Ideas about soul and body – about thinking or remembering, mind and life, brain and self – remain both diverse and controversial in our neurocentric age. The history of these ideas is significant both in its own right and to aid our understanding of the complex sources and nature of our concepts of mind, cognition, and psychology, which are all terms with puzzling, difficult histories. These topics are not the domain of specialists alone, and studies of emotion, perception, (...) or reasoning have never been isolated theoretical endeavours. As Francis Bacon described human philosophy or ‘the knowledge of ourselves’, within which he located the study of body, soul, and mind, it ‘deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly’ (1605/ 2000: 93). The history of ideas in these domains is particularly challenging given the practical dimensions and implications of theories of mind. Because theories of human nature and debates about body and mind do ‘touch us’ so ‘nearly’, they attract and can thus reveal, in specific historical contexts, interconnected discourses or associations which may be quite unlike our own. So there are no neat boundaries around a historical category of ‘seventeenth-century British philosophy of the soul’. The central topic of this chapter can be thought of either as pneumatology, the doctrine or science of spirits and souls, or as continuous with the ‘psychologia’ or psychology of Aristotelian traditions (Park and Kessler 1988; Hatfield 1995: 184-6). In neither case, however, should we expect any deep unity to be provided by history, geography, discipline, or subject-matter. (shrink)

Paper given at the 20th Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America, University of South Carolina, October 24-26, 2008 -/- The local problem of the soul-body relation can be grasped only against the global background of the relation between Nature and Spirit. This relates to Hegel's naturalism: the idea that there is one single reality - living reality - and different levels of description of it. This implies, moreover, that it is possible to ascribe some form of (...) naturality also to the social body of institutionalized ethical life. Hegel’s position can thus be characterised as a kind of aristotelian social naturalism: this, at bottom, is the combined meaning of the Hegelian theses that soul is the substance of Spirit, and habit its universal form. (shrink)

Although they are often grouped together in comparison with non-dualist theories, Plato's soul-body dualism, and Descartes' mind-body dualism, are fundamentally different. The doctrines examined are those of the Phaedo and the Meditations. The main difference, from which others flow, lies in Plato's acceptance and Descartes' rejection of the assumption that the soul (= intellect) is identical with what animates the body.

This second set of papers by John Rist is concerned with attempts by (mostly pagan) thinkers in Greco-Roman antiquity to understand the nature of morality against a background of wide-ranging debate about the relationship between soul and body and the necessity for a correct psychology and physiology if the 'good life for man' is to be revealed. Three papers are on Plato, whose elaborate mix of ethics, psychology and metaphysics sets the stage for most of the debate; one (...) is on Aristotle, five are on the Stoics and five on Plotinus. A further study deals with the general problem of the relationship between ethics, cosmology and biology, and the series concludes with the crisis among both pagans and Christians in late antiquity over whether man is naturally good enough to correct his own moral weakness. The set of difficulties recognised by Plato has now found a disturbing conclusion. (shrink)

This book examines the nexus between the corporeal, emotional, spiritual and intellectual aspects of human life as represented in the writing of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Authors from different fields examine not only the question of the body and soul (or body and mind) but also how this question fits into a broader framework in the medieval and early modern period. Concepts such as gender and society, morality, sexuality, theological precepts and medical knowledge are a (...) part of this broader framework. This discussion of ideas draws from over two thousand years of Western thought: from Plato in the fifth century BC and the fourth century Byzantine dialogues on the soul, to the philosophical and medical writings of the early 1700s. There are four sections to this book: each section is based on where the authors have found a conjunction between the body and mind/soul. The work begins with a section on text and self-perception, which focuses on creative output from the period. The second conjunction is human emotions which are described in their social contexts. The third is sex, where the human body and mind are traditionally believed to meet. The fourth section, Material Souls, engages with bodies and other material aspects of existence perceived, studied or utilised as material signs of emotional and spiritual activity. (shrink)

