This paper investigates the relationship between methodological individualism and agent-based simulation. We use a thesis defended by Caterina Marchionni and Petri Ylikoski as the starting point of our approach. According to this thesis, since MI is often considered to be a reductionist orientation, it is confusing and meaningless to assume that ABS, which is a non-reductionist and emergentist explanatory model, is committed to MI. We criticise this view and focus on the problem of the proper definition of MI. We explain (...) that MI is compatible with the ABS strategy because reductionism is only the most simplistic variant of MI and argue that ABS explanations must be regarded as explanations in terms of non-reductionist MI. (shrink)
Risk management has become a vital topic both in academia and practice during the past several decades. Most business intelligence tools have been used to enhance risk management, and the risk management tools have benefited from business intelligence approaches. This introductory article provides a review of the state-of-the-art research in business intelligence in risk management, and of the work that has been actepted for publication in this issue.
Two models are developed for updating opinions in social networks under situations where certain beliefs might be considered to be competing. These two models represent different attitudes of people towards the perceived conflict between beliefs. In both models agents have a degree of tolerance, which represents the extent to which the agent takes into account the differing beliefs of other agents, and a degree of conflict, which represents the extent to which two beliefs are considered to be competing. Computer simulations (...) are used to determine how the opinion dynamics are affected by the inclusion of conflict. Results show that conflict can enhance the formation of consensus within the network in certain circumstances according to one of the models. (shrink)
A new theory of the neuropsychological underpinnings of phenomenal consciousness, “asynchronous introspection theory,” is proposed that emphasizes asynchrony between different neurocognitive processes. We provide a detailed explanation of how a mind might arrive at a cognitive structure isomorphic to the cognitive structure that would emerge from experiential qualia. The theory suggests that a temporal illusion is created because of the mismatch between the real physical timeline and the neurally constructed timeline composed inside a person’s brain. This temporal illusion leads to (...) the origination of a thought that one has had a certain experience wherein the thought and the feeling seem synchronous to the person but, in fact, are not. This leads to the thought, “I had a feeling.” The theory is elaborated via a metaphorical “robot supervisor model” and is shown to explain many current problems of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)