Moving from Heidegger’s suggestion that philosophy has fallen into the Thaletian well because of its inadequate theorization of the essence of things, I retrace in Heidegger’s description of things as gathering elements that enable a discourse on things in terms of their alterity,· I explore the richness of such an alterity in its differing from Levinas’s otherness of the other person; I suggest the formulation of an ethics of things which, through a reciprocal exposure of Heidegger and Levinas, might rescue (...) philosophy from its fall into the Thaletian well.Suite à la thèse de Heidegger selon laquelle la philosophie, depuis qu’elle théorise I’essence des choses, aurait chuté dans le puits de Thalès, j’identifie, à partir de la description heideggérienne de la chose comme rassemblement, les elements qui rendent possible un discours sur les choses en tant qu’altérité. J’explore la richesse d’une telle altérité en ce qu’elle diffire de I’altérité lévinassienne de I’autre personne. Je propose la formulation d’une ethique des choses qui, par I’éclaircissement réciproque de Heidegger et de Lévinas, pourrait prévenir la chute de la philosophie dans le puits de Thalès. (shrink)
The relation between the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions is "the great problem" of Western philosophy, according to Emmanuel Levinas. In this book Brian Schroeder, Silvia Benso, and an international group of philosophers address the relationship between Levinas and the world of ancient thought. In addition to philosophy, themes touching on religion, mythology, metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, and politics are also explored. The volume as a whole provides a unified and extended discussion of how an engagement between Levinas and thinkers from (...) the ancient tradition works to enrich understandings of both. This book opens new pathways in ancient and modern philosophical studies as it illuminates new interpretations of Levinas' ethics and his social and political philosophy. (shrink)
Levinas’s most important contribution to contemporary philosophy is his continual vindication of the primacy of the ethical. For the contemporary reader, educated in the shadow of the Nietzschean thought that existence as will to power is art, this claim comes as an uneasy surprise. What is the place of the aesthetic within the preeminence of the ethical in Levinas’s philosophy? Or, more specifically, what is, for Levinas, the place of art in relation to the ethical? Through a Levinasian reading of (...) Plato, and a Platonic reading of Levinas, the paper argues in favor of Paul Celan’s statement that there is not “any basic difference... between a handshake and a poem.”. (shrink)
The current and the next issues of “Spazio Filosofico”, both devoted to Festival (Festival I and II respectively), are dedicated to Ugo Perone on the occasion of his 70th birthday. Perone’s friends and colleagues have chosen to celebrate his birthday in a philosophical way, namely, with a reflection on the concept of festival/holiday [festa] and its meaning for us today. Thrifty spirits might object that a journal issue is like a gift – one is enough. Are these not times of (...) economic crisis? There is no real festival, however, without a Zugabe: without an addition, an encore, or a supplement. Hence, two issues, both devoted to a single concept. The choice of the theme has not been accidental – the concept of “festival/holiday” plays in fact an important role in Perone’s thought. In an essay that is often quoted in various contributions to the two issues, Perone understands the pair of concepts “ultimate/penultimate,” which has been discussed by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in terms of “holidays/everydayness.” For Bonhoeffer, God is present not where human abilities fail but rather “at the center of the village.” Likewise, for Perone, the square, which is the “symbol for the holiday time,” is the center of town. It is even, “at the same time, the center of town and its interruption.” . (shrink)
Inverting the sequence of the traditional terms, in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence Levinas redefines philosophy as the “wisdom of love”. Through an intertwining of Platonic motifs and Levinasian inspirations, the essay argues for a mutually regulated interplay of mythos and logos as a way to regain a sense of wisdom that remains respectful of the elements of otherness in reality-in particular, respectful of the otherness of the Third who, for Levinas, constitutes the ground for politics. That is, the (...) interplay of mythos and logos results into a mytho-logy in which the logos directing the mythos is the voice of the other which imposes not only the preservation, but also the institutionalization of the differences, alterities and incommensurabilities that constitute reality. The consequence of this differently negotiated notion of wisdom is a reconfiguration of philosophy in terms of a mythological politics of bodily, economic testimony in the service of the Third. (shrink)
By exploring various semantic possibilities contained in the expression “lost in translation”, this essay addresses various difficulties entailed in the work of translation in general and as they apply to the translation into English of the works of Luigi Pareyson specifically. The essay also surveys the status of the Pareyson scholarship in the Anglophone world and suggests possible ways to foster a more congenial milieu for the appreciation of this important Italian philosopher whose thought is rarely recognized by Anglophone thinkers, (...) even of the continental kind. (shrink)
