Ethical thought experiments such as the trolley dilemma have been investigated extensively in the past, showing that humans act in utilitarian ways, trying to cause as little overall damage as possible. These trolley dilemmas have gained renewed attention over the past few years, especially due to the necessity of implementing moral decisions in autonomous driving vehicles. We conducted a set of experiments in which participants experienced modified trolley dilemmas as drivers in virtual reality environments. Participants had to make decisions between (...) driving in one of two lanes where different obstacles came into view. Eventually, the participants had to decide which of the objects they would crash into. Obstacles included a variety of human-like avatars of different ages and group sizes. Furthermore, the influence of sidewalks as potential safe harbors and a condition implicating self-sacrifice were tested. Results showed that participants, in general, decided in a utilitarian manner, sparing the highest number of avatars possible with a limited influence by the other variables. Derived from these findings, which are in line with the utilitarian approach in moral decision making, it will be argued for an obligatory ethics setting implemented in ADVs. (shrink)
This article examines how digital epidemiology and eHealth coalesce into a powerful health surveillance system that fundamentally changes present notions of body and health. In the age of Big Data and Quantified Self, the conceptual and practical distinctions between individual and population body, personal and public health, surveillance and health care are diminishing. Expanding on Armstrong’s concept of “surveillance medicine” to “quantified self medicine” and drawing on my own research on the symbolic power of statistical constructs in medical encounters, this (...) article explores the impact of digital health surveillance on people’s perceptions, actions and subjectivities. It discusses the epistemic confusions and paradoxes produced by a health care system that increasingly treats patients as risk profiles and prompts them to do the same, namely to perceive and manage themselves as a bundle of health and security risks. Since these risks are necessarily constructed in reference to epidemiological data that postulate a statistical gaze, they also construct or make-up disembodied “individuals on alert”. (shrink)
Since the end of the 20th century, patient autonomy does not only aim at protecting patients’ personal rights, but also to promote their active cooperation in the health system. In Germany, the legal development of patient autonomy goes hand in hand with the concerted establishment of patient counseling and training designed to produce „informed decision makers“. This article examines the practice of patient autonomy and its corresponding subject beyond the sphere of formal law. Therefore, it draws on (1) reports of (...) the German „Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der Entwicklung des Gesundheitswesens“ and (2) a medical genetic counseling session. On the basis of an influential political-economic discourse on health policy and an advisory doctor-patient encounter it can be shown that the original goal of patient autonomy, namely the protection of personal freedom, tends to be perverted: Patient counseling and training increasingly requires that autonomy be exercised on the condition that it incorporate an expert-controlled rationality and exhibit the subject-position of an „informed decision maker“. (shrink)
Phenomenology’s return to lived experience and “to the things themselves” is often contrasted with the synthesized perspective of science and its “view from nowhere.” The extensive use of neuropsychological case reports in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, however, suggests that the relationship between phenomenology and science is more complex than a sheer opposition, and a fruitful one for the praxis of medicine. Here, I propose a new reading of how Merleau-Ponty justifies his use of Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein’s reports on (...) Johann Schneider for his phenomenology of embodied perception. I argue that for Merleau-Ponty these neuropsychological case reports represent a coherent deformation of the intercorporeally expressed existence of Schneider that through speech fall again onto the common ground of perception, thereby allowing Merleau-Ponty to understand, in the equivalent sense delivered by language, Schneider’s total being and fundamental illness. I then discuss what Merleau-Ponty’s method implies for a phenomenological praxis of medicine, and for the role of science in this praxis. (shrink)
Much of what we understand about heterochromatin formation in mammals has been extrapolated from forward genetic screens for modifiers of position‐effect variegation (PEV) in the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. The recent identification of the HUSH (Human Silencing Hub) complex suggests that more recent evolutionary developments contribute to the mechanisms underlying PEV in human cells. Although HUSH‐mediated repression also involves heterochromatin spreading through the reading and writing of the repressive H3K9me3 histone modification, clear orthologues of HUSH subunits are not found in (...) Drosophila but are conserved in vertebrates. Here we compare the insights into the mechanisms of PEV derived from genetic screens in the fly, the mouse and in human cells, review what is currently known about the HUSH complex and discuss the implications of HUSH‐mediated silencing for viral latency. Future studies will provide mechanistic insight into HUSH complex function and reveal the relationship between HUSH and other epigenetic silencing complexes. (shrink)
This article identifies problems with regard to providing criteria that regulate the matching of logical formulae and natural language. We then take on to solve these problems by defining a necessary and sufficient criterion of adequate formalization. On the basis of this criterion we argue that logic should not be seen as an ars iudicandi capable of evaluating the validity or invalidity of informal arguments, but as an ars explicandi that renders transparent the formal structure of informal reasoning.
