9 found
Sharon Street [9]Sharon Ann Street [1]
See also
Profile: Sharon Street (New York University)
  1. A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
  2. Constructivism About Reasons.Sharon Street - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:207-45.
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  3. What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?Sharon Street - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.
    Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted 'proceduralist characterization' of constructivism in ethics is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  4. In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.
  5. Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About.Sharon Street - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.
  6. Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):213-248.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  7. Coming to Terms with Contingency : Humean Constructivism About Practical Reason.Sharon Street - 2012 - In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways.Sharon Street - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:1-32.
  9.  4
    I- Constructivism in Ethics and the Problem of Attachment and Loss.Sharon Street - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):161-189.
    This paper explores two questions in moral philosophy that might at first seem unrelated. The first question is practical. While it’s not a truth we like to contemplate, each of us faces the eventual loss of everyone and everything we love. Is there a way to live in full awareness of that fact without falling into anxiety or depression, or resorting to one form or another of forgetfulness, denial or numbing out? The second question is metaethical. Is it possible to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography