26 found
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  1. How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will.Simon Kittle - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (10):1289-1307.
    This essay is an investigation into the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will, where free will is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I argue that van Inwagen's recent functional specification of the relevant sense of ‘able’ is flawed, and that explicating the powers involved in free will shall likely require paying detailed attention to the semantics and pragmatics of ‘can’ and ‘able’. Further, I argue that van Inwagen's promise-level ability requirement on free will is too strong. (...)
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  2.  63
    God and Human Freedom.Leigh C. Vicens & Simon Kittle - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
    This Element considers the relationship between the traditional view of God as all-powerful, all-knowing and wholly good on the one hand, and the idea of human free will on the other. It focuses on the potential threats to human free will arising from two divine attributes: God's exhaustive foreknowledge and God's providential control of creation.
  3. Abilities to do otherwise.Simon Kittle - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3017-3035.
    In this paper I argue that there are different ways that an agent may be able to do otherwise and that therefore, when free will is understood as requiring that an agent be able to do otherwise, we face the following question: which way of being able to do otherwise is most relevant to free will? I answer this question by first discussing the nature of intrinsic dispositions and abilities, arguing that for each action type there is a spectrum of (...)
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  4. Powers opposed and intrinsic finks.Simon Kittle - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):372-380.
    Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic finks and when not.
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  5. When is an alternative possibility robust?Simon Kittle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):199-210.
    According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based (...)
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  6. Does Everyone Think the Ability to do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Simon Kittle - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1177-1183.
    Christopher Franklin argues that, despite appearances, everyone thinks that the ability to do otherwise is required for free will and moral responsibility. Moreover, he says that the way to decide which ability to do otherwise is required will involve settling the nature of moral responsibility. In this paper I highlight one point on which those usually called leeway theorists - i.e. those who accept the need for alternatives - agree, in contradistinction to those who deny that the ability to do (...)
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  7. Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control.Simon Kittle - 2015 - Journal of Analytic Theology 3:89-108.
    Stump and Timpe have recently proposed Thomistic based solutions to the traditional problem in Christian theology of how to relate grace and free will. By taking a closer look at the notion of control, I subject Timpe’s account – itself an extension of Stump’s account – to extended critique. I argue that the centrepiece of Timpe’s solution, his reliance on Dowe’s notion of quasi-causation, is misguided and irrelevant to the problem. As a result, Timpe’s account fails to avoid Semi-Pelagianism. I (...)
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  8. Possibilites for divine freedom.Simon Kittle - 2016 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 64 (4):93-123.
    I examine three accounts of divine freedom. I argue that two recent accounts which attempt to explain God’s freedom without appealing to alternative possibilities fail. I then show how a view of divine freedom based on Robert Adams’s idea that God’s grace means he has no obligation to create the best world is able to explain how God can be free while also being perfectly good and perfectly rational.
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  9. Robustness and up-to-us-ness.Simon Kittle - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (44):35-57.
    Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various alternatives that remain in the cases presented, while Frankfurtians have objected that such alternatives are typically not capable of grounding responsibility. In this essay I address the recent suggestion by Seth Shabo that only alternatives associated with the ‘up to us’ locution ground moral responsibility. I distinguish a number of kinds of ability, suggest (...)
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  10.  39
    The Conditional Analysis of the Agentive Modals: a Reply to Mandelkern et al.Simon Kittle - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2117-2138.
    A proper understanding of agentive modals promises to clarify issues to do with free will, know how, and other philosophically interesting topics. In this paper I identify one constraint on, and one structural feature of, trying-based versions of the conditional analysis of the agentive modals. I suggest that the constraint and structural feature together provide a novel account of why the famous Lehrer-Chisholm objection to conditional analyses of ability modals is so powerful. I argue that Mandelkern et al.’s ‘Agentive Modals’ (...)
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  11. Vihvelin and Fischer on ‘Pre-decisional’ Intervention.Simon Kittle - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):987-997.
    Vihvelin argues that Frankfurt-style cases should be divided into two kinds, according to when the trigger for the intention takes place: either prior to the agent's choice or after it. Most agree that only the former, which I call pre-decisional intervention, stands a chance of removing all of an agent's alternatives. Vihvelin notes that both sides in the dispute over whether there is a successful case of pre-decisional intervention assume that if there is a successful case, then it will be (...)
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  12. Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom.Simon Kittle - 2018 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (2):97-115.
    In this essay I identify four different problems of heavenly freedom; i.e., problems that arise for those who hold that the redeemed in heaven have free will. They are: the problem arising from God's own freedom, the problem of needing to praise the redeemed for not sinning in heaven, the problem of needing to affirm that the redeemed freely refrain from sinning, and the problem arising from a commitment to the free will defence. I explore how some of these problems (...)
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  13.  18
    Moral responsibility and general ability.Simon Kittle - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    It is widely believed that an agent can be morally responsible for something only if they were able to do otherwise. But what kind of ability to do otherwise is needed? Despite the obvious disagreements, incompatibilist and compatibilist leeway theorists tend to agree that, at the very least, an agent needs the ‘general’ ability to do otherwise. Cyr and Swenson [Cyr, T. W., and P. Swenson. 2019. “Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.” The Philosophical Quarterly 69/274: 22–40. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy034.] offer a series (...)
