Discussions of habit in Hegel’s thought usually focus on his subjective spirit since this is where the most extended discussion of this issue takes place. This paper argues that habit is also important for understanding Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The discussion of habit and second nature occur at a critical juncture in the text. This discussion is important for understanding his notion of ethical life and his account of freedom.

Hegel’s philosophy of history is fundamentally concerned with how shapes of life collapse and transition into new shapes of life. One of the distinguishing features of Hegel’s concern with how a shape of life falls apart and becomes inadequate is the role that habit plays in the transition. A shape of life is an embodied form of existence for Hegel. The animating concepts of a shape of life are affectively inscribed on subjects through complex cultural processes. This paper examines the (...) argument Hegel puts forward in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for why civilizations come to atrophy and examines the decisive role habit plays in this process. The paper concludes with a discussion of the way in which the central role of second nature in historical transitions and norm formation conflicts with Brandom’s account of norm formation in Hegel’s thought. (shrink)

This paper examines the theory of sustainable development presented by Jeffrey Sachs in The Age of Sustainable Development. While Sustainable Development ostensibly seeks to harmonise the conflict between ecological sustainability and human development, the paper argues this is impossible because of the conceptual frame it employs. Rather than allowing for a re-conceptualisation of the human-nature relation, Sustainable Development is simply the latest and possibly last attempt to advance the core idea of western modernity — the notion of self-determination. Drawing upon (...) Hegel's account of historical development it is argued that Sustainable Development and the notion of planetary boundaries cannot break out of a dualism of nature and self-determining agents. (shrink)

In Totality and Infinity Levinas presents the 'face to face' as an account of intersubjectivity, but one which maintains the absolute difference of the Other. This essay explores the genesis of the 'face to face' through a discussion of Levinas in relation to Buber. It is argued that Levinas' account of subjectivity shares much in common with Fichte's theory of subjectivity. It is further argued that while the 'face to face' clarifies and opposes traditional problems in social ontology, the 'face (...) to face' is unable to avoid the traditional problems of social ontology that it seeks to avoid. (shrink)

This paper examines the theory of sustainable development presented by Jeffrey Sachs in The Age of Sustainable Development. While Sustainable Development ostensibly seeks to harmonise the conflict between ecological sustainability and human development, the paper argues this is impossible because of the conceptual frame it employs. Rather than allowing for a re-conceptualisation of the human–nature relation, Sustainable Development is simply the latest and possibly last attempt to advance the core idea of western modernity — the notion of self-determination. Drawing upon (...) Hegel’s account of historical development it is argued that Sustainable Development and the notion of planetary boundaries cannot break out of a dualism of nature and self-determining agents. (shrink)

This paper draws on the account of second nature in Aristotle, Dewey and Hegel to examine the way in which norms become embodied. It discusses the implications of this for both the authority of norms and how they can be changed. Using the example of veganism it argues that changing norms requires more than just good reasons. The appreciation of the role of second nature in culture allows us to: firstly, better conceive the difficulty and resistance of individuals to changing (...) norms because of the material resilience of norms, habits and customs in a culture. Secondly, it argues that the effective adoption of a new norm such as veganism or the behavioral change necessary to respond to climate change, requires not just more good reasons but the creation of material pathways in the culture in which those revised norms can be inhabited. (shrink)

In thePhilosophy of RightHegel argues that modern life has produced an individualized freedom that conflicts with the communal forms of life constitutive of Greek ethical life. This individualized freedom is fundamentally unsatisfactory, but it is in modernity seemingly resolved into a more adequate form of social freedom in the family, aspects of civil society, and ultimately the state. This article examines whether Hegel’s state can function as a community and by so doing satisfy the need for a substantial ethical life (...) that runs through Hegel’s social thought. The article also examines why Hegel does not provide a detailed analysis of community, as a distinct sphere between the private and the public political sphere in thePhilosophy of Right, and why it is not a key platform of his social freedom. (shrink)

Poststructuralists hold Hegel responsible for giving rise to many of modern philosophy's problematic concepts--the authority of reason, self-consciousness, the knowing subject. Yet, according to Simon Lumsden, this animosity is rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of Hegel's thought, and resolving this tension can not only heal the rift between poststructuralism and German idealism but also point these traditions in exciting new directions. Revisiting the philosopher's key texts, Lumsden calls attention to Hegel's reformulation of liberal and Cartesian conceptions of subjectivity, identifying a (...) critical though unrecognized continuity between poststructuralism and German idealism. Poststructuralism forged its identity in opposition to idealist subjectivity; however, Lumsden argues this model is not found in Hegel's texts but in an uncritical acceptance of Heidegger's characterization of Hegel and Fichte as "metaphysicians of subjectivity." Recasting Hegel as both post-Kantian and postmetaphysical, Lumsden sheds new light on this complex philosopher while revealing the surprising affinities between two supposedly antithetical modes of thought. (shrink)

