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Profile: Sigrun Svavarsdottir (Ohio State University, Tufts University)
  1. Moral Cognitivism and Motivation.Sigrun Svavarsdottir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.
    The impact moral judgments have on our deliberations and actions seems to vary a great deal. Moral judgments play a large part in the lives of some people, who are apt not only to make them, but also to be guided by them in the sense that they tend to pursue what they judge to be of moral value, and shun what they judge to be of moral disvalue. But it seems unrealistic to claim that moral judgments play a pervasive (...)
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  2. Having Value and Being Worth Valuing.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (2):84-109.
    This paper explores the relationship between the ascription of value to an object and an assessment of conative attitudes taken towards that object. It argues that this relationship is captured by an a priori necessary truth that falls out of the mastery conditions for the concept of value: what has value is worth valuing, when valuing is understood to be a relatively stable conative attitude distinct from judging valuable. What kind of assessment of attitude is at stake? How are we (...)
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    The Practical Role Essential to Value Judgments.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):299-320.
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  4. The Virtue of Practical Rationality.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):1-33.
    Practical rationality is best regarded as a virtue: an excellence in the exercise of one's cognitive capacities in one's practical endeavors. The author develops this idea so as to yield a Humean conception of practical rationality. Nevertheless, one of the crucial features of the approach is not distinctively Humean and sets it apart from the most familiar neo-Humean approaches: an agent's practical rationality has to do with the presence and form of his cognitive activity, as well as with how it (...)
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  5. Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2001 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge University Press. pp. 144--193.
     
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  6. How Do Moral Judgments Motivate?Sigrun Svavarsdottir - 2006 - In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 6--163.
  7.  39
    Evaluations of Rationality.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2003 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Southern Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 121-136.
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  8. On Simon Blackburn's Ruling Passions.Sigrun Svavarsdóttir - 2001 - Philosophical Books 108:18-26.
     
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    Moral Cognitivism and Motivation.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.
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    Thinking in Moral Terms.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2000 - Garland.
    Issues such as moral motivation, the nature of desire and the difference between moral and scientific inquiry are discussed in this work, among others.
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  11. The Virtue of Practical Rationality.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):1-33.
    Practical rationality is best regarded as a virtue: an excellence in the exercise of one’s cognitive capacities in one’s practical endeavors. The author develops this idea so as to yield a Humean conception of practical rationality. Nevertheless, one of the crucial features of the approach is not distinctively Humean and sets it apart from the most familiar neo-Humean approaches: an agent’s practical rationality has to do with the presence and form of his cognitive activity, as weIl as with how it (...)
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