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  14. God is (probably) a cause among causes.Simon Kittle - 2022 - Theology and Science 20 (2):247-262.
    Several recent authors have suggested that much of the discussion on divine action is flawed since it presupposes that divine and human agency compete. Such authors advocate a reappropriation of the Scholastic distinction between primary and secondary causation which, it is suggested, solves many problems in the theology of divine action. This article (i) critiques defences of the primary/secondary cause distinction based on appeals to analogical predication, and (ii) argues that, even assuming an adequate account of the primary/secondary cause distinction, (...)
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  15. Grace and Free Will: On Quiescence and Avoiding Semi-Pelagianism.Simon Kittle - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4):70-95.
    Several recent incompatibilist accounts of divine grace and human free will have appealed to the notion of quiescence in an attempt to avoid semi-Pelagianism while retaining the fallen person’s control over coming to faith and thus the agent’s responsibility for failing to come to faith. In this essay I identify three distinct roles that quiescence has been employed to play in the recent literature. I outline how an account of divine grace and human free will may employ quiescence to play (...)
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  16. On General and Non‐General Abilities.Simon Kittle - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):124-144.
    I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn't entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in virtue of pertaining to a wide range of circumstances. I argue that these two types of generality – I refer to them with the terms ‘general’ and ‘generic’, respectively – produce two orthogonal distinctions among abilities. I show that the two types of generality are sometimes run together (...)
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  17. Against Synchronic Free Will.Simon Kittle - 2021 - In Simon Kittle & Georg Gasser (eds.), The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives. Routledge. pp. 176-194.
    In this chapter I argue that the necessity of the present counts against theories of synchronic free will, according to which a person may have free will at a time t0 even once that person has decided at t0 to do something. I defend the theory of diachronic free will against recent critiques drawn from the work of Michael Rota and Katherin Rogers. And I chart some of the implications for the philosophy of religion.
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  18.  29
    Mindfulness and Agential Control.Simon Kittle - 2023 - Journal of Humanistic Psychology.
    Mindfulness meditation seems to generate the following puzzle: On one hand, mindfulness reveals to the meditator that many of their thoughts are outside of their control and leads to a diminished sense of self; on the other, regular mindfulness practice is supposed to lead to greater self-awareness and self-control. In this article, the author develops an agent-causal account of agential control that explains both claims. It is suggested that the work of phenomenologist Hans Reiner shows us why the feeling of (...)
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  19. Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices.Simon Kittle - 2020 - Religious Studies 56 (4):455-472.
    Sennett (1999) and Pawl & Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this essay I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl & Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show why Matheson is mistaken to (...)
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  20. Free will and the ability to do otherwise.Simon Kittle - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis is an investigation into the nature of those abilities that are relevant to free will when the latter is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I assume from the outset the traditional and intuitive picture that being able to do otherwise bestows a significant kind of control on an agent and I ask what kinds of ability are implicated in such control. In chapter 1 I assess the simple conditional analysis of the sense of ‘can’ relevant (...)
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  21. An Introduction to Thinking about Personal and A-Personal Aspects of the Divine.Simon Kittle & Georg Gasser - 2021 - In Simon Kittle & Georg Gasser (eds.), The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives. Routledge. pp. 1-20.
  22.  49
    The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives.Simon Kittle & Georg Gasser (eds.) - 2021 - Routledge.
    This book is the first systematic treatment of the strengths and limitations of personal and a-personal conceptions of the divine. It features contributions from Jewish, Islamic, Chinese, Indian and naturalistic backgrounds in addition to those working within a decidedly Christian framework. This book discusses whether the concept of God in classical theism is coherent at all and whether the traditional understanding of some of the divine attributes need to be modified. The contributors explore what the proposed spiritual and practical merits (...)
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  23. The Incompatibility of Universal, Determinate Divine Action with Human Free Will.Simon Kittle - 2022 - In Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 100-118.
    Is it consistent to maintain that human free will is incompatible with determinism in the natural world while also maintaining that it is compatible with divine universal causation? On the face of it, divine universal causation looks like a form of determinism. And the intuitions which lead to incompatibilism about free will and natural determinism also lead to incompatibilism about free will and divine determinism. Several thinkers have attempted to resist this conclusion. This essay critiques that view, with a special (...)
     
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  24.  52
    Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, by John Martin Fischer. [REVIEW]Simon Kittle - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):235-239.
  25.  37
    Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis. [REVIEW]Simon Kittle - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):368-374.
  26.  31
    W. Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account. [REVIEW]Simon Kittle - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):374-379.
    I review W. Matthews Grant's book Free Will and God's Universal Causality. While I note that Grant's book is a systematic and wide-ranging defence of a strong doctrine of divine concurrence, I suggest that in the end the core of Grant's view fails to overcome the metaphysical objection to divine concurrence, roughly, that there cannot be two causes both of which (but not together) cause the entirety of an event.
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