This article examines Derrida's critique of Hegel. It argues that there are two key issues that Derrida misunderstands in Hegel's thought: first, Hegel's response to the concept-intuition dichotomy that plagued Kant's critical thought; second, that Hegel's notions of reason and the dialectic, when they are conceived non-metaphysically, are not tools employed to subsume differences but are, like Derrida's différance , fundamentally concerned with thought's instability. The article shows the way in which Derrida develops the notion of singularity by an examination (...) of the discussion of responsibility in his later writings. It is argued that the way that Hegel and Derrida consider the notion of singularity is a much better marker for distinguishing these two thinkers than Derrida's own interpretation of Hegel. Key Words: Jacques Derrida • dialectic • differance • G. W. F. Hegel • normativity • reason • responsibility • singularity. (shrink)

The paper argues against those who interpret Hegel's project as concerned above all with reconciliation. These interpreters usually take reconciliation to be a historical achievement produced by thought moving along a self-correcting pathway. On this view, modernity is its high point, since here Spirit is at home with itself, its freedom realized. The paper argues that in Hegel's assessment of philosophy's role, Spirit's dissatisfaction is more fundamental than reconciliation, and hence philosophy cannot be considered as striving for an ultimate reconciliation (...) and cannot be incorporated into a social theodicy. (shrink)

After briefly describing the history and significance of the nature–reason dualism for philosophy this article examines why much of the Kantian inspired examination of norms and ethics continues to appeal to this division. It is argued that much of what is claimed to be rationally legitimated norms can, at least in part, be understood as binding on actions and beliefs, not because they are rationally legitimated, but because they are habituated. Drawing on Hegel’s discussion of ethical life and habit it (...) is argued that human subjects identify most practices and norms as their own through self-feeling, not reason. It is on this basis that norms are taken not just as the basis for action but are constitutive of human identity, an identity that is spiritual, embodied and affective. While habit is central to the way Hegel reconfigures ethics and norms, as well as the distinct model of freedom that he develops in his social and political thought, it will be argued that habit has its limits as a model for human freedom, limits of which Hegel is well aware. (shrink)

Hegel had taken the Kantian categories of thought to be merely formal, without content, since, he argued, Kant abstracted the conditions of thought from the world. The Kantian categories can, as such, only be understood subjectively and so are unable to secure a content for themselves. Hegel, following Fichte, tried to provide a content for the logical categories. In order to reinstate an objective status for logic and conceptuality he tries to affirm the unity of thought and being. The idea (...) that this unity is established by reinstating a pre-Kantian metaphysics has in most of the recent Hegel literature been discredited. In the wake of this non-metaphysical Hegel there is a concern that the architectonic of concepts which is taken as the organizing principle of consciousness offers an account of experience which is too schematic. While Hegel disputes the intuition/concept distinction as it is played out in Kant and Fichte, he does nevertheless retain some residue of a notion of intuition in his theory of the Concept. This is central to understanding his notion of experience as it can't simply be equated with rule governed conceptuality. Satisfying the demands of reason for Hegel requires more than conceiving our experience solely as judgments. (shrink)

The notion of being-at-home-in-otherness is the distinctive way of thinking of freedom that Hegel develops in his social and political thought. When I am at one with myself in social and political structures they are not external powers to which I am subjected but are rather constitutive of my self-relation, that is my self-conception is mediated andexpandedthrough those objective structures. How successfully Hegel may achieve being-at-home-in-otherness with regard to these objective structures of right in thePhilosophy of Rightis arguable. What is (...) at issue in this paper is however to argue that there is a blind spot in the text with regard to nature. In Ethical Life the rational subject's passions and inclinations are brought into the subject such that she is ‘with herself’ in them; with regard to external nature no such reconciliation is achieved or even attempted. In Abstract Right external nature is effectively dominated by and subsumed into the will and it is never something in which one is with oneself. It remains outside the model of freedom that Hegel develops in thePhilosophy of Right. There is something troubling about this formulation, since it excludes nature from freedom, but also something accurate, as it reflects the unresolved attitude of moderns to the natural world. (shrink)

There is a simple story to be told about Derridarsquo;s relation to Hegel. He develops his core concepts such as diffeacute;rance and trace through an essentially negative relation to the central notions of the idealist tradition. Derrida has been particularly concerned to undermine what he takes to be the heart of the idealist projectmdash;the self-present subject. This paper examines the influence of Heidegger on the deconstructive critique of idealist subjectivity and presents Derridarsquo;s alternative to the metaphysical subject. It argues that (...) his critique of idealist subjectivity does not accord with Hegelrsquo;s presentation of subjectivity when one conceives that project as a response to problems in the view of subjectivity developed by Fichte and Kant. br /. (shrink)

The image of home has a central place in the thought of both Heidegger and Hegel. In Hegel, being at home is central to Hegel’s reformulation of Kantian freedom. The notion of home and dwelling is also a central notion in Heidegger’s thought, especially his later thought. This paper examines their respective uses of the term and argues that the different ways they conceive the problem of home or dwelling reveals their different conceptions of modernity.

