5 found
  1. Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion.Sophie C. Gibb - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (2):205-221.
    Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  2.  73
    The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization.Sophie C. Gibb - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):551-566.
    Proponents of the subset account of property realization commonly make the assumption that the summing of properties entails the summing of their forward-looking causal features. This paper seeks to establish that this assumption is false. Moreover, it aims to demonstrate that without this assumption the fact that the subset account captures an entailment relation?which it must if it is to be of any use to non-reductive physicalism?becomes questionable.
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3.  31
    Space, Supervenence and Entailment.Sophie C. Gibb - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (2):171-184.
    Le Poidevin has recently presented an argument that gives rise to a serious problem for relationist theories of space. It appeals to the simple geometrical fact that if A, B and C are three points lying in a straight line, then AB and BC together entail AC. He suggests that an ontological relationship of supervenience must be appealed to to explain this entailment. Given this thesis of supervenience, relationism is implausible. I argue that the problem that Le Poidevin raises for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4.  4
    Physical Determinability.Sophie C. Gibb - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (29).
    I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifically, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. The distinction that I make between causes and enabling (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  44
    The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Subtraction of Powers.Sophie C. Gibb - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):127-146.
    According to one popular criterion of property identity, where X and Y are properties, X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y bestow the same conditional powers on their bearers. In this paper, I argue that this causal criterion of property identity is unsatisfactory, because it fails to provide a sufficient condition for the identification of properties. My argument for this claim is based on the observation that the summing of properties does not entail the summing (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation