I attempt in this paper to argue a thesis that is the opposite of the standard reading of Plato’s Symposium. I maintain that it is not the persuasive speech of thecomic or tragic poets that is criticized and undermined in the dialogue, but Socratic dialectic and dialogical argumentation. This is to say, it is not Aristophanes’ and Agathon’s speeches that are the object of Plato’s critique, but Socrates’ minimalist and rather unpoetic elenchos. My anaysis leads to the conclusion (...) that Diotima’s speech is meant to be recognized as Plato’s own invention in order to highlight the abstraction and utter unmusicality of Socratic dialectic. (shrink)

In the final scene of the Euthydemus, Socrates argues that because the art of speechwriting merely partakes of the two good arts philosophy and politics, it places third in the contest for wisdom. I argue that this curious speech is a reverse eikos argument, directed at the speechwriters own eikos argument for the preeminence of their art. A careful analysis of the partaking relation reveals that it is rather Socratic dialectic which occupies this intermediate position between philosophy and (...) politics. This result entails that Socrates’ peculiar art is only a part of philosophy, and its practitioner only partially wise. (shrink)

In the final scene of the Euthydemus, Socrates argues that because the art of speechwriting merely partakes of the two good arts philosophy and politics, it places third in the contest for wisdom. I argue that this curious speech is a reverse eikos argument, directed at the speechwriters own eikos argument for the preeminence of their art. A careful analysis of the partaking relation reveals that it is rather Socratic dialectic which occupies this intermediate position between philosophy and (...) politics. This result entails that Socrates’ peculiar art is only a part of philosophy, and its practitioner only partially wise. (shrink)

The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to explain nature as a whole. Plato’s conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, consequently changes into a (...) value-neutral method directed at tracing the interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages on method from the Sophist and the Statesman as well. -/- The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato’s Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers. (shrink)

플라톤 『고르기아스』편 전체를 아우르는 연구는 아직까지 부족한 상황이고, 더 나아가 본 작품 전체의 통일성을 구하는 일 역시 여전히 문제꺼리로 남아 있다. 이런 상황에서 필 자는 “소크라테스적 대화”, 곧 소크라테스가 자신의 대화 상대자들과 벌이는 첨예한 문답 의 과정을 이해할 서로 다른 세 가지 길을 제시하고 이 길들 가운데 하나를 옹호하는 것이 본 대화편 전체를 관통하는 주요 관심사 중 하나라고 주장한다. 부연하자면, 본 대화편에 대한 필자의 분석에 따를 때 “소크라테스적 대화”를 승자가 모든 유익을 독식하는 일종의 전투 과정이나 소크라테스가 일방적으로 상대방에게 시혜를 베풀기 (...) 위해 분투로서의 전투 로 이해하는 두 길이 본 작품을 통해 소개된다. 하지만 소크라테스가 대화를 통해 지향하 는 바는 대화 상대자 모두가 이 대화를 통해 유덕해지는 것이고, 대화 참여자 모두가 유익 을 누린다는 바로 이 점에서 본 대화편이 제시하는 이상적인 “소크라테스적 대화”는 일종 의 축제에 비유될 수 있다고 필자는 주장한다. (shrink)

