Results for 'Shapley Shapley'

51 found
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  1.  30
    Life, Hope, and Cosmic Evolution.Harlow Shapley - 1966 - Zygon 1 (3):275-285.
  2.  15
    Reverse Correlation in Neurophysiology.Dario Ringach & Robert Shapley - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (2):147-166.
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  3.  7
    A Source Book in Astronomy.H. R. Smart, Harlow Shapley & Helen E. Howarth - 1929 - Philosophical Review 38 (4):415.
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  4.  9
    Special Issue Rendering the Use of Visual Information From Spiking Neurons to Recognition a Picture is Worth Thousands of Trials: Rendering the Use of Visual Information From Spiking Neurons to Recognition 141.Frédéric Gosselin, Philippe G. Schyns, Dario Ringach, Robert Shapley, Jason M. Gold, Allison B. Sekuler, Partrick J. Bennett, Michael C. Mangini, Irving Biederman & Cheryl Olman - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28:1035-1039.
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  5.  12
    A New Reading of Old Egyptian Textiles.John Shapley - 1962 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (4):375-388.
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  6.  3
    A Source Book in Astronomy.Harlow Shapley & Helen E. Howarth - 1929 - Philosophical Review 38 (4):415-415.
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  7.  3
    Pre-Huygenian Observations of Saturn's Ring.Dora Shapley - 1949 - Isis 40 (1):12-17.
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  8.  2
    On the Evidences of Inorganic Evolution.Harlow Shapley - 1960 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 3 (2):222-237.
  9. Abrupt Transitions in the Perception of Illusory Contours Triggered by Specific Visual Stimuli.N. Rubin, A. Grossetete, K. Nakayama & R. Shapley - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 3-3.
     
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  10. Climatic Change. Evidence, Causes and Effects.Harlow Shapley - 1955 - Science and Society 19 (1):88-89.
     
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  11. The Human Response to an Expanding Universe.Harlow Shapley - 1959 - Hibbert Journal 58:319.
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  12. The Receptive Fields of Visual Neurons.R. Shapley - 2000 - In K. K. De Valois (ed.), Seeing. Academic Press. pp. 55--78.
     
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  13.  42
    Three Ancient Problems Solved by Using the Game Theory Logic Based on the Shapley Value.Silviu Guiasu - 2011 - Synthese 181 (S1):65 - 79.
    The ancient problems of bankruptcy, contested garment, and rights arbitration have generated many studies, debates, and controversy. The objective of this paper is to show that the Shapley value from game theory, measuring the power of each player in a game, may be consistently applied for getting the general one-step solution of all these three problems viewed as -person games. The decision making is based on the same tool, namely the game theory logic based on the use of the (...)
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  14.  52
    Differential Marginality, van den Brink Fairness, and the Shapley Value.André Casajus - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):163-174.
    We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van den (...)
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  15.  6
    An Approach to Interval-Valued Hesitant Fuzzy Multiattribute Group Decision Making Based on the Generalized Shapley-Choquet Integral.Lifei Zhang & Fanyong Meng - 2018 - Complexity 2018:1-19.
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  16.  16
    A Strategic Approach for the Discounted Shapley Values.Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutiérrez-López - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (2):271-293.
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  17.  9
    Hart–Mas-Colell Implementation of the Discounted Shapley Value.Tomohiko Kawamori - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (3):357-369.
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  18. Burhoe and Shapley: A Complementarity of Science and Religion.James Gilbert - 1995 - Zygon 30 (4):531-539.
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  19.  5
    Axiomatizations of the Proportional Shapley Value.Manfred Besner - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (2):161-183.
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  20.  23
    Axioms for Shapley Values in Games with Quarrelling.D. Marc Kilgour - 1977 - Theory and Decision 8 (2):193-207.
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  21.  27
    A Competitive Test of the Descriptive Accuracy of the Characteristic Function, Power Function, and Shapley Value Based Function.Melvin M. Sakurai - 1980 - Theory and Decision 12 (3):259-278.
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  22.  32
    A Test of the Core, Bargaining Set, Kernel and Shapley Models in N-Person Quota Games with One Weak Player.Abraham D. Horowitz - 1977 - Theory and Decision 8 (1):49-65.
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  23.  8
    A Source Book In Astronomy By Harlow Shapley; Helen E. Howarth. [REVIEW]George Sarton - 1929 - Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 13:130-134.
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  24.  5
    The New Treasury of ScienceHarlow Shapley Samuel Rapport Helen Wright.Bernard S. Finn - 1966 - Isis 57 (4):497-498.
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  25.  5
    A Source Book in Astronomy. Harlow Shapley, Helen E. Howarth.George Sarton - 1929 - Isis 13 (1):130-134.
