Results for 'Socratic ignorance'

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  1.  21
    Schleiermacher in the Kierkegaardian Project: Between Socratic Ignorance and Second Immediacy.Chandler D. Rogers - 2016 - Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2016 (1):141-158.
    In this paper I identify Schleiermacher as an intermediary between the two stages of the religious set forth in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Gesturing toward categories integral to the Kierkegaardian project at large, I also argue that he occupies a pivotal role between Socratic ignorance and second immediacy. These schemata uncover answers to a dilemma that has recently been articulated: whereas Kierkegaard administers highest praise to Schleiermacher at the beginning of his pseudonymous authorship, he becomes inexplicably hostile toward him (...)
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  2.  67
    Part I Theorizing Ignorance.Theorizing Ignorance - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan Nancy Tuana (ed.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. pp. 11.
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  3.  11
    Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge in the Dialogues of Plato by Sara Ahbel-Rappe.Michael Erler - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (2):339-340.
    Rappe's book argues for a "contemplative" understanding of Socrates and proposes to distinguish between an "outer Socrates," the one who strives for definitions and denies being wise, and an "inner Socrates," who exemplifies a wisdom that consists in self-investigation. The introduction, "Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge," presents Socrates as being part of the western "esoteric tradition"—as Rappe calls it—in so far as he stands for an initiation to philosophy that is in essence self-knowledge. According to Rappe, this esoteric (...)
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  4.  6
    Socratic Ignorance.Gareth B. Matthews - 2003 - Philosophic Exchange 33 (1).
    In Plato’s Apology, Socrates famously claimed to know nothing. This Socratic claim to ignorance pervades all of Plato’s early dialogues, and it raises many puzzling questions. By working through these puzzles, we can come to understand the figure of Socrates much better, and we can also gain some insight into the nature and purpose of philosophy.
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  5.  14
    Hegel’s Revival of Socratic Ignorance.James A. Dunson Iii - 2010 - Idealistic Studies 40 (3):201-214.
    G. W. F. Hegel is stuck between a rock and a hard place in the history of moral philosophy. On one hand, he is frequently regarded as an infamous critic of Kantian moral individualism. From the standpoint of Kierkegaard’s Socratic revival, Hegel is seen as ignoring or even suppressing the individual in favor of a ‘systematic’ form of philosophy. This paper addresses both criticisms by reconstructing Hegel’s unique contribution to the history of moral philosophy. Refusing to reduce Hegel to (...)
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  6.  12
    Hegel’s Revival of Socratic Ignorance.James A. Dunson Iii - 2010 - Idealistic Studies 40 (3):201-214.
    G. W. F. Hegel is stuck between a rock and a hard place in the history of moral philosophy. On one hand, he is frequently regarded as an infamous critic of Kantian moral individualism. From the standpoint of Kierkegaard’s Socratic revival, Hegel is seen as ignoring or even suppressing the individual in favor of a ‘systematic’ form of philosophy. This paper addresses both criticisms by reconstructing Hegel’s unique contribution to the history of moral philosophy. Refusing to reduce Hegel to (...)
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  7. Socratic Ignorance and Types of Knowledge.Keith McPartland - 2013 - In John Bussanich & Nicholas D. Smith (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates. Continuum.
     
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  8.  44
    Socratic Ignorance and Skepticism.Th Brickhouse & N. Smith - 1996 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 7.
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  9.  52
    The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato's Apology.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 1984 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (2):125 - 131.
  10.  48
    Socratic Ignorance and the Therapeutic Aim of the Elenchos.Hope E. May - 1997 - Apeiron 30 (4):37 - 50.
  11.  51
    Socratic Ignorance and Authenticity.Michael E. Zimmerman - 1980 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 29:133-149.
  12.  49
    Socratic Ignorance--Socratic Wisdom.Joseph Claude Evans - 1990 - Modern Schoolman 67 (2):91-109.
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  13.  38
    The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance (How to Know That You Don't Know).Scott Austin - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (2):23-34.
  14.  35
    The Virtues of Socratic Ignorance.Mary Margaret Mackenzie - 1988 - Classical Quarterly 38 (02):331-.
