7 found
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  1. Frowe's Machine Cases.Simkulet William - 2015 - Filosofiska Notiser 2 (2): 93-104.
    Helen Frowe (2006/2010) contends that there is a substantial moral difference between killing and letting die, arguing that in Michael Tooley's infamous machine case it is morally wrong to flip a coin to determine who lives or dies. Here I argue that Frowe fails to show that killing and letting die are morally inequivalent. However, I believe that she has succeeded in showing that it is wrong to press the button in Tooley's case, where pressing the button will change who (...)
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  2.  13
    On Moral Enhancement.Simkulet William - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4):17-18..
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  3. The Compensation Principle.Simkulet William - 2015 - Filosofiska Notiser 2 (1):47-60.
    In "Should Race Matter?," David Boonin proposes the compensation principle: When an agent wrongfully harms another person, she incurs a moral obligation to compensate that person for the harms she has caused. Boonin then argues that the United States government has wrongfully harmed black Americans by adopting pro-slavery laws and other discriminatory laws and practices following the end of slavery, and therefore the United States government has an obligation to pay reparations for slavery and discriminatory laws and practices to those (...)
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  4.  7
    In Control.Simkulet William - 2014 - Philosophical Inquires 2 (1):59-75.
    In George Sher’s recent article “Out of Control”, he discusses a series of 9 cases that he believes illustrates that some agents are uncontroversially morally responsible for actions they “cannot help” but perform (2006: 285). He argues these agents exert partial control over these actions insofar as their actions are determined from their character; but this is no control at all. Here I argue that in each of these cases the agent exerts morally relevant control over her actions and that (...)
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  5. On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why Contemporary Frankfurt-Style Cases Are Irrelevant to the Free Will Debate.Simkulet William - 2015 - Filosofiska Notiser 2 (3):107-120.
    This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are irrelevant to the debate over free will. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility requires indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. Frankfurt's original case purported to demonstrate PAP false by showing an agent can be blameworthy despite not having the ability to choose otherwise; however he admits the agent can come to that choice freely or by force, and thus has alternate possibilities. Neo-FSCs attempt to show (...)
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  6.  16
    On Psychopaths and Moral Enhancement.Simkulet William - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (3):156-158.
  7.  13
    On Free Will and Evolution.Simkulet William - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 6 (2):12-13.