Especially in functional-typological linguistics, semantic roles have been studied thoroughly, because they constitute a good starting point for any study on argument marking due to their semantically defined nature. However, the very concept of semantic roles is far from being without problems, and there is still no consensus on how the roles are best defined. In this volume, the notion will be discussed from novel perspectives with the aim of providing new insights into our understanding of semantic roles. Two of (...) the papers deal with semantic role clusters, one with semantic roles in verbless constructions, one with diachrony of semantic roles and two with individual semantic roles that have not been studied in too much detail in previous studies. The book may not offer answers to all questions the readers may have, but at least it raises interesting further questions relevant to arriving at a better understanding of semantic roles. Originally published in Studies in Language Vol. 38:3 (2014). (shrink)

A number of theories of consciousness define consciousness by the folk-intuition that consciousness is somehow aware of, or ‘given’ to itself. I attempt to undermine this intuition on phenomenological, conceptual and psychological grounds. An alternative, first-order theory of consciousness, however, faces the task of explaining the possibility of self-awareness for consciousness, as well as the everyday intuition supporting it. I propose that another, weaker kind of givenness, ‘givenness as availability’, is up to both of these tasks, and is therefore sufficient (...) and suitable for first-order theories of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper will first examine the different versions of social or socialized epistemology, a field that has gathered much support among epistemologists in recent years. After the necessary classification, the paper goes on to suggest that socialized epistemology could benefit from contemporary social theory, and Derek Layder's views are presented as especially fruitful in this respect. To give grounds for this suggestion, features of Layder's theory will be contrasted with certain shortcomings in 'conservative' and 'feminist' versions of socialized epistemology.

Tony Lawson, Sandra Harding, Drucilla K. Barker, Fabienne Peter and Julie A. Nelson have recently debated the merits and demerits of critical realism as the basis of feminist social research. Yet the dialogue is left unfinished, with no clear agreement attained. Some key features of that failure are analysed in this article. It is suggested that, despite shared support for explicitly post-positivistic stances, critical realists and post-structuralist feminists cannot gain much from a dialogue that proceeds like this one. Other modes (...) of discussion should be looked for. One more promising basis for such discussion - a question-driven approach to social scientific explanation - is introduced at the end of the article. (shrink)

Tony Lawson, Sandra Harding, Drucilla K. Barker, Fabienne Peter and Julie A. Nelson have recently debated the merits and demerits of critical realism as the basis of feminist social research. Yet the dialogue is left unfinished, with no clear agreement attained. Some key features of that failure are analysed in this article. It is suggested that, despite shared support for explicitly post-positivistic stances, critical realists and post-structuralist feminists cannot gain much from a dialogue that proceeds like this one. Other modes (...) of discussion should be looked for. One more promising basis for such discussion - a question-driven approach to social scientific explanation - is introduced at the end of the article. (shrink)

: "Pure, applied and empirical" : Ferdinand Tönnies' system of sociology proper.

This book offers a concise exposition of the content theory of intentionality, which lies at the root of Husserl’s phenomenology, for student and scholar. Originally published in 1982. The first part traces the history of phenomenology from its beginnings in Aristotle and Aquinas through Hume, Reid and the Brentano school to its first clear formulation in Frege and Husserl. Part two analyses some special problems involved in two important types of mental phenomena – perception and emotion – without abandoning the (...) historical approach. Husserl’s theory of perception is extensively discussed and a Husserlian analysis of so-called de re acts is attempted. (shrink)

This book offers a concise exposition of the content theory of intentionality, which lies at the root of Husserl’s phenomenology, for student and scholar. Originally published in 1982. The first part traces the history of phenomenology from its beginnings in Aristotle and Aquinas through Hume, Reid and the Brentano school to its first clear formulation in Frege and Husserl. Part two analyses some special problems involved in two important types of mental phenomena – perception and emotion – without abandoning the (...) historical approach. Husserl’s theory of perception is extensively discussed and a Husserlian analysis of so-called _de re_ acts is attempted. (shrink)

