Realism and conventionalism generally establish the parameters of debate over universals. Do abstract terms in language refer to abstract things in the world? The realist answers yes, leaving us with an inflated ontology; the conventionalist answers no, leaving us with subjective categories. I want to defend nominalism — in its original medieval sense, as one possibility that aims to preserve objectivity while positing nothing more than concrete individuals in the world. First, I will present paradigmatic statements of realism and conventionalism (...) as developed by Russell and Strawson. Then, I will present the nominalist alternative as developed by William of Ockham. (shrink)
This paper discusses Buridan’s Ass as a thought experiment that has been misunderstood. First, the thought experiment is presented in its traditional form and typical objections to it are discussed. Then the author argues that William of Ockham supplies the background necessary for a more meaningful formulation. Buridan’s Ass is designed to show that each individual must choose how to value the value we discover in the world and that, in so doing, we create individual preferences.
A secret concealed for centuries, shrouded in myth, silenced by stone. A secret that if unleashed threatens to shake the very foundation of Western civilization. A secret that can remain hidden no longer. The quest begins in Rome, where a grizzly murder and a plundered tomb serve to ignite perhaps the most controversial conflict in human history. Inspector Domenico Conti is charged with the task of recovering the contents of the tomb, but as he delves deeper into the investigation, he (...) is thrust into the center of a centuries-old struggle between truth and those who would stop at nothing to conceal it. But he is not alone. Dr. Dana McCarter, newly appointed director of the Advanced Institute for the Study of Antiquity, finds herself at the heart of the mystery when her considerable expertise in ancient Greek philosophy and her suspect involvement with the black market take her on a journey beginning in her New York University offices and sweeping around the globe—from the dark alleys of Moscow, to the rolling hills of the Italian countryside and the enigmatic relics of an ancient civilization, alive with long-kept secrets. As the search for answers leads them through a labyrinth of conspiracy and intrigue, Dana and Domenico must question everything they believe in and decide how much they are willing to sacrifice to know the truth. (shrink)
Many philosophers embrace both evolution and existentialism as though these two views provide a mutually supportive foundation for atheism. The story goes that evolution tells us life is meaningless while existentialism tells us what to do about it. In this paper, I aim to debunk this story. I begin by explaining the existentialist quest for the meaning of life. Then I explain why it is inconsistent with the principles of evolution. In the end, I argue that the quest for the (...) meaning of life should be abandoned. It is a misleading project that science renders unnecessary. Looked at in this light, existentialism appears as a stripped down version of religion, vainly clinging to dramatic fantasies about human life. Evolution has had a deep and valuable impact upon philosophy. It will not have completed its work, however, until it stamps out existentialism and its atavistic angst once and for all. (shrink)
Sometimes it feels like you need a Ph.D. to follow the show. But you don't. You just need this book in which twenty-one philosophers explore the deep questions we all face as survivors on this planet: Does "everything happen for a reason"? Is torture ever justified? Who are the Others? How do we know we're not patients in Hurley's psych ward? What if the Dharma Intitiative is experimenting on us? Desmond may not be able to save Charlie, but this book (...) could save you. A provocative study of the hit television show, _Lost_, currently in its third season and set to reach its climax in 2010 Highlights the sense in which _Lost_ is a genuinely philosophical show Helps fans understand and navigate some of _Lost’s_ deeper meanings Connects episodes and events in the show to core philosophical issues such as truth, identity, and morality Shows that it’s no accident that there are _Lost _characters names Locke, Rousseau, and Hume. (shrink)
Ockham's razor is one of the best-known and most useful tools in the philosopher's toolkit. Here Sharon Kaye explains how the razor works, and also how it may have come by its name.
