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    Ratnākaraśānti’s Theory of Cognition with False Mental Images and the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument.Shinya Moriyama - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):339-351.
    The paper aims to clarify Ratnākaraśānti?s epistemological theory that mental images in a cognition are false (*alīkākāravāda) in comparison with Śāntarakṣita?s criticism of the Yogācāra position. Although Ratnākaraśānti frequently uses the neither-one-nor-many argument for explaining his Yogācāra position, the argument, unlike Śāntarakṣita?s original one, does not function for refuting the existence of awareness itself as the basis of mental images. This point is examined in the first two sections of this paper by analyzing Ratnākaraśānti?s proof of the selflessness of entities (...)
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  2.  76
    On self-awareness in the sautrāntika epistemology.Shinya Moriyama - 2010 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):261-277.
    This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form ( sākārajñānavāda ). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form ( grāhakākāra/svābhāsa ) grasps the objective mental form, the (...)
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