, David Bloor suggests that logical reasoning is radically relativistic in the sense that there are incompatible ways of reasoning logically, and no culturally transcendent rules of correct logical inference exist which could allow for adjudication of these different ways of reasoning. Bloor cites an example of reasoning used by the Azande as an illustration of such logical relativism. A close analysis of this reasoning reveals that the Azande's logic is in fact impeccably Aristotelian. I argue that the conclusions Bloor (...) can legitimately draw from his case study are not controversial and do nothing to make plausible the thesis of logical relativism. (shrink)
Bei der Regelung von Rechtsfragen in der modernen Medizin und der Biotechnologie kann kaum auf rechtliche oder ethische Standards zuruckgegriffen werden. Rechtsentscheidungen beruhren haufig das gesellschaftliche Selbstverstandnis.
The present study examined the effects of mindfulness training on attention regulation in university students and whether the potential benefits of implementation are influenced by the yoga component of mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) and/or by MBI homework practice. In a non-randomized trial with pre- and post-assessments, n = 180 university students were allocated to either mindfulness training (experimental groups), awareness activities (active control group), or no training (passive control group). Mindfulness was taught through two MBIs, one including yoga and the other (...) excluding yoga. Attention regulation was operationalized via behavioral indicators, namely sustained attention, cognitive flexibility, cognitive inhibition, and data-driven information processing. With the exception of speed in a cognitive flexibility task, the results indicated no systematic or differential advantage arising from mindfulness training, with or without yoga, regarding the aspects of attention regulation. There was no consistent influence of homework quantity or quality. The implications for mindfulness training in academic contexts are discussed. (shrink)
A striking empirical finding about color perception is that normal perceivers disagree about which hues are pure. (Pure hues contain no perceived admixture of any other color.) This finding poses a prima facie problem for color objectivism and representationalist accounts of perceptual experience. Michael Tye attempts to resolve this problem by arguing that pure hues do exist as objective properties of ordinary objects, but that human color detection mechanisms did not evolve with sufficient refinement to allow us to determine which (...) hues are the pure ones. I argue that Tye’s attempted solution fails, and that the most reasonable conclusion consistent with color objectivism is that pure hues do not exist. (shrink)
Over the last two decades, the Japanese notion of ba, introduced by Ikujiro Nonaka and his associates to the West, has come to play an important role in management theory. This notion, which has been roughly translated as ‘place’ or ‘topos,’ stresses the importance of processual spatial thinking for economics and management alike. As such, it echoes and amplifies recent voices in the business world, which argue that we must understand business strategy in terms ofspace, that is to say, as (...) an expression of the dynamics of social interaction which involves such factors as connectivity, information flow, external versus tacit knowledge, etc. Despite many efforts, the barriers for fully integrating ba into the body of Western management literature will remain for as long as its underlying assumptions are defined by ontologically static categories. This article is an attempt to overcome this theoretical bottleneck, first by critiquing the sub optimal approach to processual problems generated by conventional Western business theories, which can neither recognise their hidden background assumptions about space nor transcend them, and second, by explaining, within the framework of comparative analysis, how ba leads to a new processual and dynamic account of business life. Our overall aim is to demonstrate how a new processual notion of space enables a deeper, more integrated understanding not only ofthe nature of the firm, but also of the role managers play within firms. (shrink)
