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  1.  31
    Are Emotions Evaluative Modes?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):271-292.
    Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former case, the Attitudinal View threatens (...)
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  2.  94
    Are Emotions Perceptions of Value?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.
    A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...)
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  3.  26
    Norms for Emotions: Intrinsic or Extrinsic.Stéphane Lemaire - 2014 - Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    It is often suggested that emotions are intrinsically normative or that they have conditions of correctness that are intrinsic. In order to assess this thesis, I consider whether the main argument in favor of the normativity of belief can be transposed to emotions. In the case of belief, the argument is that when we wonder whether to believe that p, we acknowledge that we must abide by some norms. This is understood as showing that these norms are intrinsic to the (...)
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  4.  3
    Sur la phénoménologie évaluative et le caractère approprié des émotions.Stéphane Lemaire - 2018 - Philosophiques 45 (2):489-498.
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  5. From Emotions to Desires.Stéphane Lemaire - 2002 - European Review of Philosophy 5:109-136.
    In this paper, I defend the view that our knowledge of our desires is inferential and based on the consciousness we have of our emotions, and on our experiences of pain and pleasure.
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  6.  62
    A Gate‐Based Account of Intentions.Stéphane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):45-67.
    In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, (...)
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  7.  8
    A Stringent but Critical Actualist Subjectivism About Well-Being.Stéphane Lemaire - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):133-150.
    Stéphane Lemaire | : Subjectivists about well-being claim that an object is good for someone if and only if this individual holds a certain type of pro-attitude toward this object. In this paper, I focus on the dispute among subjectivists that opposes those who think that the relevant pro-attitudes are actual to those who think that they are counterfactual under some idealized conditions. My main claim is that subjectivism should be stringently actualist, though our actual pro-attitudes may be criticized from (...)
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  8.  10
    Quand nos émotions sont-elles raisonnables?Stéphane Lemaire - 2016 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):215-234.
    Nous jugeons les réponses émotionnelles comme plus ou moins raisonnables étant donné leur objet et le contexte. Je soutiens que la légitimité de ces jugements repose sur le caractère raisonnable des désirs ou des dispositions émotionnelles qui expliquent ces réponses émotionnelles. Il est déraisonnable d’être triste de ne pas satisfaire un désir déraisonnable. Mais comment un désir peut-il être déraisonnable ? Je rejette l’idée selon laquelle les désirs seraient raisonnables parce que cohérents. Je suggère que nos désirs et nos dispositions (...)
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  9.  18
    The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons.Stephane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):31-53.
    ABSTRACT: Confronted with the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem, several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer (...)
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  10.  17
    Values and Value Judgments: New Perspectives.Stéphane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):1-6.
    Research Articles Stéphane Lemaire, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, FirstView Article.
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  11.  3
    L'aveu: nature, effets, et valeur.Stéphane Lemaire - 2014 - In L'aveu: la vérité et ses effets. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes.
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  12.  4
    Les Désirs Et les Raisons.Stéphane Lemaire - 2008 - Vrin.
    Nous nous demandons souvent ce que nous aurions intérêt à faire ou ce que nous devrions faire, ce que les autres peuvent légitimement exiger de nous. Rien ne nous semble plus immédiat que cette réflexion sur nos désirs et nos devoirs. Pourtant, dès que l’on s’efforce de décrire les processus effectifs qui sont en jeu et les normes de rationalité ou morales qui pèsent sur cette réflexion, l’évidence s’évanouit. Comment connaissons-nous nos désirs? Qu’est-ce qui sous-tend nos jugements moraux? Quelle place (...)
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  13.  3
    L'aveu: la vérité et ses effets.Stéphane Lemaire (ed.) - 2014 - Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes.
    L’ambition de ce livre est de présenter les éléments d’une réévaluation de l’aveu. Introduit par une réflexion sur son usage contemporain dans le droit, il croise des approches philosophiques profondément distinctes si ce n’est opposées. La phénoménologie, la psychanalyse et la philosophie analytique sont autant d’éclairages sur ce phénomène multiforme.
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  14. métaéthique.Stéphane Lemaire - 2017 - L'Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    Dans cette introduction, je situe en premier lieu la métaéthique vis-à-vis des autres recherches qui s’intéressent à la morale. Je distingue pour commencer la métaéthique de l’éthique normative et des éthiques appliquées. Alors que ces dernières s’intéressent à ce que la morale nous demande de faire, la métaéthique est une interrogation de second ordre sur la nature de la morale, du discours moral et sur la possibilité de justifier des jugements moraux. Je distingue ensuite parmi ces questions de second ordre (...)
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  15. Values and Value Judgments: New Perspectives: Dialogue.Stéphane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):1-6.
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