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  26.  4
    Through Rugged Ways to the StarsHarlow S. Shapley.Daniel H. Seeley - 1970 - Isis 61 (1):148-149.
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  27.  88
    Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games.René van Den Brink & Peter Borm - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):327-342.
    Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in terms of game (...)
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  28.  36
    Equivalent Comparisons of Information Channels.Hiroyuki Nakata - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):559-574.
    This article constructs a static model of information acquisition when the agent does not know exactly what pieces of information he is missing. A representation of preferences over information channels and menus of lotteries is shown by adapting the model of unforeseen contingencies by Dekel et al. (Econometrica 69:891–934, 2001; Econometrica 75:591–600, 2007), which is an extension of Kreps (Econometrica 47:565–576, 1979; Economic analysis of markets and games: essays in honor of Frank Hahn, 1992). Also, characterisation of informativeness of an (...)
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  29.  21
    A Tractable and Expressive Class of Marginal Contribution Nets and Its Applications.Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg & Michael Wooldridge - 2009 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4):362-376.
    Coalitional games raise a number of important questions from the point of view of computer science, key among them being how to represent such games compactly, and how to efficiently compute solution concepts assuming such representations. Marginal contribution nets , introduced by Ieong and Shoham, are one of the simplest and most influential representation schemes for coalitional games. MC-nets are a rulebased formalism, in which rules take the form pattern → value, where “pattern ” is a Boolean condition over agents, (...)
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  30.  45
    Constrained Egalitarianism in a Simple Redistributive Model.Jean-Yves Jaffray & Philippe Mongin - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (1):33-56.
    The paper extends a result in Dutta and Ray's (1989) theory of constrained egalitarianism initiated by relying on the concept of proportionate rather than absolute equality. We apply this framework to redistributive systems in which what the individuals get depends on what they receive or pay qua members of generally overlapping groups. We solve the constrained equalization problem for this class of models. The paper ends up comparing our solution with the alternative solution based on the Shapley value, which (...)
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  31.  32
    Axiomatization of a Class of Share Functions for N-Person Games.Gerard van Der Laan & René van Den Brink - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (2):117-148.
    The Shapley value is the unique value defined on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form which satisfies certain intuitively reasonable axioms. Alternatively, the Banzhaf value is the unique value satisfying a different set of axioms. The main drawback of the latter value is that it does not satisfy the efficiency axiom, so that the sum of the values assigned to the players does not need to be equal to the worth of the grand coalition. By definition, (...)
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  32.  38
    Uncertainty with Partial Information on the Possibility of the Events.Aldo Montesano - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):183-195.
    The Choquet expected utility model deals with nonadditive probabilities (or capacities). Their dependence on the information the decision-maker has about the possibility of the events is taken into account. Two kinds of information are examined: interval information (for instance, the percentage of white balls in an urn is between 60% and 100%) and comparative information (for instance, the information that there are more white balls than black ones). Some implications are shown with regard to the core of the capacity and (...)
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  33.  27
    A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values.Sergiu Hart - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):35-46.
    Three values for non-transferable utility games -- the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler--Owen consistent NTU-value -- are compared in a simple example.
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  34.  55
    The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power.Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover & William Zwicker - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (1):83-116.
    If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is to be used (...)
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  35.  69
    Cooperative Provision of Indivisible Public Goods.Pierre Dehez - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (1):13-29.
  36.  28
    Bribes, Power, and Managerial Control in Corporate Voting Games.Robert A. Jarrow & J. Chris Leach - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (3):235-251.
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  37.  20
    Values with Exogenous Payments.Harald Wiese - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (4):485-508.
    The aim of cooperative game theory is to suggest and defend payoffs for the players that depend on a coalition function (characteristic function) describing the economic, social, or political situation. We consider situations where the payoffs for some players are determined exogenously. For example, in many countries, lawyers or real-estate agents obtain a regulated fee or a regulated percentage of the business involved. The aim of this article is to suggest and axiomatize two values with exogenous payments, an unweighted one (...)
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  38.  24
    The Exchange and Allocation of Decision Power.Tomas Philipson - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (3):191-206.
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  39.  34
    An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games.H. Andrew Michener & Daniel J. Myers - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (1):37-82.
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  40.  88
    Characterizations of the Β- and the Degree Network Power Measure.René Van Den Brink, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx & Guillermo Owen - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (4):519-536.
    A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game that measures the “power” of each coalition of positions in the network. Applying the Shapley value to this game yields a network power measure, the β-measure, which reflects the power of the individual positions in the network. Applying this power distribution method iteratively yields a limit distribution, which turns out to (...)
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  41.  38
    Hierarchies Achievable in Simple Games.Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):393-404.