    Plato's Socrates denies that he knows. Yet he frequently claims that he does have certainty and knowledge. How can he avoid contradiction between his general stance about knowledge and his particular claims to have it? Socrates' disavowal of knowledge is central to his defence in the Apology. For here he rebuts the accusation that he teaches – and thus corrupts – the young by telling the jury that he cannot teach just because he knows nothing. Hence his disavowal of knowledge (...)
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  15. Socratic Ignorance. An Essay on Platonic Self-Knowledge, 1 vol.Edward G. Ballard - 1966 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):401-403.
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  16.  11
    The Virtue of Socratic Ignorance.Alan R. Drengson - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (3):237 - 242.
  17.  14
    Socratic Ignorance.Robert C. Neville - 1967 - International Philosophical Quarterly 7 (2):340-356.
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  18.  7
    Schleiermacher in the Kierkegaardian Project: Between Socratic Ignorance and Second Immediacy.Lmu Drive Los Angeles & Ca Usaemailother Articles By This Author:de Gruyter Onlinegoogle Scholar - 2016 - Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2016 (1).
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 1 Seiten: 141-158.
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  19.  26
    Socratic Ignorance.Harry Neumann - 1967 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (4).
  20.  12
    Socratic Ignorance.L. W. - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 20 (1):145-146.
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  21.  8
    Socratic Ignorance and Authenticity.Michael E. Zimmerman - 1980 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 29:133-149.
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  22.  19
    Socratic Ignorance Vindicated.John A. Barker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (1):71 - 75.
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  23. Socratic Ignorance: An Essay on Platonic Self-Knowledge.Edward G. Ballard - 1965 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 158:294-296.
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  24.  3
    The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance.Scott Austin - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (2):23-34.
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  25.  1
    The Virtues of Socratic Ignorance.Mary Margaret Mackenzie - 1988 - Classical Quarterly 38 (2):331-350.
    Plato's Socrates denies that he knows. Yet he frequently claims that he does have certainty and knowledge. How can he avoid contradiction between his general stance about knowledge and his particular claims to have it? Socrates' disavowal of knowledge is central to his defence in the Apology. For here he rebuts the accusation that he teaches – and thus corrupts – the young by telling the jury that he cannot teach just because he knows nothing. Hence his disavowal of knowledge (...)
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  26. Socratic Ignorance: An Essay on Platonic Self-Knowledge.Edward G. Ballard - 1965 - The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
     
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  27. Socratic Ignorance.Edward G. Ballard - 1967 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 23 (4):514-514.
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  28. Socratic Ignorance an Essay on Platonic Self-Knowledge.Edward G. Ballard - 1965 - M. Nijhoff.
     
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  29. Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge in the Dialogues of Plato, Written by Sara Ahbel-Rappe.Danielle A. Layne - 2019 - Polis 36 (2):412-414.
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  30. Edward G. Ballard, "Socratic Ignorance". [REVIEW]Harry Neumann - 1967 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (4):365.
  31.  16
    Involuntary Evil and the Socratic Problem of Double Ignorance in Proclus.Danielle A. Layne - 2015 - International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 9 (1):27-53.
    In hisCommentary on the AlcibiadesiProclus often discusses and links the peculiar epistemological category of “double ignorance” with evil and grievous error. To understand this more fully, the following analyzes Proclus’ concept of double ignorance, its characteristics and its causes. Markedly, due to his understanding of double ignorance, Proclus offers a response to the “Socratic” idea that no one willingly errs as this particular category of not-knowing enables him to explain how individuals, despite desiring and in some (...)
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  32.  40
    M. L. McPherran : Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue: New Essays in Socratic Studies. Pp. Xi + 155. Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1997. Paper, $24.95 . ISBN: 0-920980-71-6. [REVIEW]Maud H. Chaplin - 2000 - The Classical Review 50 (1):328-329.