In the following dialogue between TT - a foundationalist - and WdeV - a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars writes: 'For a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge", not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of (...) the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.' In the ensuing dialogue, TT argues that it sets the bar too high when knowledge about perceptual conditions is required for ordinary observational knowledge - that young children, for example, are implausibly excluded as knowers given Sellars's principle. WdeV defends Sellars's metaknowledge requirement against these charges. Results from developmental psychology are surveyed for what they show about the actual capabilities of young children. The implications of these results for the success of Sellars's principle are debated. (shrink)
In the intellectual autobiography that opens this book, Chisholm divides philosophers into “drones” and “commentators,” placing himself in the first group. As a drone, Chisholm proposed solutions to philosophical problems and asked his students and colleagues to try to refute him. He reports that they often did, sending him back to the drawing board. Chisholm’s wry self-description says much about his manner as well as his method. A more pretentious philosopher might have spoken of his dogged search for philosophical truth (...) in an age when many have come to disparage that quest. (shrink)
I argue that in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Wilfrid Sellars significantly misconstrued the early twentieth-century empiricists he was criticizing (empiricists such as Bertrand Russell, H.H. Price and C.I. Lewis). Because these philosophers and their theories were becoming passé (partly due to EPM itself but also due to broader trends), this misconstrual was not noted. As a result, Sellars’s most influential claim – that the given is a myth – did not receive the critical scrutiny that it should have (...) received prior to its widespread acceptance. (shrink)
Logical relativism is the view that a logical proposition is known just in case it is collectively endorsed in some culture. This striking and controversial view is defended by David Bloor and Richard C. Jennings. They cite in its support distinctive reasoning practices among the Azande as described by E. E. Evans-Pitchard. Jennings has challenged my critique of Bloor's logical relativism, claiming that my analysis is based on misunderstandings of Bloor and Evans-Pritchard. I argue that Jennings' clarifications of Bloor do (...) nothing to support the thesis of logical relativism, and that a direct examination of Evans-Pritchard's evidence suggests that the Azande reason just as we do. (shrink)
Newton claims to have proven the heterogeneity of light through his experimentum crucis. However, Olaf Müller has worked out in detail Goethe’s idea that one could likewise prove the heterogeneity of darkness by inverting Newton’s famous experiment. Müller concludes that this invalidates Newton’s claim of proof. Yet this conclusion only holds if the heterogeneity of light and the heterogeneity of darkness is logically incompatible. This paper shows that this is not the case. Instead, in Quine’s terms, we have two logically (...) compatible theories based on mutually irreducible theoretical terms. From a Quinean point of view, this does no harm to the provability of the corresponding statements. (shrink)
Das Buch entwickelt einen neuartigen, physikalistischen Interpretationsansatz zu Wittgensteins Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Das traditionelle Urteil, Wittgenstein habe im Tractatus keine klare Vorstellung der Analyse gehabt, wird widerlegt. Auf der Basis der Rekonstruktion der um die Jahrhundertwende etablierten Sinnesdatenanalysen im allgemeinen und der Farbanalysen im besonderen wird nachgewiesen, daß Wittgensteins Tractatus eine physikalische Sinnesdatenanalyse voraussetzt. Auf diesem Hintergrund werden Wittgensteins allgemeine Auffassungen zur Analyse der Welt und Sprache gedeutet, begründet und exemplifiziert. Der Tractatus liefert die philosophische Klärung des mechanistischen Weltbildes von Boltzmann (...) und Hertz. Er stellt die Mittel bereit, um den Sinn der Sätze zu analysieren und die logische Zulässigkeit von Aussagen zu prüfen. Die Anwendung dieser Mittel ist Aufgabe der Philosophie. Daß sie anwendbar sind und wie sie anzuwenden sind, demonstriert dieses Buch. (shrink)
Jonathan barnes argues that heraclitus's unity of opposites doctrine is logically contradictory in that it requires the coinstantiation of contrary properties. but barnes relies on rather strained interpretations of the doxography. heraclitus's unity of opposites doctrine is better understood as consisting of two aspects: (1) a claim that opposing qualities, rather than being coinstantiated in one thing, are related to one another via a process of cyclic transformation; and (2) an attempt to illustrate the limited and incomplete perspectives through which (...) heraclitus believed humanity ordinarily viewed the world. (shrink)