Plato's reflection on the relationship between soul and body has attracted scholars' attention since antiquity. Less noted, but worthy of consideration, is Plato's thought on music and its effects on human beings. This book adopts an innovative approach towards analysing the soul-body problem by uncovering and emphasising the philosophical value of Plato's treatment of the phenomenon of music. By investigating in detail how Plato conceives of the musical experience and its influence on intelligence, passions and perceptions, (...) it illuminates the intersection of cognitive and emotional functions in Plato's philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Plato's reflection on the relationship between soul and body has attracted scholars' attention since antiquity. Less noted, but worthy of consideration, is Plato's thought on music and its effects on human beings. This book adopts an innovative approach towards analysing the soul-body problem by uncovering and emphasising the philosophical value of Plato's treatment of the phenomenon of music. By investigating in detail how Plato conceives of the musical experience and its influence on intelligence, passions and perceptions, (...) it illuminates the intersection of cognitive and emotional functions in Plato's philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Thomistic dualism, based on the Aristotelian view of the soul as the form of the body, presents us with a conception of the person as part of the natural world in a way that deserves our attention. The view is outlined, following Eleonore Stump’s exposition, and some objections to it are noted. Consideration is then given to a modified version of Thomistic dualism developed by J. P. Moreland. Finally, attention is directed at the theory of “emergent dualism,” which (...) obtains many of the benefits aimed at by the Thomistic view without its drawbacks. (shrink)

Body, Soul and Cyberspace explores how recent science-fiction cinema addresses questions about the connections between body and soul, virtuality, and the ways in which we engage with spirituality in the digital age. The book investigates notions of love, life and death, taking an interdisciplinary approach by combining cinematic themes with religious, philosophical and ethical ideas. Magerstädt argues how even the most spectacle-driven mainstream films such as Avatar, The Matrix and Terminator can raise interesting and important questions (...) about the human self and our interaction with the world. Apart from these well-known science fiction epics, her analysis also draws on recent works, such as Inception, The Thirteenth Floor, eXistenZ, Aeon Flux, Total Recall (2012), Transcendence and TRON: Legacy. These films stimulate an engaging discussion on what makes us human, the role memory plays in understanding ourselves, and how virtual realities challenge the moral concepts that govern human relationships. (shrink)

This book makes accessible, to a wide audience, the thought of Evagrius and Gregory on the soul, in the context of ancient philosophy/theology and the Cappadocians generally. Corrigan argues that in these two figures we witness the birth of new forms of thought and of empirical science in a new key. Evagrius and Gregory are no mere receivers of a monolithic pagan and Christian tradition, but innovative, critical interpreters on the range and limits of cognitive psychology, the soul- (...) class='Hi'>body relation, reflexive self-knowledge, personal and human identity and the soul's practical relation to goodness in the context of human experience and divine self-disclosure. This book provides a critical evaluation of their thought on these major issues and argues that in Evagrius and Gregory we see the important integration of many different concerns that later Christian thought was not always able to balance including: mysticism, asceticism, cognitive science, philosophy, and theology. (shrink)

Millions of us increasingly seek happiness in fads and self-help books, reaching upward every day toward some enlightened state that we wish to attain. Surfing icon Laird Hamilton is more intent on looking inward and appreciating the brilliant creatures we already are. In Liferider, Laird uses five key pillars-Death & Fear, Heart, Body, Soul, and Everything Is Connected-to illustrate his unique worldview and life practices, offering inspiration to anyone who wants to elevate their ordinary, landlocked lives to do (...) extraordinary things. This is Laird Hamilton in his own words--raw, honest, and unvarnished--on topics he has rarely explored before. Based on extensive interviews and conversations between Laird and his coauthor, Julian Borra, with additional insights from Laird's wife, pro-volleyball player Gabby Reece, Liferider takes on human resilience, relationships, business, technology, risk-taking, and the importance of respecting the natural world, all through the lens of Laird's extraordinary life both in and beyond the ocean. (shrink)

In this book noted theologian and ethicist Gilbert C. Meilaender examines how the field of bioethics has developed over the last quarter century and reconsiders some of its central concepts and arguments. Because the literature of bioethics has become increasingly less influenced by religious and theological concerns over the past three decades, it is Meilaender's specific aim to uncover and recapture the importance of theological reflection for current debates in bioethics. Meilaender suggests that the development of bioethics as a discipline (...) in its own right has not been entirely benign. He argues that an increasing focus on public policy has obscured the importance of background beliefs about human nature and destiny, and that without drawing attention to those beliefs one cannot fully see what is at stake in many bioethical debates. Rather than seeking a minimalist consensus, Meilaender explores ethical problems surrounding the end and beginning of life in order to uncover the "soul"-that is, some of the deeper issues within bioethics that need our attention. Abortion, the issue that so often lurks just beneath the surface of bioethical argument, is discussed in the final chapter. Throughout the book Meilaender emphasizes the "soul" of all these issues -questions about who we are and what we may become, and suggests that recapturing that soul will lead us to a new appreciation of the living body as the locus of personal presence. Ethicists, theologians, and bioethicists will appreciate Body, Soul, and Bioethics for redirecting bioethical discussion away from its current focus on public policy back toward questions of metaphysical and religious significance. (shrink)

(1999). Princess Elizabeth and Descartes: The union of soul and body and the practice of philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 503-520. doi: 10.1080/09608789908571042.