Intensified job demands originate in the general accelerated pace of society and ever-changing working conditions, which subject workers to increasing workloads and deadlines, constant planning and decision-making about one’s job and career, and the continual learning of new professional knowledge and skills. This study investigated how individual characteristics, namely negative and positive affectivity related to competence demands, and multitasking preference moderate the association between IJDs and cognitive stress symptoms among media workers. The results show that although IJDs were associated with (...) higher cognitive stress symptoms at work, that is, difficulties in concentration, thinking clearly, decision-making, and memory, competence demands-related negative affectivity explained the most variance in cognitive stress symptoms. In addition, IJDs were more strongly associated with cognitive stress symptoms at work in individuals with high competence demand-related negative affectivity, and low multitasking preference. Altogether, the present findings suggest that HR practices or workplace interventions to ease employees’ negative affectivity from increasing competence demands at work could usefully support employees’ effective cognitive functioning when confronted with IJDs. (shrink)

Veber's theory of value is based on his general classification of mental phenomena. Value-experiences constitute a special variety of emotional experiences: they have a pseudo-cognitive role; that is, they "perceive" values just as ordinary presentations perceive things and their properties. Veber also makes several distinctions between different types of value-perceiving emotions. Finally he discusses the kinds of objective correlates that these experiences have and thereby distinguishes between three types of value: thing-value, person-value and hagiological value. He may be criticised for (...) inconsistency, because he starts f r om the descriptive standpoint but ends up by legislating on how we ought to value persons. (shrink)

Veber's theory of value is based on his general classification of mental phenomena. Value-experiences constitute a special variety of emotional experiences: they have a pseudo-cognitive role; that is, they "perceive" values just as ordinary presentations perceive things and their properties. Veber also makes several distinctions between different types of value-perceiving emotions. Finally he discusses the kinds of objective correlates that these experiences have and thereby distinguishes between three types of value: thing-value, person-value and hagiological value. He may be criticised for (...) inconsistency, because he starts f r om the descriptive standpoint but ends up by legislating on how we ought to value persons. (shrink)

Meinong had problems with reality: when having an experience, one cannot tell whether its object is real or not. The problem surfaced in many contexts but it was always connected with the notion of presentation {Vorstellung). This concept, as used in the Austrian phenomenological tradition, is ambiguous: a presentation can be (1) the neutral content that is a part of any mental act, or (2) the act of mere presentation, i.e. the combination of a content and the psychological mode of (...) mere entertaining, or (3) the act of perceiving a simple object.Meinong's pupil France Veber first adopted an orthodox Meinongian view of presentation but later he became aware of the problems connected with it. He argued that there are mental acts in which the subject is in direct contact with reahty or, as he put it, "hits" reality. Thus, acts of perception have two functions, those of presenting and "hitting".It is argued, first, that there are interesting parallels between Veber's concept of zadevanje Chitting') and modem theories of direct mental reference, de re acts and indexicality; and second, that although Veber correctly saw the problem, his solution is not quite satisfactory, because he thought that one has to abandon phenomenology (or the theory of objects) in order to account for the experience of hitting reality. A thoroughly phenomenological theory of „hitting" may be possible, after all. (shrink)

Meinong had problems with reality: when having an experience, one cannot tell whether its object is real or not. The problem surfaced in many contexts but it was always connected with the notion of presentation {Vorstellung). This concept, as used in the Austrian phenomenological tradition, is ambiguous: a presentation can be (1) the neutral content that is a part of any mental act, or (2) the act of mere presentation, i.e. the combination of a content and the psychological mode of (...) mere entertaining, or (3) the act of perceiving a simple object.Meinong's pupil France Veber first adopted an orthodox Meinongian view of presentation but later he became aware of the problems connected with it. He argued that there are mental acts in which the subject is in direct contact with reahty or, as he put it, "hits" reality. Thus, acts of perception have two functions, those of presenting and "hitting".It is argued, first, that there are interesting parallels between Veber's concept of zadevanje Chitting') and modem theories of direct mental reference, de re acts and indexicality; and second, that although Veber correctly saw the problem, his solution is not quite satisfactory, because he thought that one has to abandon phenomenology (or the theory of objects) in order to account for the experience of hitting reality. A thoroughly phenomenological theory of „hitting" may be possible, after all. (shrink)

Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e. duty and value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms, whereas Mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's Law of Omission which offers, in my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views.

Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e. duty and value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms, whereas Mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's Law of Omission which offers, in my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views.

This paper examines and defends von Wright's view of moral value, put forward in his book The Varieties of Goodness (1963). He holds that moral value is not a primary value like instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, or hedonic value, but a secondary or second-level one which is based on a combination of primary values. Human actions and intentions are the only bearers of moral value, and they are morally valuable because they protect and promote some set of primary values. It (...) is argued that the same account (i) applies also to juridical value, and (ii) can be used to throw some light on the problem of defining the three competing schools of legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism, natural law theory, and legal constructivism. (shrink)

The idea of replication is based on the premise that there are permanent laws to be replicated and verified, and the scientific method is adequate for doing so. Scientific truth, however, is not absolute but relative to time and context, and the method used. Time and context are inextricably interwoven, in that time creates different contexts and contexts (e.g., Christmas Day vs. New Year’s Day) create different experiences of time, rendering psychological phenomena inherently variable. This means that internal and external (...) conditions fluctuate and are different in a replication study vs. the original. Thus, a replication experiment is just another empirical investigation that has no special status in the establishment of scientific truth. It is not the final arbiter of whether or not something exists. In their pursuit of homogeneous external conditions, replications have ignored the homogeneity of internal conditions. There is not a single replication reported in the literature that would have shown participants’ feelings and thoughts—both conscious and nonconscious—to be identical to those of the original participants. Experimental instructions can create varying ratios of conscious over nonconscious processing from one study to another. Ironically, every replication is a failure at the fundamentals of human psychology. While patterns can be discovered, they are not permanent or unchangeable laws of human behavior to be proven by the pinpoint statistical verification through replication. As scientific knowledge in physics is temporary and incomplete, should it be any surprise that science can only provide “temporary winners” for psychological knowledge of human behavior? (shrink)

Processes governing the creation, perception and production of spoken words are sensitive to the patterns of speech sounds in the language user’s lexicon. Generative linguistic theory suggests that listeners infer constraints on possible sound patterning from the lexicon and apply these constraints to all aspects of word use. In contrast, emergentist accounts suggest that these phonotactic constraints are a product of interactive associative mapping with items in the lexicon. To determine the degree to which phonotactic constraints are lexically mediated, we (...) observed the effects of learning new words that violate English phonotactic constraints on phonotactic perceptual repair processes in nonword consonant-consonant-vowel stimuli. Subjects who learned such words were less likely to “repair” illegal onset clusters and report them as legal ones. Effective connectivity analyses of MRI-constrained reconstructions of simultaneously collected magnetoencephalography and EEG data showed that these behavioral shifts were accompanied by changes in the strength of influences of lexical areas on acoustic-phonetic areas. These results strengthen the interpretation of previous results suggesting that phonotactic constraints on perception are produced by top-down lexical influences on speech processing. (shrink)

This volume contains the workshop papers of the philosophical conference Dimensions of Personhood held in August 13-15, 2004 at University of Jyväskylä, Finland. The conference was organized by the Finnish Academy research project The Concept of Person. In the call for papers, the theme of the conference was formulated as follows. Recent developments in neuroscience and information technology, in medicine and biotechnology, and in society and culture more broadly have made various questions concerning our identity as human beings urgent. As (...) our power over ourselves increases, the questions of who we are, how we are to conceive of ourselves and how we should use our powers over ourselves, become more and more pressing. The concept of person is in many ways a necessary starting point in answering such questions. However, the concept is often used in an indeterminate sense, and when efforts have been made to clarify the concept, different philosophers have ended up with rival usages and rival theories. For example, the theories differ on whether ‘person’ is identical with ‘human being’, ‘subject’ or ‘self ’. Yet it seems to us that the rival theories of personhood are trying to capture a common idea, namely that persons differ from (other) animals, machines, detached ‘minds’, brains and sub-personal mechanisms in the kind of relations to self, to others and to the world that they have, or are capable of having. The general idea of the conference is thus to approach personhood along three dimensions, where the being of persons differs from the being of non-persons: 1 self-relations, 2. interpersonal relations, and 3. world-relations. The guiding question of the conference is: how does the concept of person illuminate these relations (to self, to others, to the world), and how do these relations illuminate the concept of person? Our wish is to bring together recent work done in each of these dimensions and further our understanding concerning the ways in which personhood and these relations are intertwined. (shrink)

The target article excludes ancestral neutrality as a cause for the inheritance of schizophrenia, with an argument relating to selection against a single allele in the Finnish population. However, drift would predominate over selection within subisolates of the Finnish population. Comparisons of subisolates with heterogeneous populations may provide clues to the endophenotypic structure of complex polygenetic heritable mental disorders. (Published Online November 9 2006).