In this work, we question the ability of existing ranking-based semantics to capture persuasion settings, emphasising in particular the phenomena of procatalepsis (the fact that it is often efficient to anticipate the counter-arguments of the audience) and of fading (the fact that long lines of argumentation become ineffective). Some widely accepted principles of ranking-based semantics (like Void Precedence) are incompatible with a faithful treatment of these phenomena, which means that no existing ranking-based semantics can capture these two principles together. This (...) motivates us to introduce a new parametrized ranking-based semantics based on the notion of propagation which extends the existing propagation semantics (In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Computational Models of Argument (COMMA’16) (2016) 139–150) by adding an additional parameter allowing us to gradually decrease the impact of arguments when the length of the path between two arguments increases. We show that this parameter gives the possibility of choosing if one wants to satisfy the property Void Precedence or not (and then capture procatalepsis) and to control the scope of the impact of the arguments (and then to capture fading principle). We also propose an experiment to show that the new semantics remains stable when this parameter varies and an axiomatic evaluation to compare it with existing ranking-based semantics in the literature. (shrink)

Structured argumentation formalisms, such as ASPIC +, offer a formal model of defeasible reasoning. Usually such formalisms are highly parametrized and modular in order to provide a unifying framework in which different forms of reasoning can be expressed. This generality comes at the price that, in their most general form, formalisms such as ASPIC + do not satisfy important rationality postulates, such as non-interference. Similarly, links to other forms of knowledge representation, such as reasoning with maximal consistent sets of rules, (...) are insufficiently studied for ASPIC + although such links have been established for other, less complex forms of structured argumentation where defeasible rules are absent. Clearly, for a formal model of defeasible reasoning it is important to understand for which range of parameters the formalism (a) displays a behavior that adheres to common standards of consistency, logical closure and logical relevance and (b) can be adequately described in terms of other well-known forms of knowledge representation. In this paper we answer this question positively for a fragment of ASPIC + without the attack form undercut by showing that it satisfies all standard rationality postulates of structured argumentation under stable and preferred semantics and is adequate for reasoning with maximal consistent sets of defeasible rules. The study is general in that we do not impose any other requirements on the strict rules than to be contrapositable and propositional and in that we also consider priorities among defeasible rules, as long as they are ordered by a total preorder and lifted by weakest link. In this way we generalize previous similar results for other structured argumentation frameworks and so shed further light on the close relations between assumption-based argumentation and ASPIC +. (shrink)

This paper investigates when two abstract logic-based argumentation systems are equivalent. It defines various equivalence criteria, investigates the links between them, and identifies cases where two systems are equivalent with respect to each of the proposed criteria. In particular, it shows that under some reasonable conditions on the logic underlying an argumentation system, the latter has an equivalent finite subsystem, called core. This core constitutes a threshold under which arguments of the system have not yet attained their final status and (...) consequently adding a new argument may result in status change. From that threshold, the statuses of all arguments become stable. (shrink)

Argumentation has been an important topic in knowledge representation, reasoning and multi-agent systems during the last twenty years. In this paper, we propose a new abstract framework where arguments are associated with a strength, namely a quantitative information which is used to determine whether an attack between arguments succeeds or not. Our Strength-based Argumentation Framework (StrAF) combines ideas of Preference-based and Weighted Argumentation Frameworks in an original way, which permits to define acceptability semantics sensitive to the existence of accruals between (...) arguments. The question of accruals arises in situations where several arguments defending the same position (but from different points of view) against another argument are unable to individually defeat this argument, but could do it collectively if they combine their strengths. We investigate some of the theoretical and computational properties of our new framework and semantics, and present a reasoning algorithm that is based on a translation of the problem into pseudo-boolean constraint satisfaction. This paper proposes an intuitive framework which allows strength compensations in an argumentation context where attacks may not succeed, completed by an approach which detects accruals throughout the reasoning process without requiring the elicitation of all compensatory combinations of arguments as an input. (shrink)

This work formalizes an informant-based structured argumentation approach in a multi-agent setting, where the knowledge base of an agent may include information provided by other agents, and each piece of knowledge comes attached with its informant. In that way, arguments are associated with the set of informants corresponding to the information they are built upon. Our approach proposes an informant-based notion of argument strength, where the strength of an argument is determined by the credibility of its informant agents. Moreover, we (...) consider that the strength of an argument is not absolute, but it is relative to the resolution of the conflicts the argument is involved in. In other words, the strength of an argument may vary from one context to another, as it will be determined by comparison to its attacking arguments (respectively, the arguments it attacks). Finally, we equip agents with the means to express reasons for or against the consideration of any piece of information provided by a given informant agent. Consequently, we allow agents to argue about the arguments’ strength through the construction of arguments that challenge (respectively, defeat) or are in favour of their informant agents. (shrink)

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.