The author argues for the reductive interpretation of Descartes’ notion of the substantial union of soul and body, according to which the union is reduced to causal interactions. The opponents countered the reductive approach with the claims that Descartes (1) attributed sensations to the union rather than the soul; (2) held that the soul is the substantial form of the body; (3) identified some special conditions of the human body’s self-identity. In the article, the (...) case is made that (a) these claims lack clear textual evidence: if their context is properly considered, Descartes’ corresponding statements are consistent with the reductive interpretation; (b) they do not give proper weight to other Descartes’ statements (in particular, his numerous unambiguous statements that sensations are the soul’s states). The author argues that the reductive interpretation is consistent with other Descartes’ statements to which its opponents appeal - that sensations arise from the union of mind and body and that the causal interactions between the soul and the body are explained with the reference to their union. The consistency is achieved if we interpret these statements in the sense that the enduring union between a soul and a body is an ontological prerequisite and, hence, an explanation, of all interactions between the soul and the body and their effects (such as sensations): these interactions and effects would not take place without the union between this particular soul and this particular body. Such explanation is similar to the explanation of certain natural events by the laws of nature: just as the gist of a law of nature can be reduced to a set of causal dispositions, so the content of the notion of the union can be reduced to the emergence and maintenance of a set of causal dispositions between a certain soul and a certain body. (shrink)

Aristotle's definition of the soul should be interpreted as: 'the soul is the entelechy of a natural body that serves as its instrument'.

How an abstract immaterial being is connected to a physical thing has been viewed variously by western philosophers who considered the issue prior to their Muslim counterparts.Muslim theologians and philosophers, however, developed the related discussions which became heated following the translation of logical books and essays throughout the Translation Era.The focus of this article, besides clarifying the ideas raised by Muslim philosophers in this regard,is to shed light on Mulla Sadra's opinion and its influence on the later philosophers, Abd-ul-Razzaq Lahiji (...) in particular.To explain his opinion,Mulla Sadra primarily brings a proof to establish the unity of the soul,and to prove this,he has refuted the reasons used by the opposing philosophers through negation and affirmation.Using negation,he comments on why there can't be a unity of soul, and then refers to his opponent's inability to distinguish between specific unity and generic unity considering the latter equal to vegetable,animal and human spirits.Soul and body,Mulla Sadra reiterates,are attached to each other in two ways; in one way,soul is attached to body and yet it is contingent on itself and not on the person's being; in the other way,soul is attached to body while the person's potentialities are actualized; this second type of attachment relates to obtaining existential virtues.It must be noted that Mulla Sadra's belief in these two types of attachment results from his belief in the trans-substantial motion in which soul is also involved.Mulla Sadra works out a solution to the question of relation between soul and body and their effects on one another by proposing the mediation of a veiled spirit, since the soul which belongs to a world of pure light does not involve itself directly in the affairs of the dark body. The veiled spirit is as subtle as the non-material soul and as corporeal as it needs in connectionwith body.This view has been argued by Allameh Tabatabii who thinks corporeal qualities and ontological status must be kept separated and not be mixed.Lahiji,on the other hand, seems to have accepted Mulla Sadra's idea looking at it as a philosophical question,not a medical case. He,like Mulla Sadra, while considering unity for soul, thinks of it as having properties such as sensation imagination estimation intellection. According to Lahiji,the unity of soul and body is like the unity of matter and form; however,unlike natural forms,it does not subsist in matter and interestingly,this notion resembles Neo-Platonist views. (shrink)

For the mature Leibniz, a living being is a created substance composed of an infinitely complex organic body and a simple, immaterial soul. Soul and body do not interact directly, but rather their states correspond according to a harmony preestablished by God. I show that Leibniz’s theory faces challenges with respect to the question of whether substances need to possess knowledge of how they bring about their effects, and I argue that, to address these challenges, Leibniz (...) turns to a concept of “divine preformation” that he attributes to both soul and body. Insofar as divine preformation provides Leibniz with an explanation for how soul and body can both act without possessing explicit knowledge of what they are doing, it serves as a key tool for justifying the theory of preestablished harmony. (shrink)