Kant's account of subjectivity is ambiguous: there is an implicit critique of Descartes in Kaaat, but this is in conflict with more Cartesian aspects of his approach to subjectivity. Fichte develops the critical elements of Kant and turns them against Kant's residual Cartesianism. Fichte, in the various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is the first to be aware of the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness. In those texts he presents his alternative model for subjectivity by trying to conceive of (...) selfconsciousness such that the self-relation makes no separation between thinker and thought. While Fichte 's insight into the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness is generally accepted, his own account of the character of the immediate self-relation, which he presents as the alternative to the reflective model, was never satisfactorily resolved. The exposition of Fichte will examine his theory of subjectivity in relation to the central notion of striving; it will be argued that the notion of a striving subject tries to reconcile the dichotomy of idealism and realism. (shrink)

The notion of Bildung comes to prominence in the second half of the eighteenth century. It was originally conceived to capture the cultural conditions by which an individual becomes a moral agent. In Hegel’s thought, it develops a much more expansive role; it is at the heart of his socio-historical project. Bildung is Hegel’s theory of culture, but for Hegel, is not just the way in which individuals are cultivated, the process by which individuals internalise the norms of their society, (...) or develop their autonomy. This paper argues that Bildung is key to understanding normative change and has a critical and underappreciated role in the development of world history. It is also at the heart of Hegel’s challenge to the dualism of nature and culture. (shrink)

Dale Jamieson's recent work, Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle Against Climate Change Failed and What it Means for our Future, explores the reasons why attempts to develop a global response to anthropogenic climate change have been unsuccessful.1 One contribution to this failure is the inability of moral philosophy to redefine the actions and behaviors of individuals that are currently considered relatively unremarkable practices of western life as immoral. Arguments attempting to establish grounds for moral judgment that would (...) allow an appropriate response to climate change, ranging across the spectrum of standard modern... (shrink)

This paper examines Jean-Luc Nancy's interpretation of Hegel, focusing in particular on The Restlessness of the Negative. It is argued that Nancy's reading represents a significant break with other post-structuralist readings of Hegel by taking his thought to be non-metaphysical. The paper focuses in particular on the role Nancy gives to the negative in Hegel's thought. Ultimately Nancy's reading is limited as an interpretation of Hegel, since he gives no sustained explanation of the self-correcting function of reason.

In this paper I argue that Fichte's attempt to reconcile the dualism of concept and intuition requires the overcoming of any idea of a thing-in-itself. At the same time he preserves the idea of an external constraint on the I's self-positing. This central role for the realist constraint of the check conflicts with recent interpretations of Fichte that see his project as advocating the exclusivity of the space of reasons. The striving subject confronts and unifies the opposition between the realistic (...) and idealistic elements in the Wissenschaftslehre. It is argued that as striving, reason's drive for self-determination is a process of self-transformation, as consciousness confronts the limitations of its inadequate explanations of the objects of experience. (shrink)

Robert R. Williams, in Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God, offers an important examination of the notion of absolute spirit, a central but under-examined notion in Hegel’s thought. Williams argues that absolute spirit, along with Hegel’s other core notions such as the concept and the absolute idea, is best conceived as an organic whole. This approach, he claims, best captures the self-determination and dynamism of the whole. What absolute spirit seeks to describe is how spirit can both (...) produce itself and legitimate itself. I argue that the model of the organism, and any onto-theological claim for absolute spirit, misses the post-critical aspiration of this notion. (shrink)

