Contrary to what has been stated in most accounts that Hume intends to make arguments against the existence of God, he aims to attack the claim that religious propositions can be argued; not completely reject these propositions. He considers these propositions epistemologically outside of human knowledge but ontologically accepts the existence of God. With such a view, we can dismiss atheistic-agnostic interpretations and relate him to a kind of mysticism. The key to deciding whether or not Hume is a mystic (...) is to determine what criteria we have to consider someone a mystic. Two very influential components here are (1)the belief in the existence of God; (2) the belief that the existence of God is far from our usual reasoning (antirational or irrational).And the second component is enough to call someone like Wittgenstein a fideist. We claim that there is clear evidence of these components in Hume’s works; therefore, what reason do we have to remove Hume from the circle of fideism and mysticism? In this study, after an introduction to the concept and types of fideism, we show that Hume, based on his works, surpasses skepticism and manifests a special kind of fideism.While there is an emphasis on the mystery of the proposition that God exists, he combines Christian faith, in aform that is inseparable from illogical and mysterious propositions such as the incarnation of God. Thus, Hume can be called a Christian mystic. (shrink)

Close examination of the works of David Hume shows that his aim to explain the problem of evil is to attack natural theology and introduce it as a situation that is non-epistemological and unsystematic. So, contrary to what the majority of interpretations which typically express that he makes an argument against the existence of God, Hume wants to show that the statements of natural theology are rationally unprovable, and he does not want to totally decline them. As a matter of (...) fact, they ontologically exist, and are epistemologically out of human cognition. This article shows that the popular interpretation is false, and this would be done in two ways: the first is Hume’s statements about the cause of the world, and the second is Hume’s solutions for the problem of evil, that have mystical streaks. Based on these fact, it will be shown that Hume is not an atheist, but he is a mystical fideist. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show that statistical analysis and hermeneutics are not mutually exclusive. Although statistical analysis may capture some patterns and regularities, statistical methods may themselves generate different types of interpretation and, in turn, give rise to even more interpretations. The discussion is lodged within the context of a quantitative analysis of dream content. I attempted to examine the dialogical texts of reported dreams monologically, but soon found myself returning to dialogic contexts to make sense of (...) statistical patterns. One could cogently argue that the reported statistical relationships in this study, rather than pointing to any interaction among the "signifieds," speak only to the relationships among the "signifiers" that were being played out through various actors on the analytic or scientific stage, since all of the constructs used in theorizing about, interpreting, and telling dreams come from the same discursive system. (shrink)

The medical sciences in Sasanian society, in late Antiquity, constitute a rather neglected field of inquiry. Our most reliable sources for the study of this particular period in the history of science include a number of texts that were written in several older Iranian languages. In the following pages, we offer translations and commentaries on two such texts, written in Middle Persian, dealing with the life sciences. The topics discussed include copulation, pregnancies in various species, lactation, and moral and physical (...) characteristics in the offspring. Placed in juxtaposition, the two texts, furthermore, clarify some of the obscure points in each of them. It is hoped that this preliminary study will help to sketch the path for future studies of the field. (shrink)

In the 2nd half of nineteenth century, when the Pan-Islamism ideology as the way out of Islamic world’s straits was formed in the mind of some Islamic world’s thinkers, some of Iranian thinkers joined the issue, as well. Mostly influenced by the ideologies particularly were Istanbul-resident Iranians intellectuals and thinkers who, oppressed by authoritarians of Iran, had taken refuge in Istanbul and started living there. Among them, Mirza Agha Khan Kermani and his inseparable fellow, Sheikh Ahmad Rouhi, had an interesting (...) yet bitter adventure. Despite having non-religious ideological background, they were attracted toward Pan-Islamism, acted whole-heartedly and sacrificed themselves for it.Using the remaining works by the two characters and other sources of that time, this study tried to recognize their roles in the movement of Pan-Islamism. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 40, Issue 1, pp 80 - 103 This study was designed to examine the relationships between social support, perceived stress, religiosity, and flourishing and to test the mediating role of perceived stress in the relationships between social support and religiosity with flourishing. This study also examines the moderating roles of religiosity and gender in the relationship between social support and flourishing among 2301 Malaysian older adults. Structural Equation Modelling showed that older adults with high levels of social (...) support, high levels of intrinsic religious motivation, high levels of extrinsic religious motivation, and low levels of perceived stress were more likely to experience flourishing. Bootstrapping analysis provided evidence of perceived stress as a significant partial mediator in the links between social support, intrinsic religious motivation, and extrinsic religious motivation with flourishing. Multi-group analysis revealed that religiosity and gender acted as significant moderators in the links between social support, perceived stress, and flourishing. (shrink)

