The pursuit of linguistic analysis should mean that philosophers pay attention to the facts: in particular, the philosophy of religion cannot ignore the comparative study of religion, social anthropology, etc. A main aim should be to discover a ?grammar? of religious experience, which may help to illuminate the reasons for certain patterns of religious belief, etc. Here it is necessary to resist the functionalist views of some social anthropologists, stemming from the conviction that religion is an illusion (...) and from a conflation of reasons and causes. But in so far as a functionalist approach applies, it can help to exhibit the accidental and ?non?religious? features of a given religion. (shrink)

British structural-functionalist anthropology famously faces an objection that it is incapable of dealing with the influence of wider processes. An analytical response to this objection, which at least needs to be registered, is that some wider processes can be ignored when there is causal overdetermination.

This is a one page handout presenting some objections A.R. Radcliffe-Brown makes to Frazer on rites and Frazer's evolutionism.

This article is concerned to argue that the social sciences and notably social anthropology, must necessarily be concerned with the physical environment of the societies investigated (which includes the biological nature of its members), and not only with the social reality which is at the centre of their concern. This is argued with special reference to fields such as kinship and politics, and to social relationships such as paternity or feuding. The article is concerned to (...) refute arguments put forward in support of the logical autonomy of social studies, particularly in the sphere of kinship, in earlier articles by Barnes and Needham. (shrink)

The purpose. Explore the major ideological patterns of development of a socially philosophies of education in the context of the problems of institutionalization of knowledge about human and social development. To analyse system-integration aspect of social philosophy and education management in interaction of concepts of an instrumentalism of a pragmatism and a neopragmatism with model of «new humanism» in formation of socially valuable orientations. Methodology. Classification existing in the western philosophy of education and education of directions is spent, (...) proceeding from basic principles of philosophical school or a current, first of all considering those the purpose and means which are really involved by them in process of education, social development and socially-moral education and being based on the basic installations, the purpose expressed by that or other direction, how its supporters imagine the person, its requirement, a social role, модус behaviour which the education system and education urged to form. Scientific novelty. In conditions when against crisis of an education system of the government of the USA and the leading countries of Europe are compelled to begin its long-term reform, its theorists substantially pay attention to democratic workings out of concepts of an instrumentalism of a pragmatism/neopragmatism in modern social philosophy of education, in particular on their aspiration to introduce in process of social development, education and education idea and practical model both educational, and a social equality. Considering growing requirement of a practical embodiment of ideas of freedom, justice, aspiration to realization of the human rights proclaimed a society, supporters of the concept of «new humanism» see the main objective in blocking a way to conformism, to a manipulation behaviour of the person and to create conditions for its free self-expression, for realization by the person of a fundamental choice of acts in a concrete situation and by that to warn danger of formation of the unified form of behaviour. In it principles of «new humanism» approach with a position of «new humanism» instrumentalism and neopragmatism. Conclusions. Before social philosophy of education/education it is necessary to define a problem factors which cause achievement of its main objective, to state an estimation to moral principles and personal qualities with which actually the education/education theory connects realization of the problems, to show, why these, instead of any other principles and qualities open to the person possibility to choose in a concrete situation socially powerful both morally defensible and comprehensible line of conduct in public the relation. Statement of a question on necessity of the philosophical analysis of problems of education and education in a social context serves as an indicator of understanding philosophers, teachers of an increasing role of the human and moral factor in society development. And, at last, the aspiration to develop socially-philosophical bases of pedagogics in general and education in particular, testifies that the western and domestic philosophers, teachers, representatives of social and psychological sciences, at least, the majority of them, have realized the public importance of an education system and education, its global character. (shrink)

This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect (...) of social interaction, and second, ‘what—and how—people think’, the conceptual, classifying, cognitive component of human culture. Now in reality, of course (and perhaps not so ‘of course’; people do tend to think of them as separate ‘things’), these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. But it is essential to distinguish them analytically, because each aspect gives rise to quite different kinds of problems of understanding for the social anthropologist. We shall see that the problem of how to be ‘objective’, and so to avoid ethnographic error, arises in both contexts, but in rather different forms in each. (shrink)

This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect (...) of social interaction, and second, ‘what—and how—people think’, the conceptual, classifying, cognitive component of human culture. Now in reality, of course (and perhaps not so ‘of course’; people do tend to think of them as separate ‘things’), these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. But it is essential to distinguish them analytically, because each aspect gives rise to quite different kinds of problems of understanding for the social anthropologist. We shall see that the problem of how to be ‘objective’, and so to avoid ethnographic error, arises in both contexts, but in rather different forms in each. (shrink)

A research project by the Schools of Theology and Psychology of Australia’s Charles Sturt University surveyed a large sample of Salvation Army officers. This article considers survey responses to two questions relating to end-of-life care: the use of pain medications that may shorten life, and the cessation of fluid and food intake. The results of the analyses are evaluated in terms of Michael Banner’s proposal that moral theology should more assiduously converse with ‘patient ethnographic study’, which the survey instantiates to (...) some extent. Banner’s proposal and the results of the survey are contrasted to Peter Singer’s analytical moral philosophical dictums on end-of-life care. The results are also compared to a metastudy by Andrea Rodríguez-Prat and Evert van Leeuwen of 14 ethnographic studies of those who wish to hasten death at the end of life. We conclude that respondents exemplify a form of moral reasoning that is embedded within Christian spirituality; counters the assumptions of Singer’s approach; contrasts the diminishment of ‘meaning’ at the end of life, as seen in Rodríguez-Prat and van Leeuwen; and deserves further respectful ethnographic study. (shrink)

Suspending the social matter of social anthropology (along with other surprises).