Aristotelian scholars tend to reject the Cartesian dualism as applied to Aristotelian model of the soul, and favor the view that denies that the soul is radically opposed to body. This is so due the fact that Aristotle takes the living being to be a unified whole. I start by reminding that both Plato and Aristotle argue that by their very nature soul and body are different, but at the same time they maintain that there (...) are things that are ‘common’ to soul and body. The issue is how it is possible that two entities so different in nature have something in common. I argue that the key to the problem lies in the fact that both Plato and Aristotle regard the soul and the body as capacities, and that – in so far as they are able to act and to be acted upon – such is the ‘commonality’ shared both by soul and body. Given that capacities are relational entities, both of them turn out to be very plastic notions that should not necessarily be understood as entirely foreign to each other. (shrink)

This issue was discussed with regard to chosen commentaries to Aristotle’s treatise De anima, formed in the so-called via moderna mainstream, in particular those of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Laurentius of Lindores. In such a context, the Cracovian commentaries referring to Parisian nominalists were presented by those of Benedict Hesse and Anonymus. The analyses carried out above allow one to ascertain that although William of Ockham’s opinion questioning the possibility of knowledge of the soul in the field of (...) philosophy, nominalists of the late Middle Ages did not resign from speculation on the beginning and the separation from the body of the soul, also the fate of the soul after death. They focused on the nature of the matter – human body and his relation with the soul – in the moment of birth. In the aspect of death 14th century scholars undertook the struggle, which was one with the justification of the psycho-physical unity of the human being existing after death solely as an immortal soul. In both thems, they tried to find their solutions, while if they could not solve these aporeticals questions – they had the courage to admit, that is not possible by solely relying on the natural forces of reason. They had to refer to the teaching of christianity, without however falling prey to fideism. This was a methodical endeavour based on the experience that natural reason in searching for the truth is not capable of its own efforts to attain to certain concepts and might on occasion err, it is then that faith becomes its guide and supplies it with more acceptable solutions. This is the courage of one of the greatest philosophers – Plato, who said that you have to have this “great courage” to undertake only probable knowledge, when another is not possible. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of the object of psychology in the context of recent attempts in philosophy of mind to restore the concept of the soul in the framework of a strong anthropological dualism. After an historical and philosophical explanation of the modern dismissal of the human soul as the object of psychology, this article provides a critical examination of the new turn to dualism by reference to an exemplary case. It is shown that apriorism and spiritualism (...) are the two fundamental problems that explain neodualism’s inefficacy to provide a convincing argument for the restoration of the substantial soul as the object of psychology. Finally, certain guidelines for a new approach to this question are proposed in rudimentary form. (shrink)

I approach the subject of artistic interpretation through art, letting philosophical questions arise from the complexities of the individual cases and thus allowing a thornier but more interesting picture of interpretation to emerge. This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which explores interpretation via a work in a different artistic medium, and an afterword which treats interpretation more directly. "Bodies: Self-Mutilation, Interpretation, and Controversial Art" deals with the performance artist, Stelarc, who hung himself over a New York intersection by (...) fish hooks piercing his skin. To understand the response that there is something offensive about such art, I consider the notions of humiliation and demeaning treatment, starting with the work of Gabriele Taylor. I offer an interpretation of Stelarc's performance to show that it is not necessarily demeaning, and that how we judge a work morally is inextricably related to how we interpret it. In "Souls: Theatricality in Bouts' Last Supper Painting" I consider the intense theatricality of Dirk Bouts' Last Supper altarpiece. Contrasting my view of theatricality with that of Michael Fried, I present a reading of the Bouts painting that shows how we can learn from ahistorical interpretations of works of art. "Ordinary People: Trio A and How Dances Signify" takes up the pedestrian dances of the 1960's in order to ask how dances achieve signification. Building on the groundwork of Nelson Goodman, I conclude that works like Yvonne Rainer's Trio A signify through representation, not by straightforward exemplification. In my Afterword, I consider the stance we should have as interpreters of works of art, and contrast it with the stances with which we approach propaganda and pornography. In interpreting art, we navigate between freedom and constraint. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that we have got a mind-body problem? Do we need to think of our inner and outer lives as two separate items between which business must somehow be transacted, rather than as aspects of a whole person?

What does it mean to say that we have got a mind-body problem? Do we need to think of our inner and outer lives as two separate items between which business must somehow be transacted, rather than as aspects of a whole person?