BackgroundUncertainty intolerance (IU), the tendency to think or react negatively toward uncertain events may have implication on individuals’ mental health and psychological wellbeing. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12 (IU-12) is commonly used across the globe to measure IU, however, its’ psychometric properties are yet to be evaluated in Iran with a Persian-speaking population. Therefore, the purpose of this research was to translate and validate the IU-12 among Iranian undergraduate students.Materials and MethodsThe multi-stage cluster random sampling was employed to recruit 410 (...) Iranian undergraduate students (260 females) from the Azad University to complete the IU-12, the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-2, and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire in a cross-sectional design. In this study, face validity, content validity, construct validity, and concurrent validity were measured and Construct Reliability (CR) and Cronbach’s alpha were used to measure reliability.ResultsThe impact score of the translated IU-12 indicated acceptable face validity (value of impact score was greater than 1.5). The value of Content Validity Index (CVI) and the value of Content Validity Ratio (CVR) were above 0.7 and 0.78, respectively. The values of CVI and CVR indicated the items had acceptable content validity and were deemed essential to the measure. The measurement model analysis showed the measure with two subscales had good fit indices (CMIN/df = 2.75, p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.07, TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.95, GFI = 0.94). A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) indicated the scale was composed of the two subscales found in the English-version of the scale (prospective anxiety and inhibitory anxiety), and no items were removed from the scale. The values of CR (0.86) and Cronbach’s alphas (0.89) showed the measure had appropriate internal consistency.ConclusionThe findings support the psychometric properties of the Persian version of the IU-12. This scale could be used to reliably and accurately measure uncertainty intolerance among undergraduate students in Iran. (shrink)

Recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. In response to this finding, three cognitive theories have been offered to explain this: the simulation constraint theory (Bering, Citation2002); the imaginative obstacle theory (Nichols, Citation2007); and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). First, I provide a critical analysis of each of these theories. Second, I argue that these theories, while perhaps explaining why one would believe in his own personal (...) immortality, leave an explanatory gap in that they do not explain why one would intuitively attribute survival of death to others. To fill in the gap, I offer a cognitive theory based on offline social reasoning and social embodiment which provides for the belief in an eternal social realm in which the deceased survive—the afterlife. (shrink)

Recent research (Bering 2002, 2006) into what has become known as “the folk psychology of souls” demonstrates that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. Additional research (Harris & Gimenéz, 2005; Astuti & Harris, 2008) has demonstrated that this belief is highly context sensitive. In this thesis, the author presents this research and provides a critical analysis of the findings based on philosophical and empirical concerns. The author also presents and critically analyses several theories that have been proposed to explain (...) this intuitive belief: intuitive Cartesian substance dualism (Bloom, 2004); the simulation constraint theory (Bering, 2006); the imaginative obstacle theory (Nichols, 2007); and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008; Vail III, et al., 2010). The author argues, based on philosophical concerns, and anthropological and psychological empirical evidence, that none of the proposed theories are up to the task of giving a cognitive account of the folk psychology of souls. The author then argues for three interconnected theses to provide a cognitive account for why humans intuitively believe that others survive death. The first thesis, from which the second and third theses follow, is that the acceptance of afterlife beliefs is predisposed by a specific, and already well-documented, imaginative process—the offline social reasoning process. The second thesis is that afterlife beliefs are social in nature. The third thesis is that the living imagine the deceased as socially embodied in such a way as to continue to fulfill on-going social obligations with others. The author further suggests six reasons why the fantasy/reality distinction breaks down for the imaginer such that the continued existence of the decedent in the afterlife is believed to be real. Finally, the author suggests avenues for further research that would support this cognitive account. (shrink)

In this volume, renowned experts in psychoanalysis reflect on the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion, in particular presenting various controversial interpretations of the question if and to what extent monotheism semantically and structurally fits psychoanalytic insights. Some essays augment traditional religious critiques of Freudianism with later religio-philosophical theories on, for example, femininity. Others explore the relation between psychopathology and morality from the Freudian premise that psychopathology shows in an excessive way aspects or mechanisms of the human psyche that constitute our (...) subjectivity, moral capacities, and behavior.Contributors: Andreas De Block, KU Leuven-University of Leuven; Fethi Benslama, University of Paris Diderot; Sergio Benvenuto, ISTC, Rome; Gohar Homayounpour, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran; Felix de Mendelssohn, Sigmund Freud University, Vienna; Julia Kristeva, University of Paris Diderot; Lode Lauwaert, KU Leuven-University of Leuven; Siamak Movahedi, University of Massachusetts; Wolfgang Muller-Funk, University of Vienna; Gilles Ribault, University of Paris Diderot; Céline Surprenant, University of Sussex; Inge Scholz-Strasser, Sigmund Freud Foundation; Herman Westerink, University of Vienna; Joel Whitebook, Columbia University; Moshe Zuckermann, Tel Aviv University. (shrink)