Innovation has been widely regarded as a powerful tool for stimulating economic growth and changing the quality of human life since the beginning of time. Innovation will continue to remain a key driving force for sustainability and growth in the current economic global slowdown. At present there are hardly any studies that show why innovation is successful at some organizations, and yet fails to achieve the desired results at others. The authors investigate the role of “core values and beliefs” of (...) leading innovative companies in India and abroad on how they go about building a unique innovation culture which ensures their continuous growth even in troubled times. (shrink)
Post-globalization trends have left many people with a sense of insecurity—on both the economic and the employment fronts. Business re-engineering, downsizing, lay-offs, excessive consumerism and greed have altered the rules of the business game. Skewed attention to mere economic criteria in many business organizations, even at the cost of societal and environmental factors, is leading to a sense of hollowness, ‘something missing’, in the organization and its employees. People are making every attempt to discover this ‘missing component’ in their lives, (...) with particular reference to their work lives. This ‘missing component’ is referred to as ‘spirit at work’ in management literature. Bringing in spirit at work has become a matter of priority for many business organizations, in their drives for sustained success. Spirit at work is about care, compassion, integrity, and about attempting to live one’s values at the workplace. It is about employees who are passionate and energized by their work, who find meaning and purpose and pursue excellence in their work, and who feel that they can express their complete selves at work. It is about individuals and organizations that see work as an opportunity to grow and to contribute to society in a meaningful way. Spirit at work can be better understood by gaining clarity about the key aspects that constitute this concept. This article reviews the extant litera-ture on spirit at work, highlights the key dimensions of spirit at work, and elaborates on each of them. A number of Indian scholars like S.K. Chakraborty, Subhash Sharma, M.B. Athreya, Panduranga Bhatta and others have proposed an Indian perspective of spirit at work and have elaborated on it since a decade and a half. This article extends the Indian perspective further, based on Indian psychophilosophy, and establishes its comprehensive and inclusive nature that enables incorporation of most of the key dimensions of spirit at work as identified in literature. (shrink)
The paper examines the Tattvôpaplava-siṁha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, and presents an analysis of his positive arguments that can be traced in the work. Despite the widely held opinion that Jayarāśi was a sceptic or held no positive opinions, the author concludes that, first, Jayarāśi does not fit a standard description of a sceptic. What may appear as an approach to philosophical problems, typical of a sceptic, turns out to be Jayarāśi’s particular method of critical examination on the part of a (...) rationalist. Second, a number of positive views Jayarāśi entertains can be identified in his work, and most of them overlap with much of the doctrine of the Cārvākas and Lokāyatas and materialist tradition recorded as early as the Sāmañña-phala-sutta. Therefore, Jayarāśi should be classified as a representative of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata tradition. (shrink)
The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) when it was appropriated by Śaiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition ( ahampratyaya ). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmakaṇṭha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). (...) It is then pointed out that Dharmakīrti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism are offered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anātmavāda , the doctrine of no-self, and sākāravāda , the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Rāmakaṇṭha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmakīrti’s contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself. (shrink)
This entry counters the paradigmatic status of modern western science by pointing to the existence of alternative knowledges that precede this hegemonic form, and by showing the fruitfulness of alternative sciences that have emerged in contemporary times. It argues that the idea of an alternative science demonstrates that issues of knowledge determine the possibilities of a politics that connects the question of alternative lifeworlds to alternative livelihoods, lifestyles and life cycles.