    A previous work by Friedman et al. (Theory and Decision, 61:305–318, 2006) introduces the concept of a hierarchy of a simple voting game and characterizes which hierarchies, induced by the desirability relation, are achievable in linear games. In this paper, we consider the problem of determining all hierarchies, conserving the ordinal equivalence between the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices, achievable in simple games. It is proved that only four hierarchies are non-achievable in simple games. Moreover, it is also (...)
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  42.  58
    Political Influence in Multi-Choice Institutions: Cyclicity, Anonymity, and Transitivity. [REVIEW]Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho & Lawrence Diffo Lambo - 2011 - Theory and Decision 70 (2):157-178.
    We study political influence in institutions where each member chooses a level of support for a collective goal. These individual choices determine the degree to which the goal is reached. Influence is assessed by newly defined binary relations, each of which ranks members on the basis of their relative performance at a corresponding level of participation. For institutions with three options (e.g., voting games in which each voter may vote “yes”, “abstain”, or vote “no”), we obtain three influence relations, and (...)
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  43.  45
    Monotonicity of Power in Games with a Priori Unions.J. M. Alonso-Meijide, C. Bowles, M. J. Holler & S. Napel - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (1):17-37.
    Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some given voting weight as to any player of the same game with smaller weight. This local monotonicity and a related global property however are frequently and for good reasons violated when indices take account of a priori unions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity). This paper introduces adaptations of the conventional monotonicity notions that are suitable for voting games with an (...)
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  44.  47
    A Banzhaf Share Function for Cooperative Games in Coalition Structure.Gerard van Der Laan & René van Den Brink - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (1):61-86.
    A cooperative game with transferable utility–or simply a TU-game– describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A value function for these games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of payoffs over the players. Well-known solutions for TU-games are the Shapley and the Banzhaf value. An alternative type of solution is the concept of share function, which assigns to every player in a TU-game its share in the worth of the grand coalition. In this paper (...)
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  45.  61
    Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games.Barış Çiftçi, Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):205-218.
    A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the (...)
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  46.  58
    A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed.Ines Lindner - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (4):495-518.
    In general, analyses of voting power are performed through the notion of a simple voting game (SVG) in which every voter can choose between two options: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Felsenthal and Machover [Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1997), International Journal of Game Theory 26, 335–351.] introduced the concept of ternary voting games (TVGs) which recognizes abstention alongside. They derive appropriate generalizations of the Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices in TVGs. Braham and Steffen [Braham, M. and Steffen, F. (2002), in Holler, (...)
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  47.  60
    Altruism and the Administration of the Universe: Kirtley Fletcher Mather on Science and Values.Edward B. Davis - 2011 - Zygon 46 (3):517-535.
    Abstract. Few American scientists have devoted as much attention to religion and science as Harvard geologist Kirtley Fletcher Mather (1888–1978). Responding to antievolutionism during the 1920s, he taught Sunday School classes, assisted in defending John Scopes, and wrote Science in Search of God (1928). Over the next 40 years, Mather explored the place of humanity in the universe and the presence of values in light of what he often called “the administration of the universe,” a term and concept he borrowed (...)
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  48.  38
    The Lovász Extension of Market Games.E. Algaba, J. M. Bilbao, J. R. Fernández & A. Jiménez - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):229-238.
    The multilinear extension of a cooperative game was introduced by Owen in 1972. In this contribution we study the Lovász extension for cooperative games by using the marginal worth vectors and the dividends. First, we prove a formula for the marginal worth vectors with respect to compatible orderings. Next, we consider the direct market generated by a game. This model of utility function, proposed by Shapley and Shubik in 1969, is the concave biconjugate extension of the game. Then we (...)
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  49.  33
    L S Penrose's Limit Theorem: Tests by Simulation.Pao-Li Chang, Vincent C. H. Chua & Moshé Machover - unknown
    L S Penrose’s Limit Theorem – which is implicit in Penrose [7, p. 72] and for which he gave no rigorous proof – says that, in simple weighted voting games, if the number of voters increases indefinitely and the relative quota is pegged, then – under certain conditions – the ratio between the voting powers of any two voters converges to the ratio between their weights. Lindner and Machover [4] prove some special cases of Penrose’s Limit Theorem. They give a (...)
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  50.  10
    Equitable Distribution in a Three Players Problem.Marek Szopa - 2014 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 37 (1):239-252.
    Jazz band is a 3 player superadditive game in characteristic function form. Three players have to divide the payoff they can get, while being in a grand coalition, provided their individual and duo coalitions payoffs are known. Assumptions of individual and collective rationality lead to the notion of the core of the game. We discuss offers that cannot readily be refused [OCRR] as the solutions of the game in case of an empty core, when duo coalitions are the best options (...)
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