The object of my dissertation is to demonstrate that the conceptual thrust of Nietzsche's philosophical activity is a sustained endeavor to negate the Socratic basis of Western ontology through the re-implementation of the Aeschylean tragic paideia. Nietzsche's most consequential objection against Socrates is the latter's neutralizing of Hellenic mythos with the "cold edge" of reason and the "naive optimism" of science. Accordingly, we may most properly understand Nietzsche's effort as a movement against aesthetic Socratism, since it is with its (...) "supreme law," "To be beautiful everything must be intelligible," that Socrates--from behind his "Euripidean mask"--quelled the Dionysian spirit in Attic aesthetics, ipso fact put into operation an impulse-taming didacticism, and thus made ready the social climate for the institutionalization of the Judeo-Christian moral system. ;Nor, as I urge, is this a mere intellectual position, a philosophical exercise for Nietzsche. Just as the Platonic Socrates saw the need for a new moral and aesthetic direction, so does Nietzsche regard the culturo-political reformulation of Western society as a practical goal. Two interrelated themes of his appear to speak in favor of this observation: his regard of the composer Richard Wagner as the new Aeschylus who would reanimate the Dionysian spirit within German culture, and his persistent call for the somato-intellectual overcoming of humankind as we know it. That is, Wagner's musical dramas would at once transform Western/Socratic aesthetics and prepare the socio-cultural mentality for the rise and establishment of the Ubermensch as a new and profoundly "superior" "species" of human beings. That the younger Nietzsche did indeed regard Wagner as useful toward the achievement of such an artistic and cultural inversion may be noticed from the fact that he terminated their friendship virtually immediately after the composer signalled that he was turning to a more traditional and acceptable subject--Christianity. ;Despite this loss, Nietzsche ineluctably presses on his vision of the future "masters" of the earth. Indeed, in The Will to Power he implicitly offers at least two dissimilar "blueprints" whereby that goal could be realized. Only one of these plans of action, however, could ultimately prove useful in the establishment of the Ubermensch, while the other could at best permit only isolated communities of Ubermenschen to exist for a relatively short time, before succumbing to the rabble's socio-cultural levelling tendency. Only after the rabble's lifestyle would have become intolerable even to themselves, such that they would collectively rise up to transcend their mass-identity in all its manifestations, could the emergence and future of the Ubermensch as a phenomenal being be assured. (shrink)

Incorporating Gadamer and other thinkers from the continental tradition, this essay is a close and detailed hermeneutic, phenomenological, and ontological study of the dialectic practice of Plato’s Socrates—it radicalizes and refutes the Socrates-as-teacher model that educators from scholar academic ideology embrace.

Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance—is in (...) fact a benefit. Socrates’ attitude toward his own pending death sentence, his claim that the virtues are unified around wisdom, and his opposition to vengeance or retaliation as a moral motive, all underscore how dialectical engagement is a paradigm instance of just Socratic punishment. (shrink)

Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance—is in (...) fact a benefit. Socrates’ attitude toward his own pending death sentence, his claim that the virtues are unified around wisdom, and his opposition to vengeance or retaliation as a moral motive, all underscore how dialectical engagement is a paradigm instance of just Socratic punishment. (shrink)

The paper proposes (1.) a non-standard interpretation of the proverbial expression “deuteros plous” by giving a fresh look to Phaedo, 99c9-d1. Then (2.) it proceeds to the philosophical problem raised in this passage according to this interpretation, that is, the problem of the “hypothesis” or the “unproved principle”. It indicates finally (3.) the kernel of truth contained in the standard Interpretation and it concludes with some remarks on the “weakness of the logoi”.

The aim of this paper is to understand some meaningful aspects of the Socratic use of Iliad x 224 in Plato’s Protagoras and Symposium. In these dialogues the Homeric reference appears in different contexts, but Plato’s Socrates applies it in the same way and seems to indicate it as a relevant step for the implementation of the dialectic method. Socrates is not only provoking his interlocutor, but rather making a comparison between the dialogue’s scene and the context involving (...) Diomedes and Odysseus’ in Iliad x. Ultimately, the use of this reference shows that a dialogical interplay to achieve a common purpose is a precondition for the Socratic dialectic. This previous cooperation between Homeric characters is emphasized by Plato’s Socrates and is derived from a specific soul’s manifestation. (shrink)

In the Crito, a dialogue that is highly influential for the traditions both of philosophy and of political thinking, Socrates resists the pleading of his friend Crito to escape the city that has condemned him. For Arendt, the dialogue instantiates the separation between humans as thinking beings and humans as acting beings, and so between political theory and philosophy. For others, the dialogue shows Socrates’ reasoning to be self-contradictory. Socrates’ introduction of the Athenian Laws as a world of greater moral (...) force than the empirical Athens of Crito’s appeal aims to ground principled action. Yet, there are many competing principles that, interpretively speaking, have been understood as validated by this dialogue. Is there any necessary or analytic principle that can be articulated and, if so, what are the grounds of such? Drawing on the theory and methods of Blum and McHugh’s analysis and Gadamer’s hermeneutics, this article seeks to demonstrate that practical action needs to be understood in an analytic context to grasp fully its ethical and political implications. Along the way, reference will be made to Garfinkel’s articulation of members’ methods for discovering agreements and Arendt’s articulation of the common world that the conversation among friends sustains. (shrink)