The argument of the book develops through four chapters, all of which are heavily reliant on Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. There is little engagement with Hegel’s systematic works, the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic. Instead, Hegel’s thought of god and religion is determined almost entirely by his lectures on religion, and the argument is largely constructed through a detailed use of quotations from these lectures. The first chapter is concerned to position Hegel in relation (...) to the traditional defenses and critiques of the ontological proof of god’s existence. Calton argues that Hegel agrees with many of Kant’s criticisms of the ontological proof, though he transforms them to give his own critique of Anselm’s ontological proof, all of which is leading to his own formulation of the ontological proof, which is outlined in chapter 2. The form that this proof takes is the development of “a self-grounding concept of god”, which would demonstrate that being is necessarily entailed by the concept of god. What distinguishes Hegel’s ontological proof from earlier attempts is the development of an objective concept of god. The concept of an objective god entails being as our knowledge of the world is in fact knowledge of a “creative and self-communicating mind of which the world is an expression”. Being is a type of consciousness writ large of which we have experience and knowledge because we are participants in it. The next two chapters illustrate the nature of that participation. In the third chapter Calton argues that this ontology shows itself to have a Trinitarian structure, as only such a structure allows for knowledge of god, a knowledge which god’s self-expression requires. The fourth chapter discusses various forms of community required for such a knowledge and the developmental stages of human history required for this knowledge and ultimately for the reconciliation of humans with god. (shrink)

This paper responds to an article by Kevin Thompson (in the same volume) which argued that a systematic reading of the _Philosophy of Right requires that it be ontologically grounded. In response I argue that such an approach to the _Philosophy of Right is essentially based on a precritical metaphysics which Hegel could not support and that his "Logic" excludes as a viable interpretation of his thought.

At every point of transition in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit each shape of consciousness becomes a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction. It is just at these points, however, that the shape of consciousness in question shows itself as a 'higher' or more adequate shape of consciousness that is able to suspend or move beyond [aufheben] these seemingly irreconcilable differences. The transitions in Hegel's systematic works are complicated and often bewildering. One element is constant in all of them, however: a type of one-sided (...) abstraction which Hegel calls Verstand. It expresses itself as the unyielding manner in which the shapes of consciousness or categories of thought adhere to the certainty of their truth claims. This certainty inevitably expresses itself in antinomies; antinomies that the logic of Verstand itself is unable to reconcile; only reason can achieve this. Verstand cannot be conflated with the dialectical movement as a whole; nevertheless, Verstand has a central and important role to play in the dialectical logic of both the PhG and the Science of Logic. It is a limited way of thinking which abstracts and isolates, but it is powerful, initiating and sustaining the dialectical mechanic of conceptual development in Hegel's systematic works. (shrink)

This chapter presents the model of subjectivity that Hegel establishes in his _Phenomenology of Spirit_, which requires some examination of the key conceptual problems that he inherited from his predecessors. The development of Hegels subjectivity is set against the views expressed by Fichte and Kant. A particular concern for the Hegelian subjectivity established in the _Phenomenology_ is how Kant conceived the conditions for self-consciousness and his failure to resolve the concept/intuition distinction. In addition, the chapter examines how Hegel tries to (...) reinvent the concept of apperception, and how he attempts to avoid the mind/world dualism involved in the concept/intuition relationship. The self-understanding of the _Phenomenology_ is expressed in and through Hegels development of the notions of reason, community, spirit, law, education, empirical science, and religion. (shrink)

Kant's account of subjectivity is ambiguous: there is an implicit critique of Descartes in Kaaat, but this is in conflict with more Cartesian aspects of his approach to subjectivity. Fichte develops the critical elements of Kant and turns them against Kant's residual Cartesianism. Fichte, in the various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is the first to be aware of the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness. In those texts he presents his alternative model for subjectivity by trying to conceive of (...) selfconsciousness such that the self-relation makes no separation between thinker and thought. While Fichte's insight into the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness is generally accepted, his own account of the character of the immediate self-relation, which he presents as the alternative to the reflective model, was never satisfactorily resolved. The exposition of Fichte will examine his theory of subjectivity in relation to the central notion of striving; it will be argued that the notion of a striving subject tries to reconcile the dichotomy of idealism and realism. (shrink)

In this essay, I focus on the way Hegel reconciles consciousness and self-consciousness in absolute knowing. What I want to suggest is that in absolute knowing the conscious subject comes to understand itself in terms of these conditions, providing it with the content of a new form of consciousness. It is in conceiving of itself in terms of these objective conditions for knowledge, which supersede the singularity of the self and yet are the conditions for consciousness, that the conscious subject (...) is to be understood as self-transcending. (shrink)

There is a simple story to be told about Derridarsquo;s relation to Hegel. He develops his core concepts such as diffeacute;rance and trace through an essentially negative relation to the central notions of the idealist tradition. Derrida has been particularly concerned to undermine what he takes to be the heart of the idealist projectmdash;the self-present subject. This paper examines the influence of Heidegger on the deconstructive critique of idealist subjectivity and presents Derridarsquo;s alternative to the metaphysical subject. It argues that (...) his critique of idealist subjectivity does not accord with Hegelrsquo;s presentation of subjectivity when one conceives that project as a response to problems in the view of subjectivity developed by Fichte and Kant. br /. (shrink)