In this paper I deal with a puzzling passage, which occurs in Metaphysics Z 13.1038b2 – 3 and where Aristotle mentions four possible meanings of substance: the substratum, the essence, the compound of these (τὸ ἐκ τούτων) and the universal. This list accords only partially with the previous one in Z 3.1028b33–36, where Aristotle mentions the substratum, the essence, the universal and the genus. Thus, Z 13’s list omits Z 3’s genus, but includes τὸ ἐκ τούτων, which is standardly used (...) by Aristotle to refer to the compound of matter and form. This is puzzling, for at least two reasons: (1) it is not clear what has happened to Z 3’s genus; (2) it is not clear what exactly is the reference of τὸ ἐκ τούτων, for the context suggests, at first glance awkwardly, that the compound in question is that of substratum and essence, and not of matter and form. These problems have led some scholars to delete τὸ ἐκ τούτων from the list. In this paper I provide two sets of arguments in order to resist the deletion. In the first set I show how, at least in principle, it would not be inaccurate to define the compound of matter and form as a “compound of substratum and essence”. In the second set, I show how, in fact, through the reference to the compound of substratum and essence, Aristotle does not want to designate, in Z 13, the hylomorphic composite. Rather, he aims to designate the notion of form regarded as universal, namely as ‘species’, which seems to reveal a peculiar sort of composition between a substratum (its genus) and an essence (its specific difference). (shrink)

ABSTRACTEmpathy represents a fundamental ability that allows for the creation and cultivation of social bonds. As part of the empathic process, individuals use their own emotional state to interpret the content and intensity of other people’s emotions. Therefore, the current study was designed to test two hypotheses: empathy for the pain of another will result in biased emotional intensity judgment; and changing one’s emotion via emotion regulation will modulate these biased judgments. To test these hypotheses, in experiment one we used (...) a modified version of a well-known task that triggers an empathic reaction We found that empathy resulted in biased emotional intensity judgment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a bias in the recognition of emotional facial expressions as a function of empathy for pain. In experiment two, we replicated these findings in an independent sample, and further found that this biased emotional intensity judgment can be moderated via reappr... (shrink)

Consolidation of long-term memory is a highly and precisely regulated multistep process. The transcription regulator cAMP response element-binding protein (CREB) plays a key role in initiating memory consolidation. With time processing, first the cofactors are changed and, secondly, CREB gets dispensable. This ultimately changes the expressed gene program to genes required to maintain the memory. Regulation of memory consolidation also requires epigenetic mechanisms and control at the RNA level. At the neuronal circuit level, oscillation in the activity of CREB and (...) downstream factor define engram cells. Together the combination of all regulation mechanisms allows correct memory processing while keeping the process dynamic and flexible to adjust to different contexts. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/BhSCSmorpEc. (shrink)

The evolutionary origin of synapses and neurons is an enigmatic subject that inspires much debate. Non-bilaterian metazoans, both with and without neurons and their closest relatives already contain many components of the molecular toolkits for synapse functions. The origin of these components and their assembly into ancient synaptic signaling machineries are particularly important in light of recent findings on the phylogeny of non-bilaterian metazoans. The evolution of synapses and neurons are often discussed only from a metazoan perspective leaving a considerable (...) gap in our understanding. By taking an integrative approach we highlight the need to consider different, but extremely relevant phyla and to include the closest unicellular relatives of metazoans, the ichthyosporeans, filastereans and choanoflagellates, to fully understand the evolutionary origin of synapses and neurons. This approach allows for a detailed understanding of when and how the first pre- and postsynaptic signaling machineries evolved. The evolutionary origin of synapses and neurons is an enigmatic subject that inspires much debate. Most of our knowledge and recent discussions are biased towards a metazoan perspective, leaving a considerable gap in our understanding. Recent work has now revealed important insights into the emergence and co-regulation of complex synaptic signaling machineries from studies in the closest unicellular relatives of metazoans. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 10, October 2022.

Although we frequently acquire knowledge and skills through social interactions, the focus of most research on learning is on individual learning. Here we characterize Interaction Based Learning, which represents the acquisition of knowledge or skill through social interactions, and compare it to Observational Learning —learning by observation. To that end, we designed a movement synchronization paradigm whereby participants learned Tai-Chi inspired movement sequences from trained teachers in two separated sessions. We used a motion capture system to track the movement of (...) 40 dyads comprised of a teacher and learner, who were randomly divided into OL or IBL groups, and calculated time-varying synchrony of three-dimensional movement velocity. While in the IBL group both the learner and the teacher could see each other through a transparent glass, in the OL group dyads interacted through a one-way mirror, such that the learners observed the teacher, but the teacher could not see the learners. Results show that although the number of movements recalled was not different between groups, we found improved movement smoothness in the IBL compared to the OL group, indicating movement acquisition was better in the IBL group. In addition, we found that motor synchronization levels in dyads improved over time, indicating that movement synchronization can be learned and retained. In the first session, the IBL group, but not the OL group, showed a significant improvement in synchronization. This suggests that dyadic interaction is important for learning movement sequences, and that bidirectional communication of signals and mutual feedback are essential for the consolidation of motor learning. (shrink)

Despite the challenges associated with virtually mediated communication, remote collaboration is a defining characteristic of online multiplayer gaming communities. Inspired by the teamwork exhibited by players in first-person shooter games, this study investigated the verbal and behavioral coordination of four-player teams playing a cooperative online video game. The game, Desert Herding, involved teams consisting of three ground players and one drone operator tasked to locate, corral, and contain evasive robot agents scattered across a large desert environment. Ground players could move (...) throughout the environment, while the drone operator’s role was akin to that of a “spectator” with a bird’s-eye view, with access to veridical information of the locations of teammates and the to-be-corralled agents. Categorical recurrence quantification analysis was used to measure the communication dynamics of teams as they completed the task. Demands on coordination were manipulated by varying the ground players’ ability to observe the environment with the use of game “fog.” Results show that catRQA was sensitive to changes to task visibility, with reductions in task visibility reorganizing how participants conversed during the game to maintain team situation awareness. The results are discussed in the context of future work that can address how team coordination can be augmented with the inclusion of artificial agents, as synthetic teammates. (shrink)

The purpose of socially responsible investing (SRI) is to: (1) allow investors to reflect their personal values and ethics in their choices, and (2) encourage companies to improve their ethical, social, and environmental performance. In order to achieve these ends, the means SRI fund managers employ include the use of negative screening, or the exclusion of companies involved in "sinful" industries. We argue that there are problems with this methodology, both at a theoretical and at a practical level. As a (...) consequence, current SRI offerings cannot accurately reflect the values and ethical beliefs they propose to represent. Moreover, the use of a priori criteria is potentially misleading, as we show by discussing examples of glue and wine making. Applying this flawed approach SRI funds fail to influence the direction of the firms they deem most in need of redirecting. Rather than engaging in the simple a priori assumption that some industries are "saints" while others are "sinners" (Freeman, 2007) we suggest a new framework upon which the SRI screening methodology could be grounded. Embracing the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism, we suggest that SRI methodology could be improved by engaging in an analysis based on (1) the actual impacts of the company's products and services, (2) the company's relationships with its specific, real stakeholders, and (3) the contingent environment (social, economic, political, legal, and cultural) in which the business operates. (shrink)

The article discusses major biographical milestones and provides a general evolution of philosophical views of the Russian philosopher Simon L. Frank. At the initial stage of the creative way, Frank is an economist and critical Marxist. Appeal to philosophy in the 1900s characterized by the influence of neo-Kantianism, the immanent philosophy and philosophy of life. Around 1908-12 Frank’s transition to the position of metaphysics begins to take shape his own philosophical system, absolute realism. One of the main features of (...) the work of Frank is consistency. Throughout his creative career, the philosopher developed the deepened and detailed original philosophical intuition - the intuition of the supra-rational unity of being - which was already fixed in his early philosophical works. Absolute being is a concrete metalogical reality, revealed in the living knowledge Simultaneously, the potentiality and transfiniteness of absolute being acts as the basis of individuality and creativity of man, the source of his freedom. The philosophical method of Frank, rational comprehension of rationally incomprehensible, based on the principle of antinomic monodualism. Philosophy of religion unfolds as a phenomenological analysis of religious experience. In the social political field Frank justifies the position of liberal conservatism and Christian realism. (shrink)

What constitutes a just war? How does race matter in America? Are the interests of corporations the same as those of the public when it comes to the environment or public health? Middle and high school history, literature, and science classes abound with important moral, social, and political questions. But under pressure to cover required materials and out of fear of raising controversy, teachers often avoid classroom discussions of questions of profound importance to students and to society. This book investigates (...) how schools can responsibly take an active role in moral education while honoring their academic mission. Using extensive observations in public, Catholic, and Jewish high schools, Katherine Simon analyzes the ways in which teachers avoid or address moral questions raised by students and implicit in course materials. She examines how morally charged issues may be taught responsibly in a diverse democracy. And in an afterword that teachers and teacher educators will find particularly useful, Simon provides practical tools and strategies for structuring discussion and designing units to help teachers explore moral issues more deeply with their middle and high school students. (shrink)

James Bryson’s The Christian Platonism of Thomas Jackson offers the first comprehensive study of the Oxford Platonist Thomas Jackson. While Jackson is by no means unknown to early modern historians...

What constitutes a just war? How does race matter in America? Are the interests of corporations the same as those of the public when it comes to the environment or public health? Middle and high school history, literature, and science classes abound with important moral, social, and political questions. But under pressure to cover required materials and out of fear of raising controversy, teachers often avoid classroom discussions of questions of profound importance to students and to society. This book investigates (...) how schools can responsibly take an active role in moral education while honoring their academic mission. Using extensive observations in public, Catholic, and Jewish high schools, Katherine Simon analyzes the ways in which teachers avoid or address moral questions raised by students and implicit in course materials. She examines how morally charged issues may be taught responsibly in a diverse democracy. And in an afterword that teachers and teacher educators will find particularly useful, Simon provides practical tools and strategies for structuring discussion and designing units to help teachers explore moral issues more deeply with their middle and high school students. (shrink)

The authors focus on four major thematic areas – the reform of church, the reform of theology, the reform of perspective, and the reform of method – which together encompasses the breadth and depth of Cusanus’ own reform initiatives.

In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...) not only allow for a deeper understanding of different self-conceptions, but also for a formulation of new hypotheses regarding the cultural influence on self-representations. As one example, we will highlight the role of the proposed levels of self-representation for emotional experience and formulate some major implications of our interdisciplinary framework for future empirical research. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the phenomenology of self-awareness in an attempt to get clear on the nature of our 'basic sense of self'. I argue that our self-understanding is typically muddled by a prevalent but false metaphysical view that I refer to as 'the quasi-Cartesian view'. I begin with a diagnosis of this quasi-Cartesian view of the self and self-awareness, and argue that there are two main reasons for one might hold this view: on the one hand, we may have our (...) phenomenology colored by false metaphysical preconceptions; on the other, we may end up holding this view as a result of commitments held in the philosophy of mind. I try to cure us of this view by showing that it is neither defensible when presented with counter-arguments, nor fits the phenomenological data of our own experience. I next develop a positive account of what our basic sense of self is like when we have shed the distorting quasi-Cartesian preconceptions. I argue that in basic experience, we experience ourselves as bodily agents; moreover, I develop a transcendental argument to the effect that we must be embodied agents in order for us to have the kinds of experience that we do have. I next turn to an examination of the Heideggerian claim that we are self-interpreting animals in part constituted by our own self-interpretations in an attempt to determine the truth as well as the scope of this claim. My conclusion is that we can truthfully be said to be partly constituted by our own self-interpretations, but that we have but a limited authority as to the 'rightness' of an interpretation. Thus there are strict limits to our ability to be self-constituting. (shrink)