Ancient India recognized the supreme value of education in human life. The ancient thinkers felt that a healthy society was not possible without educated individuals. They framed an educational scheme carefully and wisely aiming at the harmonious development of the mind and body of students. What they framed was a very liberal, all-round education of a very high standard, calculated to prepare the students for a useful life in enjoying all aspects of life. This is essentially a universally applicable educational (...) framework highlighting the purpose of human life and interconnectedness at all levels of existence as a basis of human values. Insights from ancient Indian educational system are of great help in facilitating the production of a creative, ethical and a learning mind, which will concern itself not only with greater ‘progress’, but primarily or more importantly with the inner transformation of the human consciousness. (shrink)
An attempt has been made in this article to re-examine the inscriptions of Ashoka, an ancient Indian king, who was a great leader, well known in history, who had the courage, confidence, vision and will to provide an administration based purely on genuine human values. As evidenced in his inscriptions, 'effective leadership' depends not on preaching moral values but on practising them, and modifying life and leadership styles accordingly. Ashoka believed that the success of a true leader is directly related (...) to the maintenance of purity in public life and harmony in domestic affairs. (shrink)
Two eight-century Jaina contemporaries, a Śvetāmbara philosopher Siddhasena Mahāmati and a Digambara Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa revolutionised Jaina epistemology, by radically transforming basic epistemological concepts, which had been based on canonical tradition. The paper presents a brief historical outline of the developments of basic epistemological concepts in Jaina philolosophy such as the cognitive criterion and logical faculties as well as their fourteen typological models which serve as the backdrop of important innovations in epistemology introduced by Siddhasena, Pātrasvāmin and Akalaṅka. An important contribution (...) of these Jaina thinkers was to economize Indian logic and the rules of inference, first, by devising only one kind of logical reason called ‘inexplicability otherwise’, based on the single inseparable connection of the proving property with the inferable property, and, second, by limiting the necessary number of the members of the proof formula merely to two. These two innovations were related to the thinkers’ intention to devise a logic which would not primarily be based on empirical verification but its structural patterns would be valid irrespective of external observation. Further, the paper focuses on the nature of the epistemological shifts which Siddhasena and Akalaṅka introduced independently of each other and on the question how Siddhasena’s and Akalaṅka’s ideas were partly anchored in Buddhist concepts of the pramāṇa school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. With the Buddhist background, Siddhasena sought to define the criteria essential to distinguish true from false cognitions and to provide a novel classification of the pramāṇas. He can further be accredited with formulating the first Jaina descriptive definition of the cognitive criterion. The final section of the paper explains how Akalaṅka applies novel epistemological ideas, first, to construct realistic ontology and objectivity of both the external world and the cognising subject, and, secondly, to combat fundamental Buddhist concepts such as idealism and momentariness. (shrink)
Vedāntadeśika is one of many Sanskrit intellectuals who wrote prolifically in both poetic and philosophical genres. This essay considers how his poetry is related to his philosophical concerns. Scholars have understood the relationship between his poetry and philosophy in a number of ways, some arguing that his poetry permitted a freer exploration of his philosophical ideas, others wishing to discuss his poems independently of his philosophy. My paper will propose a distinct way of understanding this relationship by focusing specifically on (...) a strain of Vedāntadeśika’s poetry inspired by Kālidāsa. Examining selections from his poetry alongside his theological writing on the nature of devotional attention, I will argue that the poetic practice Vedāntadeśika learns by reading Kālidāsa activates the same mental faculty involved in bhakti-yoga, or the devotional contemplation of god. This strain of Vedāntadeśika’s poetry thus amounts to a performance of the devotional practice he describes in his philosophical writings. (shrink)
The essay traces the definitions of nation through various stages, outlining the consequences of each definition. It emphasizes that the movement to exclusivity has been genocidal and then hints at the possibility of re-reading the idea of nation.
We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)
This is a translation of the chapter on perception by Kumarilabhatta's magnum opus, the Slokavarttika , which is one of the central texts of the Hindu response to the criticism of the logical-epistemological school of Buddhist thought. It is crucial for understanding the debates between Hindus and Buddhists about metaphysical, epistemological and linguistic questions during the classical period. In an extensive commentary, the author explains the course of the argument from verse to verse and alludes to other theories of classical (...) Indian philosophy and numerous other technical matters. Notes to the translation and commentary go further into the historical and philosophical background of Kumarila's ideas. The book provides an introduction to the history and the development of Indian epistemology, a synopsis of Kumarila's work and an analysis of its argument. It is a valuable contribution to the field of Indian philosophical studies. (shrink)
The paper presents an analysis of the anumāna chapter of Jayarāśi’s Tattvôpaplava-siṁha and the nature of his criticism levelled against the anumāna model. The results of the analysis force us to revise our understanding of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa as a sceptic. Instead, he emerges as a highly critical philosopher. In addition, the nature of Jayarāśi’s criticism of the anumāna model allow us to conclude that anumāna should not be equated with inference, but rather is its limited subset, and may at best (...) be rendered as ‘disputational inference’, ‘debational inference’ or even ‘dialogical inference’. Jayarāśi applies a range of logical laws which clearly represent patterns of what can be classified as a priori reasoning and analytical justifications for knowledge, which were traditionally not reckoned sound. Against the backdrop of Jayarāśi’s criticism of anumāna, the paper also attempts to provide an explanation to why Indian philosophy and logic did not develop any concept of proper symbols and variables. (shrink)