20 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Sofia Jeppsson [15]Sofia M. I. Jeppsson [5]
See also
Sofia M.I. Jeppsson
Umeå University
  1.  80
    Psychosis and Intelligibility.Sofia Jeppsson - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (3):233-249.
    When interacting with other people, we assume that they have their reasons for what they do and believe, and experience recognizable feelings and emotions. When people act from weakness of will or are otherwise irrational, what they do can still be comprehensible to us, since we know what it is like to fall for temptation and act against one’s better judgment. Still, when someone’s experiences, feelings and way of thinking is vastly different from our own, understanding them becomes increasingly difficult. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  81
    Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Sofia Jeppsson - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1225-1240.
    It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the relevant ‘can’ is incompatibilist. In this paper, I argue that even if the first step of the argument for reason incompatibilism succeeds, the second (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3.  53
    Michael S. Moore: Mechanical Choices. The Responsibility of the Human Machine. [REVIEW]Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-4.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  58
    Accountability, Answerability, and Freedom.Sofia Jeppsson - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (4):681-705.
    It has been argued that we cannot be morally responsible in the sense required to deserve blame or punishment if the world is deterministic, but still morally responsible in the sense of being apt targets for moral criticism. Desert-entailing moral responsibility is supposed to be more freedom-demanding than other kinds of responsibility, since it justifies subjecting people to blame and punishments, is nonconsequentialist, and has been shown by thought experiments to be incompatible with determinism. In this paper, I will show (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5.  73
    The Agential Perspective: A Hard-Line Reply to the Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Sofia Jeppsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1935-1951.
    One of the most influential arguments against compatibilism is Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Professor Plum, the main character of the thought experiment, is manipulated into doing what he does; he therefore supposedly lacks moral responsibility for his action. Since he is arguably analogous to an ordinary agent under determinism, Pereboom concludes that ordinary determined agents lack moral responsibility as well. I offer a hard-line reply to this argument, that is, a reply which denies that this kind of manipulation is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  12
    Solving the Self-Illness Ambiguity: The Case for Construction Over Discovery.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-20.
    Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  40
    Irrational Option Exclusion.Sofia Jeppsson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):537-551.
    In this paper, I describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent who suffers from this problem does not merely fail to act on her best judgement – she fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I furthermore argue that this kind of irrationality is serious enough to undermine moral responsibility. I show that an agent suffering from this problem has compromised reasons-responsiveness, does not really express (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  33
    Responsibility Problems for Criminal Justice.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  9.  33
    Theories of Psychosis Versus: What It Is Like.Sofia Jeppsson - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (3):257-258.
    My response to Rashed's critique of my account as theorizing instead of showing what it is like.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  28
    Retributivism and Uncertainty : Why Do We Punish Criminals?Sofia Jeppsson - 2021 - Daily Philosophy (18).
    Published on Daily Philosophy 2021-10-18 Why do we have a criminal justice system? What could possibly justify the state punishing its citizens? Philosophers, scholars of law, politicians and others have proposed different justifications, one of them being retributivism: the view that we ought to give offenders the suffering that they deserve for harming others. However, intentionally harming other people and making them suffer is serious business. If we are to do this in the name of what’s right and good, we (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  38
    Ciurria and Strawson : How Deep is the Divide.Sofia Jeppsson - forthcoming - Syndicate Philosophy.
    In this book symposium text, I focus on Ciurria’s critique of P. F. Strawson’s incredibly influential paper “Freedom and Resentment”, and more generally present-day Strawsonians about moral responsibility. Ciurria rightfully argues that the picture painted of “our responsibility practices” is highly idealized; it ignores crucial power asymmetries and oppression. I agree with this. However, it seems to me that Ciurria sometimes lacks awareness of exactly how profound the disagreement between her and Strawson and his followers is.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  91
    Purebred Dogs and Canine Wellbeing.Sofia Jeppsson - 2014 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 27 (3):417-430.
    Breeders of purebred dogs usually have several goals they want to accomplish, of which canine wellbeing is one. The purpose of this article is to investigate what we ought to do given this goal. Breeders typically think that they fulfil their wellbeing-related duties by doing the best they can within their breed of choice. However, it is true of most breeders that they could produce physically and mentally healthier dogs if they switched to a healthier breed. There are a few (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  28
    Obesity and Obligation.Sofia Jeppsson - 2015 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (1):89-110.
    The belief that obese people ought to lose weight and keep it off is widespread, and has a profound negative impact on the lives of the obese. I argue in this paper that most obese people have no such obligation, even if obesity is bad, and caused by calorie input exceeding output. Obese people do not have an obligation to achieve long-term weight loss if this is impossible for them, is worse than the alternative, or requires such an enormous effort (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  17
    A Coherent and Comprehensible Interpretation of Saul Smilansky’s Dualism.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2015 - Filosofiska Notiser 2 (1):39-45.
    Saul Smilansky’s theory of free will and moral responsibility consists of two parts; dualism and illusionism. Dualism is the thesis that both compatibilism and hard determinism are partly true, and has puzzled many philosophers. I argue that Smilansky’s dualism can be given an unquestionably coherent and comprehensible interpretation if we reformulate it in terms of pro tanto reasons. Dualism so understood is the thesis that respect for persons gives us pro tanto reasons to blame wrongdoers, and also pro tanto reasons (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  2
    Practical Perspective Compatibilism.Sofia Jeppsson - 2012 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions. The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  2
    Solving the Self-Illness Ambiguity: The Case for Construction Over Discovery.Sofia Jeppsson - 2022 - Tandf: Philosophical Explorations:1-20.
    Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are–their selves–and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which belongs to the mental (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  43
    Retributivism, Justification and Credence: The Epistemic Argument Revisited.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):177-190.
    Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified under the circumstances, we ought not to do it. In this paper, I argue that we ought to dismantle harsh retributivist criminal justice systems for this reason; we cannot be sufficiently certain that the harm is justified. Gregg Caruso, Ben Vilhauer and others have previously argued for the same conclusion; however, my own version sidesteps certain controversial premises of theirs. Harsh retributivist criminal (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  59
    Flourishing Dogs: The Case for an Individualized Conception of Welfare and Its Implications.Sofia Jeppsson - 2016 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (3):425-438.
    Martha Nussbaum argues that animals are entitled to a flourishing life according to the norm for their species. Nussbaum furthermore suggests that in the case of dogs, breed norms as well as species norms are relevant. Her theses capture both common intuitions among laypeople according to which there is something wrong with the breeding of “unnatural” animals, or animals that are too different from their wild ancestors, and the dog enthusiast’s belief that dogs departing from the norms for their breed (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  38
    Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life. [REVIEW]Sofia Jeppsson - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):241-244.
    Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 219) follows quite closely in the steps of his Living Without Free Will (2001). Pereboom argues for “hard incompatibilism” in both – the thesis that regardless of whether determinism is true, the kind of free will required for desert-entailing moral responsibility is unlikely to exist. In Free Will…, however, he pays more attention to issues other than moral responsibility. This, I think, is a great strength (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  25
    Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism.Sofia Jeppsson - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):793-808.
    There are powerful arguments for free will scepticism. However, it seems obvious that some of our actions are done of our own free will. It has been argued that we can solve this puzzle by giving ‘free’ a contextualist analysis. In everyday contexts we are often allowed to ignore sceptical arguments, and can truly say that we acted freely. In the more demanding context of philosophy, it is true that we never do anything freely. Our freedom is elusive; it escapes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark