Outlines of Scepticism, by the Greek philosopher SextusEmpiricus, is a work of major importance for the history of Greek philosophy. It is the fullest extant account of ancient scepticism, and it is also one of our most copious sources of information about the other Hellenistic philosophies. Its first part contains an elaborate exposition of the Pyrrhonian variety of scepticism; its second and third parts are critical and destructive, arguing against 'dogmatism' in logic, epistemology, science and ethics - (...) an approach that revolutionized the study of philosophy when Sextus' works were rediscovered and published in the sixteenth century. This volume presents the accurate and readable translation which was first published in 1994, together with a substantial new historical and philosophical introduction by Jonathan Barnes. (shrink)
This volume contains a translation into clear modern English of an unjustly neglected work by SextusEmpiricus, together with introduction and extensive commentary. Sextus is our main source for the doctrines and arguments of ancient Scepticism; in Against the Ethicists he sets out a distinctive Sceptic position in ethics.
David Blank presents a new translation into clear modern English of a key treatise by one of the greatest of ancient philosophers, together with the first ever commentary on this work. SextusEmpiricus' Against the Grammarians is a polemical attack on ancient Greek ideas about grammar, and provides one of the best examples of sustained Sceptical reasoning.
About SextusSextusEmpiricus is one of the most important ancient philosophical writers after Plato and Aristotle. His writings are our main source for the doctrines and arguments of Scepticism. He probably lived in the second century AD. Eleven books of his writings have survived, covering logic, physics, ethics, and numerous more specialized fields. About Against the Ethicists In this unjustly neglected and misunderstood work Sextus sets out a distinctive Sceptic position in ethics. He discusses the (...) concepts good and bad, and puts forward the sceptical argument that nothing is either good or bad by nature or intrinsically or invariably, but only relatively to persons and/or to circumstances. He then argues that the sceptic is better off than the non-sceptic. In the latter part of the book, Sextus attacks the Stoic view that there is such a thing as a `skill for life'. About this edition This volume contains a translation of Against the Ethicists in clear modern English, together with an introduction and a detailed commentary. Those who have discussed this work in the past have tended to underestimate it, often regarding its main position as essentially the same as that of Sextus' better-known Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Richard Bett shows that Against the Ethicists represents quite a distinct and coherent philosophical outlook, associated with a phase of Scepticism earlier than Sextus himself, an outlook of which little other evidence survives. (shrink)
This is the first complete English translation of SextusEmpiricus' Against Those in the Disciplines that includes substantial interpretive aids, including introduction, extensive notes, and glossary. The work discusses six specialized fields of study: grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology, and music.
Outlines of Scepticism, by the Greek philosopher SextusEmpiricus, is a work of major importance for the history of Greek philosophy. It is the fullest extant account of ancient scepticism, and it is also one of our most copious sources of information about the other Hellenistic philosophies. Its first part contains an elaborate exposition of the Pyrrhonian variety of scepticism; its second and third parts are critical and destructive, arguing against 'dogmatism' in logic, epistemology, science and ethics - (...) an approach that revolutionized the study of philosophy when Sextus' works were rediscovered and published in the sixteenth century. This volume presents the accurate and readable translation which was first published in 1994, together with a substantial new historical and philosophical introduction by Jonathan Barnes. (shrink)
The subject is SextusEmpiricus, one the chief sources of information on ancient philosophy and one of the most influential authors in the history of skepticism. Sextus' works have had an extraordinary influence on western philosophy, and this book provides the first exhaustive and detailed study of their recovery, transmission, and intellectual influence through Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. This study deals with Sextus' biography, as well as the history of the availability and (...) reception of his works. It also contains an extensive bibliographical section, including editions, translations, and commentaries. (shrink)
Alan Bailey offers a clear and vigorous exposition and defence of the philosophy of SextusEmpiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism. The subsequent sceptical tradition in philosophy has not done justice to Sextus: his views stand up today as remarkably insightful, offering a fruitful way to approach issues of knowledge, understanding, belief, and rationality. Bailey's refreshing presentation of Sextus to a modern philosophical readership rescues scepticism from the sceptics.
SextusEmpiricus' Against the Logicians is by far the most detailed surviving examination by any ancient Greek sceptic of the areas of epistemology and logic. It critically examines the pretensions of non-sceptical philosophers to have discovered methods for determining the truth, either through direct observation or by inference from the observed to the unobserved. It is therefore a fine example of the Pyrrhonist sceptical method at work. It also provides a mine of information about the ideas of other (...) Greek thinkers, ideas that are in many cases poorly preserved in other sources. This volume presents Against the Logicians in a new and accurate translation, together with a detailed introduction that sets the work in its philosophical context. (shrink)
In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.110–113, SextusEmpiricus presents four different accounts of the conditional, presumably all from the Hellenistic period, in increasing logical strength. While the interpretation and provenance of the first three accounts is relatively secure, the fourth account has perplexed and frustrated interpreters for decades or longer. Most interpreters have ultimately taken a dismissive attitude towards the fourth account and discounted it as being of both little historical and logical interest. We argue that this attitude (...) is unwarranted and demonstrate that the conditional expressed in the fourth account can profitably be understood as a precursor of analytic entailment, familiar from containment logics such as those developed by Parry and Angell. Exploiting recent work by Fine, we present a formal truthmaker semantics for this conditional and show how it sheds light on a number of longstanding issues in the interpretation of this passage. (shrink)
R. G. Bury’s translations of SextusEmpiricus for the Loeb Library have served English language readers well, but new translations, taking account of advances in scholarship since Bury’s day, have long been needed. We now have two new English versions of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. They take different and in some ways complementary approaches to the task.
This volume contains a translation into clear modern English of an unjustly neglected work by SextusEmpiricus, together with introduction and extensive commentary. Sextus is our main source for the doctrines and arguments of ancient Scepticism; in Against the Ethicists he sets out a distinctive Sceptic position in ethics.
_ Source: _Volume 54, Issue 4, pp 255 - 285 This paper examines the authorship and reception of the medieval translation of SextusEmpiricus’ _Outlines of Pyrrhonism_. It is shown that its traditional ascription to Niccolò da Reggio cannot be maintained, because the translation must have circulated already in the late 1270s. Its author is difficult to identify: the closest stylistic parallels are found with the anonymous translator of Aristotle’s _De partibus animalium_. With Alvaro of Oviedo and the (...) otherwise unknown Johannes de Peretis two early readers can be named. Though a copy was accessible in Viterbo at this time and another copy possibly travelled around in Italy in the 1320s, no philosophical or other impact can be determined. A single reference is found in Peter of Auvergne’s _Quaestiones_-commentary on Aristotle’s _Politics_. Its origin is difficult to assess. (shrink)
Alan Bailey offers a clear exposition and defence of the philosophy of SextusEmpiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism.
David Blank presents a new translation into clear modern English of a key treatise by one of the greatest of ancient philosophers, together with the first ever commentary on this work. SextusEmpiricus' Against the Grammarians is a polemical attack on ancient Greek ideas about grammar, and provides one of the best examples of sustained Sceptical reasoning.
SextusEmpiricus' Against the Physicists examines numerous topics central to ancient Greek inquiries into the nature of the physical world, covering subjects such as god, cause and effect, whole and part, bodies, place, motion, time, number, coming into being and perishing and is the most extensive surviving treatment of these topics by an ancient Greek sceptic. Sextus scrutinizes the theories of non-sceptical thinkers and generates suspension of judgement through the assembly of equally powerful opposing arguments. Richard Bett's (...) edition provides crucial background information about the text and elucidation of difficult passages. His accurate and readable translation is supported by substantial interpretative aids, including a glossary and a list of parallel passages relating Against the Physicists to other works by Sextus. This is an indispensable edition for advanced students and scholars studying this important work by an influential philosopher. (shrink)
In this paper I take a closer look at SextusEmpiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.
SextusEmpiricus was the voice of ancient Greek skepticism for posterity. His writings contain the most subtle and detailed versions of the ancient skeptical arguments known as Pyrrhonism, adding up to a distinctive philosophical approach. Instead of viewing philosophy as valuable because of the answers it gives to important questions, Sextus considered the search for answers itself to be fundamental and offered a philosophy centered on inquiry. Assuming the point of view of an active inquirer, Sextus (...) developed arguments concerning conflicting appearances, infinite regress in argument, dogmatic assertion of premises that are insufficiently justified, and many other ideas that fascinated later philosophers of knowledge across the centuries. He provided a unique perspective on topics of enduring relevance such as perception, language, logical consequence, belief, ignorance, disagreement, and induction. -/- While Sextus's importance to epistemology was appreciated by early modern and modern philosophers, he is underrepresented in contemporary discussions. In order to put Sextus back in the center of epistemology, these essays discuss his influence in the history of modern philosophy as well as contemporary engagements with Sextus's version of Pyrrhonian skepticism. The contributors investigate epistemology after Sextus, addressing four core themes of Sextus's skepticism: appearances and perception, the structure of justification and proof, belief and ignorance, and ethics and action. The arguments presented here bridge the divide between contemporary and ancient debates about knowledge and skepticism and will appeal to philosophers interested in epistemology and philosophy of mind as well as those interested in ancient philosophy and the history of philosophy more generally. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to discuss some challenging issues concerning Sextus’ works and outlook, and to offer an overview of the influence exerted by Sextan Pyrrhonism on both early modern and contemporary philosophy.
Richard Henry Popkin - SextusEmpiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 537-539 Book Review SextusEmpiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism Luciano Floridi. SextusEmpiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 150. Cloth, $54.00. This is a most important book for those who wish to understand how skepticism became (...) a vital part of philosophy from the Renaissance onward. For at least the last decade, the author has been working as a historical detective to find out what was known about ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism and the writings of SextusEmpiricus during the Middle Ages and what happened when Greek manuscripts of the texts became available in Europe. Floridi's information enables us to gain a more accurate picture of how, when, and where Greek skepticism reached Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; who had access to manuscripts; who translated the Greek texts into Latin; and who read them, thereby correcting the usual picture that I and other scholars have presented. Floridi reveals that there was a lingering knowledge of Pyrrhonian skepticism in philosophical handbooks that were used during the Middle Ages. But it is only in the.. (shrink)
Although it is difficult to exaggerate the similarities between the philosophical doctrines of contemporary scientific empiricists and those which were expounded by SextusEmpiricus, the Greek physician and sceptic of the third century A. D., Sextus seems to have been neglected by most historians of empiricism. An account of his position may be of some pertinence at the present time, for a striking parallel can be drawn without any distortion. His most significant contributions are: first, the positivistic (...) and behavioristic theory of signs which he opposed to the metaphysical theory of the Stoics; secondly, his discussion of phenomenalism and its relation to common sense claims to knowledge; and, thirdly, his account of the controversy over the principle of extensionality in logic, where the anticipation of contemporary doctrines is perhaps most remarkable. (shrink)
By understanding the sense in which Sextus thinks reason is deceptive we may clarify his attitude towards ordinary life. The deception, like that of the Siren's song, is practical rather than epistemic. It is not a matter of leading us to assent to false or unjustified conclusions but is rather a distraction from, or even corruption of, ordinary life.
Abstract: In this paper I discuss SextusEmpiricus' response to the dogmatists' objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus' arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists' (...) inquiry, we should conclude either that it is impossible or that it does not supply the skeptics with satisfactory starting-points for further inquiry. (shrink)
The two books of SextusEmpiricus' Against the Physicists have not received much attention in their own right, as sustained and methodical specimens of sceptical philosophy. This volume redresses the balance by offering a series of in-depth studies on them, focusing in particular on their overall argumentative structure and on the various ways in which their formal features relate to their contents, showing how Sextus' procedures vary from one section to the other, and throwing new light on (...) the way he was using his sources. It follows Sextus' own division of these two books into nine successive topics, namely god, cause, wholes and parts, body, place, motion, time, number, coming-to-be and passing-away. These nine chapters are preceded by an introduction which discusses a number of general features of Sextus' scepticism and links the conclusions of this volume to some recent discussions on the scope of ancient scepticism. (shrink)
It has become a veritable industry to defend Descartes against the charge of circularity and, to a lesser extent, to argue that he successfully responds to the skepticism of SextusEmpiricus. Since one of Sextus’ main skeptical ploys is to press the charge of circularity against any view, and because Descartes does reply to Sextus, it is worthwhile to criticize these efforts in the same paper. I argue that Descartes did not successfully respond to Sextus’ (...) skeptical arguments. I argue that he is guilty of not one but of five distinct circularities in his defense of empirical knowledge, thst clearing him of such charges can only be had by rendering him naively dogmatic, and that he fails to respond to a Pyrrhonisn contraposition argument. One circle concerns divine logical voluntarism. Another concerns the semantic component of innate ideas. A third arises from his natural inability to disbelieve whatever he clearly and distinctly perceives. A fourth circularity arises in Descartes’ proof that he cannot have generated his idea of God. A final circularity concerns Descartes’ attempt to verify the reliability of his thinking nature by employing that very same thinking nature. To substantiate these claims I review the principles of Sextus’ arguments briefly and I reexamine Descartes’ texts and doctrines in detail. I also take occasion to reflect on why Descartes’ foundationalist program must have failed. (shrink)
"Judicious in every respect: selection, translation and structuring of the texts, footnotes, bibliography, and index.... The book of choice for undergraduate courses." --Edward M. Galligan, University of North Carolina.
Sextus’ interpretation of Xenophanes’ scepticism in M 7.49–52 is often cited but has never been subject to detailed analysis. Such analysis reveals that Sextus’ interpretation raises far more complex problems than has been recognised. Scholars invariably assume one of two ways of construing his account of Xenophanes B34, without observing that the choice between these two alternatives poses an interpretive dilemma. Some scholars take it that Sextus ascribes to Xenophanes the view that one may have knowledge without (...) knowing that one has knowledge. Others take it that he ascribes to Xenophanes the view that one may have true belief without knowing that one has true belief. A close examination of Sextus’ paraphrase exposes a crucial but overlooked complication. Sextus elides Xenophanes’ pivotal distinction between knowing “the clear and certain” and believing “what has been fulfilled” . He eliminates altogether tetelesmenon from his analysis of B34, and expands the role of to saphes. I demonstrate that, as a result, Xenophanes B34, as interpreted by Sextus, does not consistently and straightforwardly express either view or view . Sextus, I argue, in fact develops a fundamentally incoherent interpretation of Xenophanes B34. On Sextus’ interpretation, Xenophanes justifies the proposition “No human knows” by arguing that, even if a human does, in fact, know, he does not know that he knows. Finally, I argue that Sextus’ incoherent account reflects not unthinking negligence, but a sophisticated if ultimately doomed attempt to interpret the logical structure of Xenophanes B34 in line with later models of second-order scepticism. (shrink)
This dissertation explores the relationship between an extensive skepticism concerning the existence of the world and the concept of mental representation in SextusEmpiricus and Descartes. In Chapter 1, it is argued, against the traditional interpretation, that Sextus does espouse such an extensive skepticism; that, at the same time, he is using a very strong causal concept of experience according to which the object of the experience is 'the cause' of the experience; and that he can consistently (...) embrace these two positions because his skepticism is flexible enough that he can always turn around and undermine the very presuppositions implicit in the use of a concept, which he has previously used to prove a skeptical point. Chapter 1 also includes an examination of Descartes's skepticism in the First Mediation, and it is argued that this skepticism undermines not only the Scholastico-Aristotelian causal view of mental representation, but also the weaker principle to the effect that we cannot have representations of simple things that compose those complex representations are caused by similar simple things. But Descartes's skepticism in the First Meditation is not as flexible as Sextus's. Hence, he cannot overturn his skeptical arguments by using any strong causal principle of mental representations. Chapters 2 and 3 together include an extensive defense of the view that the causal principle that Descartes uses in the Meditations to prove the existence of God and of physical objects is so weak as to allow that all our ideas--except the idea of God--are generated by our minds, and that this is the only principle he uses and needs in the Meditations and elsewhere. To this end, Chapter 2 examines the concepts of objective reality, material falsity, etc. It includes a defense of an interpretation of Descartes's view of ideas, according to which ideas have two levels of content: a seemingly representational and a truly representational. I relate this interpretation to his views on objective reality, material falsity, sensible qualities, the causes of innate ideas, and the nature of sensory perception and imagination. (shrink)
In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne’s thought is dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Unlike Hegel’s progressive dialectic, however, Montaigne’s thought is, according to Hartle, circular in that the reconciliation of opposed terms comes not in the form of a newly emergent term, but in a return to the first term, where the meaning of the first is transformed as a result of its dialectical interaction with the second. This analysis motivates Hartle’s claim that (...) Montaigne is not a skeptic at all, let alone a Pyrrhonian skeptic. In this paper, I argue that Hartle’s circular-dialectical interpretation of Montaigne is not only compatible with Pyrrhonism, but is in fact an ideal model for understanding SextusEmpiricus’s skeptical therapy. (shrink)
The opening chapter of this book presents the skepticism of SextusEmpiricus as far more interesting than any of the varieties of skepticism typically discussed today. It is claimed that the skeptic in Sextus’s understanding quite generally “denies our claim to have rationally justified beliefs” ; by contrast, contemporary skeptical worries about whether we can really have knowledge—whatever exactly that amounts to—are stigmatized as absurdly trivial, and also out of touch with skepticism’s historical origins. The remainder of (...) the book promises to justify this interpretation of Sextus’s skepticism, and to show that such a skepticism is not subject to the standard objections that it would be self-refuting and unlivable. (shrink)
SextusEmpiricus does not reveal anything of himself as distinct from ‘the Sceptic’ except in a passing and incidental way. He does not refer to his contemporaries, nor to his country, nor to any personal experiences, in such a way as to provide a definite picture of his life and times. The few references he makes to his involvement in the medical profession are as perplexing as they are enlightening. The only attachments which Sextus strongly identifies with (...) in his extant writings are the demands of the Pyrrhonean philosophy. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to examine the political implications of SextusEmpiricus’ neo-Pyrrhonism by considering two fundamental texts. Both texts are usually interpreted as endorsing political conformism insofar as Sextus allegedly claims that one should follow the laws and customs of one’s community. But it seems possible to interpret the reference to laws and customs merely as a description of what humans in fact do. What Sextus would therefore recommend is to abandon any theoretical (...) approach to politics in favor of a pragmatic one. (shrink)
Stefan Sienkiewicz analyses five argument forms which are central to Pyrrhonian scepticism, as expressed in the writings of SextusEmpiricus. In particular, Sienkiewicz distinguishes between two different perspectives of the sceptic and his dogmatic opponent, and interprets the five modes of scepticism from both viewpoints.
This book is the recent addition to the Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series, and its greatest significance lies in its being the sole commentary on Against the Grammarians. It also provides the only English alternative to Bury’s 1949 translation in the Loeb edition. As such, it is a clear and readable translation, although, of course, there is no Greek text provided.