Traditional ethics has ignored the metaphysics of things, reduced the relation to things to a relation to objects in opposition to subjects, and consequently legitimized the subject's domination over the objects. My dissertation provides a metaphysical and ethical foundation for reappraising the value of things by both challenging and retrieving different aspects of Levinas's and Heidegger's philosophies. ;Levinas considers the Other as the authority capable of suspending the subject's tendency to unlimited power and domination, mistakenly understood as freedom. Ethics is (...) the place of the suspension of violence and of the encounter with the Other. Yet, the Other is only the other person. As in traditional ethics, things remain instrumental to the relation between the I and the Other. ;Heidegger's notion of thinghood, retraced through a tortuous path of thinking leading from the early works to the later essays, is not ethically colored. Nevertheless, it preserves the Otherness of things thanks to their simultaneous mirroring of the mortals, the gods, the sky, and the earth. ;My dissertation extends Levinas's notion of ethics to Heidegger's notion of things and develops an ethics where tenderness is the essential category. Tenderness is a peculiar mode of touch. It allows us contact with things, but is not subject to the abuses of technological manipulation and as a consequence is respectful of the irreducible Otherness of things. (shrink)
Two waves mark the appropriation of Derrida in English: an earlier, literary and a later, philosophical reception. Both readings neglect the relation between deconstruction and ethics, leaving unanswered the question: "why bother with deconstruction?". Critchley's book, written in an elegant, concise, clear and yet--despite its scholarly rigor--pleasant style, admittedly locates itself at the origin of a third way of reception, "one in which ethical--not to mention political--questions are uppermost".
A practical hermeneutics of time. The Possible Present unfolds from within a freely reinterpreted hermeneutic perspective and provides an original theoretical proposal on the topic of time. In dialogue especially with the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger, but resorting also to suggestions coming from a theological background (Barth and Bonhoeffer), the work proposes a personal and original theory of time centered on a conception of the present that does not reduce temporality to a succession of mere instants. When one claims (...) that time is ungraspable, one refers neither to the past (which is rather irretrievable) nor to the future (which is rather uncertain) but to the present. The present in which we are is in fact what fades from our hands without break. The present is a decisive threshold for finite existence. It is the threshold where past and future meet and can give birth to a livable horizon of meaning. Dilating the present and giving it a meaningful chance to be is a task for philosophy. It is the attempt of giving time to time and also giving it shape, place, and space. To succeed at this task while rediscovering the sources of a narrative way of thinking that in truth it has never abandoned, philosophy must go back and turn time into the primary object of discourse, like in stories, which are precisely the attempt at disposing the temporal flow of events according to a meaning. Perone argues that in time, however, what passes is not simply decline, but rather something irreducible, an exteriority that must be said. (shrink)
What is Levinas's relation to Hegel, the thinker who seems to summarize everything which Levinas's philosophy opposes, yet with whom Levinas never enters a sustained philosophical engagement? An answer can be found through an analysis of the concept of work, understood both as activity of labor and product thereof. The concept of work reveals that, despite the apparent (but superficial) sense of opposition, Levinas's philosophy works in a deliberately noncommittal, or, to use a Levinasian expression, ``dis-interested'' mode with respect to (...) Hegel. Such mode of disinterstedness expresses an ethical gesture of joyful hospitality that neither confirms nor refutes the German philosopher but rather opens him up to an eschatological dimension. (shrink)
Moving from Heidegger’s suggestion that philosophy has fallen into the Thaletian well because of its inadequate theorization of the essence of things, I retrace in Heidegger’s description of things as gathering elements that enable a discourse on things in terms of their alterity,· I explore the richness of such an alterity in its differing from Levinas’s otherness of the other person; I suggest the formulation of an ethics of things which, through a reciprocal exposure of Heidegger and Levinas, might rescue (...) philosophy from its fall into the Thaletian well.Suite à la thèse de Heidegger selon laquelle la philosophie, depuis qu’elle théorise I’essence des choses, aurait chuté dans le puits de Thalès, j’identifie, à partir de la description heideggérienne de la chose comme rassemblement, les elements qui rendent possible un discours sur les choses en tant qu’altérité. J’explore la richesse d’une telle altérité en ce qu’elle diffire de I’altérité lévinassienne de I’autre personne. Je propose la formulation d’une ethique des choses qui, par I’éclaircissement réciproque de Heidegger et de Lévinas, pourrait prévenir la chute de la philosophie dans le puits de Thalès. (shrink)
