13 found
Order:
See also
Sharon Ryan
West Virginia University
  1. Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
  2. In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.
    This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3.  97
    The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.
    The lottery paradox has been discussed widely. The standard solution to the lottery paradox is that a ticket holder is justified in believing each ticket will lose but the ticket holder is also justified in believing not all of the tickets will lose. If the standard solution is true, then we get the paradoxical result that it is possible for a person to have a justified set of beliefs that she knows is inconsistent. In this paper, I argue that the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  4. Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality.Sharon Ryan - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):99-112.
    After surveying the strengths and weaknesses of several well-known approaches to wisdom, I argue for a new theory of wisdom that focuses on being epistemically, practically, and morally rational. My theory of wisdom, The Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom, claims that a wise person is a person who is rational and who is deeply committed to increasing his or her level of rationality. This theory is a departure from theories of wisdom that demand practical and/or theoretical knowledge. The Deep Rationality (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  5.  89
    Wisdom.Sharon Ryan - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  6. What is Wisdom?Sharon Ryan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):119-139.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  7. The Preface Paradox.Sharon Ryan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):293-307.
  8.  84
    Does Warrant Entail Truth?Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):183-192.
    Although ‘warrant’ has been used to mean something like ‘justified to the degree required for knowledge’, it has recently come to mean something else. Alvin Plantinga has recently used the word ‘warrant’ to mean “that, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” So, in Plantinga’s sense of the word, warrant is the justification condition plus some other condition designed to rule out Gettier examples. In almost all cases, reliabilists, foundationalists, and coherentists have not (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  9.  59
    The Logic of Rationality.Sharon Ryan - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):525-528.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. The Logic of Rationality.Sharon Ryan - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):287-299.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11.  42
    A Deeper Defense of the Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom: A Reply to Fileva and Tresan.Sharon Ryan - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):115-123.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism.Sharon Ryan - 2019 - In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein. Springer Verlag.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Rational Belief in the Impossible.Sharon Ryan - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    It is commonly assumed that if one's beliefs are epistemically rational, then those beliefs must at least be consistent with one another. I argue that this assumption is false. I argue that it can be epistemically rational for a person to believe an inconsistent set of statements. I argue further that while one can rationally believe an inconsistent set of statements, one cannot rationally believe a set of statements that she or he knows to be inconsistent. ;In opposition, versions of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark