While there are many issues to be raised in using lethal autonomous robotic weapons (beyond those of remotely operated drones), we argue that the most important question is: should the decision to take a human life be relinquished to a machine? This question is often overlooked in favor of technical questions of sensor capability, operational questions of chain of command, or legal questions of sovereign borders. We further argue that the answer must be ?no? and offer several reasons for banning (...) autonomous robots. (1) Such a robot treats a human as an object, instead of as a person with inherent dignity. (2) A machine can only mimic moral actions, it cannot be moral. (3) A machine run by a program has no human emotions, no feelings about the seriousness of killing a human. (4) Using such a robot would be a violation of military honor. We therefore conclude that the use of an autonomous robot in lethal operations should be banned. (shrink)
We create value for ourselves by making sacrifices. In Sacrifice and Value, Sidney Axinn presents the role of sacrifice in the work of many figures in the history of Philosophy. A novel feature is the attention given to Kant's use of sacrifice, and the way this changes the usual view of the Categorical Imperative, and Kant's concept of value.
This book is a thorough study of the question posed by Kant, For what can a human being rationally hope? It offers a detailed commentary on Kant's seminal work, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, as well as an original development of the logic of three of Kant's basic ideas: ambivalence, ignorance, and hope. Sophisticated analytic techniques, including symbolic logic, are applied to this conceptual matrix. The result is a striking case for the transformation of world society into a (...) Kingdom of Ends of individuals and a peaceful League of Nations. (shrink)
Kant is not ordinarily included in the roll-call of nominalists. However, it is rather startling to put together the analysis of possible individuals that is to be found in Kant, and to compare this with the position on the matter that Nelson Goodman developed. We can reach the issues a bit faster by starting with Goodman’s view. In this way we shall approach Kant as he suggested that we should approach nature, “not … in the character of a pupil who (...) listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witness to answer questions which he has himself formulated.”. Goodman will help us formulate the questions. (shrink)
According to Kant, there are limits to possible hope. For example, hope for a contradiction is obviously not a logically possible hope. However, Kant goes much further and restricts possible hope to what can be possibly experienced. The line between what can and cannot be constructed as an image in space and time limits what can be thought rather than what can be merely mentioned. The apparently modern distinction between use and mention (generally attributed to Frege) is used by Kant (...) to distinguish phenomena and noumena as well as real and fictitious concepts. I propose a definition of hope that is consistent with Kant’s concept of reasonable and unreasonable hopes. I then consider some applications of this definition to Kant’s view of world peace, grace, and miracles. Despite notions of secondorder hope and transcendental hope, all possible hope lies within the limits of possible experience. (shrink)
This paper has had the following theses:One can't be moral without choosing a particular moral style.A style is a specific balance of Type I and Type II risks of error.There are just four alternative moral patterns, defined in terms of beneficiaries.Sacrifice is the basic moral relation.A moral style is a balance of risks of error in choosing beneficiaries.The categorical imperative limits the range of styles that can be accepted as moral.One's moral style is not chosen by logic but by feelings, (...) just as one chooses art. (shrink)