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Simon Bostock
University of Sheffield (PhD)
  1.  72
    In Defence of Pan-Dispositionalism.Simon Bostock - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):139-157.
    Pan-Dispositionalism – the view that all properties (and relations) are irreducibly dispositional – currently appears to have no takers amongst major analytic metaphysicians. There are those, such as Mumford, who are open to the idea but remain uncommitted. And there are those, such as Ellis and Molnar, who accept that some properties are irreducibly dispositional but argue that not all are. In this paper, I defend Pan-Dispositionalism against this ‘Moderate’ Dispositionalism.
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  2. John W. Carroll , Readings on Laws of Nature. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press , 296 Pp., $26.95.Simon Bostock - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (3):409-412.
  3. Are All Possible Laws Actual Laws?Simon Bostock - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):517 – 533.
    Suppose it is a law that all Fs are G. Does the law hold in all possible worlds? According to Necessitarianism, it holds in at least all those worlds containing F-ness. I argue that the Necessitarian must also take the law to hold in all those possible worlds which do not contain F-ness. Accepting the principle that a law can only hold in a world if it has some ontological grounding in that world, I argue that Necessitarianism is committed to (...)
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  4.  3
    Review of Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate[REVIEW]Simon Bostock - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (317):542-547.
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  5. The Necessity of Natural Laws.Simon Bostock - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    I argue that the best explanation of law-like regularity is that properties are universals and that universals are irreducibly dispositional entities.
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  6.  60
    Stephen Mumford Laws In Nature London, Routledge, 2004 Hardback £60.00 ISBN 0-415-31128-4. [REVIEW]Simon Bostock - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):449-452.
  7.  18
    Review of D. M. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers. [REVIEW]Simon Bostock - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):369-370.
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  8.  80
    Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties (by Alexander Bird). [REVIEW]Simon Bostock - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (1):152-157.
  9.  6
    Metaphysics.Simon Bostock - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):245-248.
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  10. Internal Properties And Property Realism.Simon Bostock - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):73-83.
     
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  11.  24
    The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science - by E.J. Lowe.Simon Bostock - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (3):274-277.
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  12.  3
    From an Ontological Point of View. [REVIEW]Simon Bostock - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (3):491-494.
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  13.  9
    From an Ontological Point of View by John Heil Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2003. Pp. XV+267. £30.Simon Bostock - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (3):491-494.
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  14.  10
    Metaphysics.Simon Bostock - 1994
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  15. Nomic Inversion And The Contingency Of Laws.Simon Bostock - 2005 - Philosophical Writings 30 (3).
    According to the Contingency Theory of Laws, if there are possible worlds in which it is a law that all Fs are G, there are also possible F-containing worlds in which it is not. I argue here that the theory is forced to accept the possibility of nomic inversion: i.e. pairs of properties that have their actual nomic roles swapped in some possible world. Such inversions cannot be ruled out on grounds of logical or metaphysical inconsistency, and therefore – since (...)
     
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  16. Reviews: Reviews. [REVIEW]Simon Bostock - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (1):152-157.
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