not inclined to postulate an (...)
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  45. Perception, sensation, and non-conceptual content.David W. Hamlyn - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53.
    Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense which (...)
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  46. Bodily Sensation and Tactile Perception.Louise Richardson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):134-154.
  47.  12
    Perception, Sensation and Verification.Richard W. Miller - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (3):403.
  48.  27
    The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas.Julius Sensat - 1978 - Studies in Soviet Thought 23 (1):77-79.
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  49.  19
    Bodily Sensations.J. T. Stevenson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):543.
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  50.  10
    The ‘Sensation of Doubt’ in East Asian Zen Buddhism and Some Parallels with Pāli Accounts of Meditation Practice.Robert E. Buswell - 2018 - Contemporary Buddhism 19 (1):69-82.
    The technique of ‘examining meditative topics’ is one of the emblematic practices of the ‘Zen’ traditions of East Asia. An emblematic feature of this technique is the generation of a sense of inquiry, or more literally a ‘feeling’ or ‘sensation of doubt’. This inquiry creates an intense introspective focus that, in some strands of the practice, may be accompanied by palpable physical sensations; these sensations seem to be analogous to the experience of ‘excitation’ or ‘rapture’ described in contemporary samatha/śamatha (...)
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