  33. Technē and the Problem of Socratic Philosophy in the Gorgias.David Levy - 2005 - Apeiron 38 (4):185-228.
    In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates argues that philosophy is superior to rhetoric in part because the former is a techne while the latter is not. I argue that the Socratic practice of philosophy within this dialogue fails to qualify as a techne for exactly the same reasons that rhetoric fails to qualify as a techne. In doing so, I introduce a new kind of Socratic ignorance: methodological ignorance. I reject both Charles Kahn’s account of the relationship between (...)
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  34.  30
    New Essays in Socratic Studies: Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue, Edited by Mark L. McPherran.Naomi Reshotko - 1999 - Ancient Philosophy 19 (2):407-411.
  35. Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue New Essays in Socratic Studies.Mark L. Mcpherran & Arizona Colloquium on the Philosophy of Socrates - 1997
     
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  36.  52
    Belief, Knowledge, and Socratic Knowledge of Ignorance.Ronna Burger - 1981 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 30:1-23.
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  37. Socratic Irony, Plato's Apology, and Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony.Paul Muench - 2009 - In Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Hermann Deuser & K. Brian Söderquist (eds.), Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook. de Gruyter. pp. 71-125.
    In this paper I argue that Plato's Apology is the principal text on which Kierkegaard relies in arguing for the idea that Socrates is fundamentally an ironist. After providing an overview of the structure of this argument, I then consider Kierkegaard's more general discussion of irony, unpacking the distinction he draws between irony as a figure of speech and irony as a standpoint. I conclude by examining Kierkegaard's claim that the Apology itself is “splendidly suited for obtaining a clear concept (...)
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  38. Kierkegaard's Socratic Point of View.Paul Muench - 2007 - Kierkegaardiana 24:132-162.
  39.  5
    An Imaginative Meeting at the Entrance to the Temple of Apollo at Delphi: Self-Knowledge and Self-Love in Johann Georg Hamann and Hryhorii Skovoroda. Comparative Analysis.Roland Pietsch - 2018 - Sententiae 37 (1):47-64.
    At First, the article analyses Hamann’s path to self-knowledge and self-love as a path of Socratic ignorance, which is indeed the highest form of knowledge. For Hamann Socrates is the predecessor of Christ, and Socratic ignorance (I know that I know nothing) is the path to divinization. Subsequently, it is pointed out, how Hryhorii Skovoroda explains the path of self-knowledge and self-love. To illustrate this thought, he makes use of the Ovidian Narcissus myth. Concerning the figure (...)
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  40. Kierkegaard's Socratic Point of View.Paul Muench - 2006; rev. 2009 - In Sara Ahbel-Rappe & Rachana Kamtekar (eds.), Kierkegaardiana. Blackwell.
  41. Whatever Became of the Socratic Elenchus? Philosophical Analysis in Plato.Gareth Matthews - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):439-450.
    Readers who are introduced to philosophical analysis by reading the early Platonic dialogues may be puzzled to find that Plato, in his middle and late periods, largely abandons the style of analysis characteristic of early Plato, namely, the 'Socratic elenchus'. This paper undertakes to solve the puzzle. In contrast to what is popularly called 'the Socratic method', the elenchus requires that Socrates, the lead investigator, not have a satisfactory answer to his 'What is F-ness?' question. Here is the (...)
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  42.  21
    Wrong Turns in the Euthyphro.Paul Woodruff - 2019 - Apeiron 52 (2):117-136.
    Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.
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  43. Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato’s Early Dialogues.Hugh H. Benson - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    While the early Platonic dialogues have often been explored and appreciated for their ethical content, this is the first book devoted solely to the epistemology of Plato's early dialogues. Author Hugh H. Benson argues that the characteristic features of these dialogues- -Socrates' method of questions and answers, his fascination with definition, his professions of ignorance, and his thesis that virtue is knowledge- -are decidedly epistemological. In this thoughtful study, Benson uncovers the model of knowledge that underlies these distinctively (...) views. What emerges is unfamiliar, yet closer to a contemporary conception of scientific understanding than ordinary knowledge. (shrink)
  44.  47
    In Praise of the Mere Presence of Ignorance.Danielle A. Layne - 2009 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:253-267.