In Anerkennung der für Gegenwartsgesellschaften konstitutiven Diversität ihrer Bevölkerungen diskutieren Bioethik und Medizin verstärkt die kulturelle Relativität ihrer eigenen Voraussetzungen, die Kulturspezifik „anderer“ Positionen und die Möglichkeiten kulturübergreifender Orientierungen. Dabei kommt häufig ein Kulturbegriff zum Einsatz, der aus der Perspektive der aktuellen Sozial- und Kulturanthropologie zu statisch, zu homogenisierend und zu sehr auf Differenz und Abgrenzung hin orientiert ist. Der Beitrag diskutiert zunächst Konzepte von Kultur, die solche Verkürzungen zu vermeiden suchen. Sie betonen hingegen Verflechtungszusammenhänge unter dem Vorzeichen intensivierter Globalisierung (...) und deuten Kultur aktiv und reflexiv, als Ressource menschlichen Tuns, und nicht deterministisch als Kausalfaktor. Anschließend wird der ethnographische Forschungsstand zu Patientenverfügungen in westlichen Gesundheitssystemen zusammengefasst. Zeitintensive, qualitative Forschung verdeutlicht die Gefahr einer Kulturalisierung sozialer Ungleichheiten, die spezifische Positionalität bioethischer Prämissen und die Vielfalt und Komplexität im Umgang mit Patientenverfügungen. Der Beitrag schließt mit Hinweisen darauf, wie Diversität in Entscheidungsprozessen am Ende des Lebens jenseits von Kultur analysiert werden kann. (shrink)

In Anerkennung der für Gegenwartsgesellschaften konstitutiven Diversität ihrer Bevölkerungen diskutieren Bioethik und Medizin verstärkt die kulturelle Relativität ihrer eigenen Voraussetzungen, die Kulturspezifik „anderer“ Positionen und die Möglichkeiten kulturübergreifender Orientierungen. Dabei kommt häufig ein Kulturbegriff zum Einsatz, der aus der Perspektive der aktuellen Sozial- und Kulturanthropologie zu statisch, zu homogenisierend und zu sehr auf Differenz und Abgrenzung hin orientiert ist. Der Beitrag diskutiert zunächst Konzepte von Kultur, die solche Verkürzungen zu vermeiden suchen. Sie betonen hingegen Verflechtungszusammenhänge unter dem Vorzeichen intensivierter Globalisierung (...) und deuten Kultur aktiv und reflexiv, als Ressource menschlichen Tuns, und nicht deterministisch als Kausalfaktor. Anschließend wird der ethnographische Forschungsstand zu Patientenverfügungen in westlichen Gesundheitssystemen zusammengefasst. Zeitintensive, qualitative Forschung verdeutlicht die Gefahr einer Kulturalisierung sozialer Ungleichheiten, die spezifische Positionalität bioethischer Prämissen und die Vielfalt und Komplexität im Umgang mit Patientenverfügungen. Der Beitrag schließt mit Hinweisen darauf, wie Diversität in Entscheidungsprozessen am Ende des Lebens jenseits von Kultur analysiert werden kann. (shrink)

According to Marilyn Strathern, it is, or was, an axiom of social anthropology that societies differ in how they handle the same facts. I present a challenge which I anticipate and respond to it.

This paper challenges Marilyn Strathern’s claim that it is, or was, an axiom of social anthropology that societies differ in how they handle the same facts. I present a set of foundational commitments for conducting social anthropology which leave the truth of the proposition as an empirical question of the discipline.

Marilyn Strathern claims that it is, or was, an axiom of social anthropology that societies differ in how they handle the same facts. I present two clarifications neither of which looks suitable for axiomatic status.

Anthropologists have always been concerned with the difference between traditional and scientific modes of thought and with the relationships between magic, religion and science. John Skorupski distinguishes two broadly opposed approaches to these problems: the 'intellectualist' regards primitive systems of thought and actions as cosmologies, comparable to scientific theory, which emerge and persist as attempts to control the natural world; the 'symbolist' regards them as essentially representative or expressive of the pattern of social relations in the culture in which (...) they exist. Dr Skorupski considers in particular the notions of ritual, ceremony and symbol. He shows how their understanding involves and suggests more general philosophical problems of relativism, interpretation, translation, and the connections between belief and action. These are difficult and important problems and require an unusual combination of imagination and interdisciplinary exercise. This book is intended especially for philosophers, social anthropologists, social theorists and students of comparative religion. (shrink)

In Britain and also in France, arguments have been put forward against the claim that there are or have been paradigms in British social anthropology. But historian of anthropology Henrika Kuklicka supposes that there was a paradigm from the late 1920s to just before the 1960s. I raise an objection to her portrait of this research community and observe that her text implies two quite different replies.

This paper also gives feedback in response to the evening of presentations about the value of different disciplines to the social sciences, at the University of Manchester. I respond to Keir Martin on the value of social anthropology. Martin flagged that an anthropologist predicted the 2007-8 global financial crisis. I present a response I anticipate from economics.