8 found
Sharon Street [8]Sharon Ann Street [1]
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Profile: Sharon Street (New York University)
  1. A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
  2. Constructivism About Reasons.Sharon Street - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:207-45.
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  3. What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?Sharon Street - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.
    Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted 'proceduralist characterization' of constructivism in ethics is (...)
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  4. In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.
  5. Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About.Sharon Street - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.
  6. Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):213-248.
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  7. Coming to Terms with Contingency : Humean Constructivism About Practical Reason.Sharon Street - 2012 - In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways.Sharon Street - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:1-32.