    With regard to the theme “Reason in context,” the following stimulates a discussion on both Plato’s Socrates and the culpability of ignorance. By focusingon Plato’s Lysis, Alcibiades I, Philebus, and the Laws, I debunk the typical interpretation of Socratic moral intellectualism by evidencing that though there are various forms of ignorance in the Platonic dialogues, only one leads to shame-worthy error. Furthermore, in this endeavour to understand the “hierarchy” of ignorance in Plato, I take an unusual (...)
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  45.  43
    Refutation and Double Ignorance in Proclus.Danielle A. Layne - 2009 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):347-362.
    Regardless of the inconsistencies between Plato and his inheritors, the late neo-Platonist Proclus offers poignant answers to several contemporary debatesimbedded in Socratic scholarship. In the following, we will concentrate on Proclus’s interpretation of the Socratic elenchos and the provocative concept of double ignorance by clarifying their appearance in The Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and The Commentary on the Alcibiades I. In this endeavor we shall unpack how Proclus characterizes the elenchos as an authentic dialectic purifying its recipients (...)
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  46. Kierkegaard's Socratic Task.Paul Muench - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) conceived of himself as the Socrates of nineteenth century Copenhagen. Having devoted the bulk of his first major work, *The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates*, to the problem of the historical Socrates, Kierkegaard maintained at the end of his life that it is to Socrates that we must turn if we are to understand his own philosophical undertaking: "The only analogy I have before me is Socrates; my task is a (...) task." The overall aim of my dissertation is to examine and critically assess this claim, and ultimately to argue that the Socratic nature of Kierkegaard's endeavor finds its fullest expression in the activity and writings of one of his best-known literary creations, Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of *Philosophical Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. The first part of my dissertation addresses Kierkegaard's own status as a Socratic figure. I examine Kierkegaard's claim that his refusal to call himself a Christian--in a context where it was the social norm to do so--is methodologically analogous to Socrates' stance of ignorance. I also consider how the use of a pseudonymous manner of writing allows Kierkegaard to employ a Socratic method. In the second part of my dissertation I focus on Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus and his claim that his contemporaries suffer from a peculiar kind of ethical and religious forgetfulness. I argue that Climacus adopts two Socratic stances in order to address this condition. In *Philosophical Fragments* he adopts the stance of someone who has intentionally "forgotten" the phenomenon of Christianity, whereas in the *Postscript* he adopts the stance of someone who openly declares that he is not a Christian. In the process, he develops a conception of philosophy that places a premium on self-restraint and an individual's ability to employ the first personal "I." As Climacus emerges as Kierkegaard's Socratic pseudonym par excellence, we obtain two significant results: a deeper understanding of Kierkegaard's conception of Socrates and Socratic method, and a compelling conception of philosophy rooted in Greek antiquity. (shrink)
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  47.  33
    Dialectical Refutation as a Paradigm of Socratic Punishment.Michael J. Cholbi - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:371-379.
    Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance —is in (...)
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  48.  11
    Dialectical Refutation as a Paradigm of Socratic Punishment.Michael J. Cholbi - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:371-379.
    Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance—is in fact (...)
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  49.  6
    In Praise of the Mere Presence of Ignorance.Danielle A. Layne - 2009 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:253-267.
    With regard to the theme “Reason in context,” the following stimulates a discussion on both Plato’s Socrates and the culpability of ignorance. By focusingon Plato’s Lysis, Alcibiades I, Philebus, and the Laws, I debunk the typical interpretation of Socratic moral intellectualism by evidencing that though there are various forms of ignorance in the Platonic dialogues, only one leads to shame-worthy error. Furthermore, in this endeavour to understand the “hierarchy” of ignorance in Plato, I take an unusual (...)
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  50. Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato’s Early Dialogues.Hugh H. Benson - 1999 - Oxford University Press USA.
    While the early Platonic dialogues have often been explored and appreciated for their ethical content, this is the first book devoted solely to the epistemology of Plato's early dialogues. Author Hugh H. Benson argues that the characteristic features of these dialogues--Socrates' method of questions and answers, his fascination with definition, his professions of ignorance, and his thesis that virtue is knowledge--are decidedly epistemological. In this thoughtful study, Benson uncovers the model of knowledge that underlies these distinctively Socratic views. (...)
     
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