Sharon M. Kaye - Passions in William Ockham's Philosophical Psychology - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 330-332 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Sharon Kaye John Carroll University Vesa Hirvonen. Passions in William Ockham's Philosophical Psychology. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Mind, 2. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004. Pp. ix + 212. Cloth, €96.30. This volume is the second in a series aiming to produce monographs that "are historically reliable (...) as well as congenial to the contemporary reader" by providing "original insights into central contemporary problems" . The aim of this series is ambitious, yet sorely needed in scholarship today. As modern technology catapults our understanding of ourselves and the world into the future, history seems.. (shrink)
Realism and conventionalism generally establish the parameters of debate over universals. Do abstract terms in language refer to abstract things in the world? The realist answers yes, leaving us with an inflated ontology; the conventionalist answers no, leaving us with subjective categories. I want to defend nominalism in its original medieval sense, as one possibility that aims to preserve objectivity while positing nothing more than concrete individuals in the world. First, I will present paradigmatic statements of realism and conventionalism as (...) developed by Russell and Strawson. Then, I will present the nominalist alternative as developed by William of Ockham. (shrink)
Because playing along involves pretence, it is liable to be seen as an objectionable form of deception. In this paper, however, I argue that it is a virtue based on its role in creating and sustaining valuable relationships. According to William of Ockham and Michelle de Montaigne, to love another as a true friend is to will as he or she wills. Given that even the most like-minded individuals often will different things, there is need for a meta-level, at which (...) one can validate the will of the other without actually willing it oneself. This is what it is to play along. (shrink)
Because playing along involves pretence, it is liable to be seen as an objectionable form of deception. In this paper, however, I argue that it is a virtue based on its role in creating and sustaining valuable relationships. According to William of Ockham and Michelle de Montaigne, to love another as a true friend is to will as he or she wills. Given that even the most like-minded individuals often will different things, there is need for a meta-level, at which (...) one can validate the will of the other without actually willing it oneself. This is what it is to play along. (shrink)
Second Life, an on-line, interactive environment in which users create avatars through which they have virtual experiences, is a contemporary experiment in utopia. While most often it is used for social networking, it also is used for commercial and educational purposes, as well as for political activism. Here, we share the results from a course that uses Second Life as a tool for examining social justice. We examine the notion of utopia, present the results of a pre- and post-survey designed (...) to measure the effectiveness of our Second Life course, and relate insights gleaned from the centerpiece assignment of the course that required students to construct proposals for how $200 best could be spent in Second Life to promote social justice. Finally, we demonstrate how Second Life can be a helpful classroom tool for examining John Rawls’s influential utopian work, A Theory of Justice. (shrink)
William of Ockham was tried for heresy due to his assertion that certain qualities can exist independently of substances. Scholars have assumed he made thisstrange assertion in order to account for the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. I argue, however, that the assertion was philosophically rather than theologically motivated. Ockham develops a nominalist substance ontology, according to which most changes can be explained as the result of local motion. Knowledge and virtue are changes in human beings that cannot be so explained, (...) however, because they are not entirely passive processes. In fact, knowledge and virtue require free will, which could not be considered truly free if it were not an independently existing quality. In this paper, I explain Ockham’s nominalist substance ontology and show how it functions as the sine qua non foundation for his uncompromising commitment to metaphysical libertarianism. (shrink)
William of Ockham was tried for heresy due to his assertion that certain qualities can exist independently of substances. Scholars have assumed he made thisstrange assertion in order to account for the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. I argue, however, that the assertion was philosophically rather than theologically motivated. Ockham develops a nominalist substance ontology, according to which most changes can be explained as the result of local motion. Knowledge and virtue are changes in human beings that cannot be so explained, (...) however, because they are not entirely passive processes. In fact, knowledge and virtue require free will, which could not be considered truly free if it were not an independently existing quality. In this paper, I explain Ockham’s nominalist substance ontology and show how it functions as the sine qua non foundation for his uncompromising commitment to metaphysical libertarianism. (shrink)
(2006). Was there no evolutionary thought in the middle ages? The case of William of Ockham. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 225-244.
